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I.

HERBERT SPENCER,

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The death of Herbert Spencer with its flood of mementos, eulogistic and otherwise, call to my mind reminiscences from my early student days. Darwinism, as we called the whole evolutionary movement, was then the central topic of all serious discussions. I was scarcely more than eighteen years of age when our professor of German literature, aroused by the dangerous tendencies toward agnosticism so prevalent among the students in the gymnasium, gave us as a topic for our monthly essay Rueckert's noted epigram:

"Die Natur ist Gottes Buch!
Doch ohne Gottes Offenbarung
Misslingt daran der Leseversuch,
Den anstellt menschliche Erfahrung."

This was a rare opportunity for some of us to show the profundity of our wisdom and learning by attempting a thorough refutation of the great poet's statement. The result was somewhat disastrous to our conceit, but rather wholesome to our subsequent mode of thinking. We were made to feel

very keenly that we utterly lacked the essential quality of unbiased reasoning, having allowed ourselves to be captivated by a few brilliant deductions attached to the shiboleth of evolution and paraded before private circles of students by one of the overly enthusiastic members of the faculty. Fortunately the first German translation of Herbert Spencer's works had made its appearance only a few years before, in 1875, and had created a profound impression, although known only to a chosen few. To us immature seekers after truth Spencer's message came as a welcome solace in the midst of great distress. Current German philosophy, notably that of Schelling, was purely speculative, basing its deductions entirely upon the supposedly omniscient human mind and looking with disdain upon all the hard labor of modern science; wherever experimental results differed from *a priori* deductions the error was credited to the experimentalist. Kant's dictum that natural laws are laws of thought, *i. e.*, subjective interpretations of the manifoldness of natural phenomena, was reversed and laws of thought were interpreted as natural laws. His humble confession, that the absolute, *i. e.*, the objective essence of nature is unknowable was discarded and the metaphysicians loudly proclaimed that they indeed knew the unknowable, had discovered the undiscoverable, and comprehended the incomprehensible. But it was a pity, indeed, that each one had found a different solution, viz., Fichte the ego, Schelling the absolute identity of subject-object, Hegel the self-development of the logos, Herbert the reality of things, Schopenhauer the will, Hartman the unconscious, Lotze the monad and Fechner and Paulsen the universal soul. This dissension among the learned philosophers had driven many unconditionally into the extreme evolutionary camp, under the leadership of Ludwig Fuerbach, who held that God did not create man in His own image but men created their Gods in their own image. It was, therefore, exceedingly refreshing to most of us, when Herbert Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy appeared. It delightfully ignored the great German speculators and trans-

cedentialists emphasizing with Kant, that nature cannot be apprehended without experiment and concrete investigation. Moreover, with him man again became the measure of all things, but in a sense different from the Greek ideal, not above and separate from nature but as a part of nature. If—somewhat in his own words*—without knowledge of terrestrial phenomena and their laws Newton had attempted a theory of planetary and stellar equilibrium he might have cogitated to all eternity without result. Such an attempt, however, would have been far less absurd than to find out the principles of public polity by a direct examination of that wonderfully intricate combination—society. In order to understand society, it is necessary to comprehend man, the instrument by which and the material on which laws are to act. Over against Hegel who had glorified the blessings of absolute state rights Herbert Spencer asserted that civilization is a progress towards that constitution of man and society required for the complete manifestation of everyone's individuality. Applying his principle of individuation to all forms of life he clearly demonstrated that the present complex conditions of human society are the result of a struggle toward individuation that began millions of years ago in lower forms of life gradually becoming more complex, until it reached its completion in man. Here, then, we had more than mere speculation on the one hand and more than mere physicism on the other. It was a stupendous attempt not only at the unification of all knowledge, but especially at the explanation in terms of evolutionary science of the development which human society is undergoing and towards the elucidation of which development all work of science in lower fields should be preliminary. Here we also had an attempt at least at reconciliation between religion and science. In his discussion on the relativity of all knowledge, he asserts that "though the absolute cannot in any manner or degree be known, in the strict sense of knowing, yet we find that its positive existence is a

* "Social Statics," p. 13.

necessary datum of consciousness and that the belief which this datum constitutes has a higher warrant than any other whatever," and further, "we are obliged to regard every phenomenon as a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon; though omnipresence is unthinkable, yet, as experience discloses no bounds to the diffusion of phenomena, we are unable to think of limits to the presence of this Power; while the criticisms of science teach us that this Power is incomprehensible. And this consciousness of an incomprehensible Power called omnipresent from inability to assign its limits, is just that consciousness on which Religion dwells. In Religion let us recognize the high merit that from the beginning it has dimly discerned the ultimate verity, and has never ceased to insist upon it."*

Thus Herbert Spencer rendered invaluable service to the younger generation of students who directly came under the influence of the most radical school of evolutionists, seeking in despair ideals in the world of thought which materialism pure and simple could not furnish, but for which an enthusiastic youth was ever striving. It is with the full consciousness of this indebtedness that I venture upon the difficult task of rehearsing the life and work of Herbert Spencer.

Spencer's first book on "Social Statics," published in 1850, already pointed to a progress in human civilization according to definite natural laws as expressed, *e. g.*, in the now well known statement "we are alike taught, as the law of right social relationship, that every man has freedom to do all he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man."† Much more frequent does this tendency become in his "Principles of Psychology," published in 1855, in which he attempts to explain the complex phenomena of the human mind as the result of a progressive transformation of like nature with the progressive transformation traced in the universe as a whole no less than in each of its parts. If

* "First Principles," pp. 100, 101.

† "Social Statics," p. 55.

we study the development of the nervous system," he says, "we see it advancing in integration, in complexity, in definiteness. If we turn to its functions we find these similarly show an ever increasing inter-dependence, an augmentation in number and heterogeneity, and a greater precision."* The elements of thinking are neither more nor less than inherited and progressively developed experiences—here we have a mediation and synthesis of rationalism and empiricism not necessarily antagonistic to Kant's method though very different from it. We see how then already Spencer was seeking a universal formula which would cover the idea of evolution. He was sure of his ground, if evolution could only be established in the biological sphere. When this was accomplished by Darwin he was the first one to acknowledge his indebtedness to the sage of Down. But his own system had been fundamentally completed long before; "natural selection" was only its final confirmation. In an essay published in 1857 and entitled "Progress: its Law and Cause" Spencer gives us *his system in its germinal form, it may be called his formula which to him was the key to the history of the world*: "In respect to that progress which individual organisms display in the course of their evolution, this question has been answered by the Germans. The investigations of Wolff, Goethe and Von Baer have established the truth that the series of changes gone through during the development of a seed into a tree, or an ovum into an animal, constitute an advance from homogeneity of structure. In its primary stage, every germ consists of a substance that is uniform throughout, both in texture and chemical composition. The first step is the appearance of a difference between two parts of this substance or, as the phenomenon is called in physiological language, a differentiation. Each of these differentiated divisions presently begins itself to exhibit some contrast of parts; and by and by these differentiations become as definite as the original one. This process is continuously repeated—is

* "Principles of Psychology," I., p. 627.

simultaneously going on in all parts of the growing embryo; and by endless such differentiations there is finally produced that complex combination of tissues and organs constituting the adult animal or plant. This is the history of all organisms whatever. It is settled beyond dispute that organic progress consists in a change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous.

Now, we propose in the first place to show, that this law of organic process is the law of progress. Whether it be in the development of the earth, in the development of life upon its surface, in the development of society, of government, of manufactures, of commerce, of language, literature, science, art, this same evolution of the simple into the complex, through successive differentiations, holds throughout. From the earliest traceable cosmical changes down to the latest results of civilization, we shall find that the transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous is that in which progress essentially consists."

The young railroad engineer had gradually, through his participation in the discussion of the great scientific and philosophical questions, discovered his real calling. In March, 1860, when forty years of age, he published the plan of his life-work under the caption "A Prospectus of a System of Synthetic Philosophy." No publisher came forward to offer his services; poor in health and still poorer in purse, the young author never lost courage. He enjoyed the confidence of a small but distinguished circle of friends, yet relied much more on his own energy, his eminently practical mind, his enormous knowledge and penetrating, keen power of reasoning, and especially on his faith in the truth and importance of his deductions. The fundamental thoughts of this great work had already been published in a series of essays, the psychology even as a whole, attracting world-wide attention. What the first prospectus had promised in 1860 was faithfully carried out and completed in 1869 with the exception of the last part of sociology, which was to treat of the progress in language, in-

telleet, morals and æsthetics. But so very much not mentioned in the prospectus had been added that the work may be considered as complete, a marvelous undertaking, especially when we consider that the author was attacked by nervous prostration and forced to lay down his pen before even the first chapter of the first volume was finished.

In order to understand the arrangement of the work we must have some knowledge of his essay on "The Classification of the Sciences," published in 1854, in which he distinguishes three chief groups, viz., (1) the abstract science, dealing with the laws of forms of phenomena (logic and mathematics); (2) the abstract-concrete science, dealing with the laws of the elements of phenomena (mechanics, physics, chemistry, etc.); and (3) the concrete science, dealing with the laws of phenomena in their totalities (astronomy, geology, biology, psychology, sociology, etc.). The concrete sciences find their completion in the evolution of things from the lowest to the highest, from the concentration of sidereal nebular masses to the corporative actions of men.

The prospectus followed in the main this general classification, except that the application of the evolution-formula to inorganic phenomena such as the heavenly bodies and the earth was not systematically carried out, but merely outlined in its fundamental features in "First Principles." On the other hand, the author went beyond his original plan by adding as a closing part two volumes on the "Principles of Morality," later called "Principles of Ethics." It is very evident that the great philosopher was especially interested in this part of his work, which represents the logical conclusions of the principles of biology, psychology and sociology as "a theory of correct living." To him conduct is a product of evolution conditioned by a higher human type; absolute ethics is the presentation of individual conduct perfectly adjusted within a perfectly adjusted social state, or, in other words, the consideration of "the ideal man as existing in the ideal social state."* Ethics to him has a biological aspect, since it con-

* "Principles of Ethics," p. 280.

cerns certain effects, inner and outer, individual and social, of the vital changes going on in the highest type of animals. It has a psychological aspect in as much as its subject-matter is an aggregate of actions that are prompted by feelings and guided by intelligence; and it has a sociological aspect, since these actions, some directly and all indirectly, affect associated beings. Belonging under one aspect of each of these sciences—physical, biological, psychological, sociological—it can find its ultimate interpretations only in those fundamental truths which are common to all of them, as different aspects of evolving life.

To appreciate Spencer's system we must call to mind that every philosophical system is but the interpretation of the scientific consciousness of an age. The philosophies of Descartes, Newton, Spinoza and Leibnitz are largely mathematical in their character, because the ruling empirical science of their age was mathematics. Schelling's natural philosophy followed in the wake of the new sciences of physics, astronomy and chemistry, and when the accumulation of new discoveries in anatomy, embryology and physiology during the first half of the nineteenth century with ever increasing force pointed to the essential oneness of nature a new monistic philosophy was but the logical outcome of this movement. August Comte utilized the Lamarckian factor of environment and Herbert Spencer, the creator of the term evolution, those of Darwin. It was but the crowning event in that great movement that had begun with Copernicus, was continued by Newton, Kant and Lyell and finally completed by Charles Darwin. In full accord with it, Spencer distinctly declared that the unification of knowledge is *the* problem in philosophy, more particularly *his* problem. As a first attempt it is certainly gigantic in its proportions and far-reaching in its consequences. Whatever is weak in it—and this is not a little—is largely due to the primitive stage of development upon which empirical science to-day rests. Will it ever be possible to deduce a universal verification of the law of evolution from

a unification of knowledge? Some claim that Spencer's influence is already on the wane, but such influences have their fluctuations; we may just as confidently assert that Spencer's synthesis is only an early stage in the development of a final world view, endowed with the most favorable chances of surviving in the struggle for existence, retaining its essential principles and acquiring new and better ones as the world's day moves onward, more thoroughly adjusted to the conditions of the future.

Spencer's own life and thought suggests such an onward movement. The gradual development of his own "*formula to reduce all knowledge to a coherent whole*" confirms the claim. No one can appreciate the great philosopher's position unless he thoroughly understands his formula and its gradual growth in his mind. When we compare the various editions of "*First Principles*" from 1860 to 1900 we shall find that the fundamental idea has grown and branched out enormously, the sixth edition of 1900 deviating from all other issues in many additions and changes. The primary conception of evolution is differentiation, expressing the whole past and the whole future of each object and the aggregate of objects, the passage from the imperceptible to the perceptible and again from the perceptible to the imperceptible. Its counter conception is integration. When the relatively homogeneous becomes heterogeneous a division of parts takes place, *i. e.*, a differentiation of the whole; the parts in turn become themselves wholes, *i. e.*, they integrate. Gradually integration is more and more emphasized as the chief process involving concentration, *i. e.*, condensation of matter. Differentiation becomes secondary, not even necessarily connected with integration. Evolution under the primary aspect is illustrated most simply and clearly by the passage of the solar system from a nebular widely diffused incoherent state to a consolidated coherent state. But differentiation as a secondary process becomes more marked; in embryonic development distinct tissues take the place of matter that was diffused, having no recognizable

unlikeness of parts, and each of the tissues first produced undergoes secondary modifications, accompanied by division of labor, the tissues changing from independent like parts into mutually dependent unlike parts. But in order to prove that these processes are in accordance with law it was necessary to appeal to those terms of thought which universal experience has organized in us. A series of positions occupied in succession involves the conceptions of space, of time and of matter, and since these are severally elaborated from experiences of force a further synthesis of such experiences leads to the idea of motion, and since matter and motion, as we know them, are differently conditioned manifestations of force, and force is the ultimate of ultimates, the final disclosure of analysis, we are at once face to face with the universal truths, that matter is indestructible, motion continuous and force persistent. Deductions drawn from them show us that force is transformable and that between its correlates there exist quantitative equivalences, belonging to all divisions of nature and pointing to all existence as constant change. The problem before Spencer was to find, in harmony with these *a priori laws* a universal law applicable to the changes of *concrete objects and its aggregates*. Every object is either in the process of growth or decay; the former implies an increase in its mass, the latter a decrease; the one involves a dissipation of motion, the other an absorption. The law to be sought must be the law of the continuous redistribution of matter and motion, the question to be answered is—What dynamic principle, true of the metamorphosis as a whole and in its details, expresses these ever-changing relations. If, then, hitherto integration had been laid down as the chief principle of evolution the definition now assumed a broader scope, viz., “the change from a diffused imperceptible stage to a concentrated perceptible stage is an integration of matter and concomitant classification of motion; and the change from a concentrated perceptible state to a diffused imperceptible state is an absorption of motion and concomitant disintegration of matter.”* “The processes every-

* “First Principles,” p. 295.

where in antagonism and everywhere gaining now a temporary and now a more or less permanent triumph the one over the other we call evolution and dissolution.* But evolution means in almost all cases far more than integration of matter and dissipation of motion; progressive complications take place both of motion and of matter, culminating in the one case in organic function and in the other in organic structure, simple evolution becomes compound evolution, centering ultimately in one single evolution or metamorphosis of the cosmos.

Spencer next asks the question: "Is this law ultimate or derivative? Is it possible to ascertain *why* such is the course of transformation? Can the preceding inductions be reduced to deductions? Unless we succeed in finding a *rationale* of this universal metamorphosis, we obviously fall short of that completely unified knowledge constituting philosophy." The phenomena of evolution have to be deduced from the persistence of force. This is done by showing at length that the homogeneous is *unstable*, that all effects of forces have a tendency to multiply, that unlike units, or groups of units, segregate into minor aggregates, each consisting of units that are severally like each other and unlike those of the other minor aggregates, and that finally all these processes tend towards a state of equilibration, exemplified by all kinds of evolution—by the formation of celestial bodies, by the molding of the earth's crust, by organic modifications, by the establishment of mental distinctions, by the genesis of social divisions. Finally, when evolution has run its course, when it has reached that equilibrium in which its changes end, the period must at last come when, either alone or in company with surrounding aggregates, it has its parts dispersed, and the process of dissolution sets in which forms the complement of evolution and which inevitably at some time or other undoes what evolution has done. Here it seems to me lies the great weakness of Herbert Spencer's system; the idea of dissolution ap-

* *Ibid.*, p. 295.

pears somewhat as an afterthought, its aspects are left undeveloped, it only occurred to the great thinker after his formula was practically completed; he, therefore, does not dwell long on dissolution, which to him has none of those various and interesting aspects which evolution presents. This is true perhaps of the cosmic system of which both evolution and dissolution must in the nature of the case remain purely speculative, but when referred to the three great spheres of life, mind and social culture, to which the specific works of Spencer are devoted, we certainly find as much concrete material open to observation in the process of dissolution as we do in that of evolution. But Spencer's thinking was so thoroughly controlled by the one view of the ascending series of living phenomena as closely connected with the gradual cooling of the earth's crust, that the phenomena of dissolution and decay were to him only subordinate, and especially so since they serve higher positive purposes belonging, as he says, to that indefinite consciousness of existence transcending relations which forms the essence of religion—and yet his starting point, the persistence of force, necessarily implies the same secondary processes—here of retrogression—passing from the special, definite and complex to the general, indefinite and simple.

Moreover, in his "Psychology," the earliest of his great works, written before dissolution was taken up into his formula, the phenomena of disintegration are not discussed; the great pathological problems are nowhere touched, certainly a serious defect. To the great thinker the disintegration of individual life only begins with death, the final maker of a stable equilibrium. A chief corollary in the formula does indeed say that every evolution is bound up with dissolution and *vice versa* and that in each case the preponderating process decides the whole status of the phenomenon. However, Spencer should not have failed to notice that in the decay of the dead body there no longer takes place an evolutionary process of the aggregate as such, *i. e.*, here of the living being,

although numerous evolutions of new chemical combinations occur. Here is a glaring defect in the fundamentals of his metaphysical thinking. For when Spencer opens the chapter of the introductory volume, headed "Evolution and Dissolution," with the sentence: "An entire history of anything must include its appearance out of the imperceptible and its disappearance into the perceptible," and then applies these ideas to objects, existences, aggregates, he does so without discussing their distinctions from other ideas, without critically defining them. The aggregate "organic individual" becomes after its death imperceptible; its real self offers no observations either for evolution or for dissolution. The process of dying is to all appearances its dissolution as a being, and if dissolution is considered the normal continuation of evolution, it should be represented as a part of the regular process of life itself. In the process of metabolic changes dissolution with its distinctive catabolic properties is so well known as antagonistic to the building up of organic molecules, that Bichat defines life as the resistance to death. Though Spencer, as he incidentally remarks, had himself, before Darwin, dwelled upon the idea of the survival of the fittest in the realm of species, the idea had only become clear to him through Darwin's masterful explanation of it as the constantly active cause of organic divergences. Yet it never occurred to him that even this evolution arises as it were out of the accumulation of dead bodies; that the great battlefield of life is strewn with dead varieties, species, genera, etc., and that as long as their struggle for existence lasts, this will be the case. Is not death here also the condition of life? Nor has Spencer raised the question whether or not the logical conclusion of his reasoning demands the prophecy that there must come a time in the history of universal life when decay and death will be in the preponderance, when dissolution must become the characteristic mark in its process. With regard to the solar and sidereal system he does not hesitate to pronounce the judgment, but not without the promise—and rightly so—of a new heaven and a

new earth in endless resurrection. But it would be of much greater interest and value to study the evolution of the human race from the standpoint of the conflict between life and death; to study the conflicts and rivalries of races and nations, of tribes and states; the natural selection of the strong, the wise, the cruel and harsh, but also of the philanthropic, the faithful and virtuous individuals and varieties, and how the latter are related to the former. Attempts of this kind—unfortunately only rhetorical attempts—have been made. Spencer touches upon the subject in his "Inductions of Ethics," where he shows "that in respect to all leading divisions of human conduct, different races of men, and the same races at different stages, entertain opposite beliefs and display opposite feelings." But in his "Sociology" he contradicts this statement, when he advances his unexplained and impossible theory of the social organism, the development of which he compares with the rise and gradual differentiation of the germ layers of an embryo. "Like a low animal, the embryo of a high one has few distinguishable parts; but while it is acquiring greater mass, its parts multiply and differentiate. It is thus with a society. At first the unlikeness among its groups of units are inconspicuous in number and degree; but as population augments, divisions and subdivisions become more numerous and more decided. Further, in the social organism as in the individual organism, differentiations cease only with that completion of the type which marks maturity and precedes decay."* The conception of dissolution as the complement of evolution receives here hardly any recognition at all. We scarcely hear of the disappearance of human groups, biological or sociological, which two terms are, by the way, constantly confused, nor of the closely connected, though not identical, disappearance of civilizations. Nevertheless, Spencer's work along all these lines abounds in strong and fine thoughts, full of bold and humane sentiments. The principle of individual freedom which runs through all his writings is carried out with

* "Principles of Sociology," II., 449.

such logical consistency that it smacks of anarchism, and Huxley called his political system "administrative nihilism." Measuring all progress in civilization by the decrease of the warlike spirit and the disappearance of every kind of violence of man against man, Spencer naturally detests a state power which proposes to interfere with the citizens' activities further than by enforcing their mutual limitations; he derides, therefore, all regulations of economic interests by the state, which is to him socialism sanctioned by law.

In his three great volumes of *Sociology* Spencer works out the evolutions of the family, of customs, manners and ceremonies, of political and religious institutions, finally of political economy and labor organizations; all these discussions are prefaced by general considerations of anthropological and psychological data and the elements of social life. His arguments are controlled by the great contrast which he observed between the social type of forced coöperation and that of voluntary coöperation; on the one hand he sees the organization for war, ruled by despotism, class spirit, slavery, formalism, rigorous laws, superstition, egotism, and the moral code of enmity, and on the other hand the but feebly developed organization for peaceful labor and commercial intercourse, governed by treaties between free men and the good will of man towards man, compromise between the two belongs to incomplete conduct. Spencer's system was worked out during the flourishing period of England's peaceful, progressive and cosmopolitan politics so closely bound up with her faith in free trade. This has all changed to-day. His mood is that of quiet resignation, sometimes of despair. He complains of symptoms of returning barbarism, as we read in "Facts and Comments": "Thus for a generation past, under cover of the forms of a religion which preaches peace, love and forgiveness, there has been a perpetual shouting of the words 'war' and 'blood,' 'fire' and 'battle' and a continual exercise of antagonistic feelings."*

* P. 178.

false patriotism in the same book must forever ring in the ears of the authors of the Boer war.

It is certainly a matter of rejoicing to all thoughtful men, that Spencer was spared to fulfill the great purpose of his life in spite of material losses, moral discouragements and shattered health. He himself confesses in the preface to the last volume of his system, written in August, 1896, "that in earlier days doubtless some exultation would have resulted over this completion; but as age creeps on feelings weaken," yet he expresses satisfaction, which later on led him to even subject his work to a thorough revision, so that now the "First Principles" and the "Principles of Biology" are before us in new editions. He declares that after so many years he is able to look upon his own work with the eye of a foreign critic, not only as to form but also as to content. Some may be somewhat startled at my endorsement, but it is certainly a mistake to condemn Spencer's work as materialism. He was too profound a thinker not to be impressed with a constantly growing reverence for the great world-mystery. Materialism is a dogmatic system, but Spencer, however far and strange Kant has remained to him, nevertheless belongs to the group of critical philosophers largely through the mediation of Sir William Hamilton and Mansel of the Scotch School. Speaking, however, from the standpoint of modern empirical science Spencer is or was in the beginning at least materialist. His principle to reduce all facts within the sphere of the phenomenal to matter and motion can never become an adequate explanation of vital much less of psychic phenomena. Life to him is a specific case of the effects of physical and chemical forces and the mind (or soul) is a specific case of life. In his revised and enlarged edition of his "Biology" he undertakes to explain the functions of the marvellous karyocinetic nuclear processes which the microscope has recently revealed. The changes thereby produced in his thinking were of sufficient importance as to warrant the addition of several new chapters and new paragraphs. If

there is anything strikingly marked in these additions it is the change which the author's confidence in the omnipotence of concepts and the value of formulas has undergone, yielding to a still stronger doubt, due not so much to a mere mood or old age as to a newly acquired insight into phenomena. This is especially true of the chief problem, viz., life itself, and it is a significant sign of the times that the new investigations of biology have wrought this change among many of the best scientists of our age. Spencer's old definition of life which can be traced through Coleridge to Schelling—curious as this may seem—read: "Life is the definite combination of heterogeneous changes, both simultaneous and successive in correspondence with external coexistence and sequences." This definition, reached after long and most searching investigations and many improvements, was considered by Spencer as unassailable, as the net proceeds of his thinking. Now we read in a new chapter in his "*Principles of Biology*," under the caption "*The Dynamic Element in Life*": "Evidently, then, the preceding chapters recognize only the form of our conception of life and ignore the body of it. Partly sufficing as does the definition reached to express the one, it fails entirely to express the other. Life displays itself in ways which conform to the definition; but it also displays itself in many other ways. We are obliged to admit that the element which is common to the two groups of ways is the essential element. The essential element, then, is that special kind of energy seen alike in the usual classes of vital actions and in those unusual classes instanced above"* and further on: Thus a critical testing of the definition brings us, in another way, to the conclusion reached above, that that which gives the substance to our idea of life is a certain unspecified principle of activity. The dynamic element in life is its essential element.† And after a crucial examination of the hypotheses which attempt to explain this: "In brief, then, we are obliged

* P. 113.

† P. 114.

to confess that life in its essence cannot be conceived in physico-chemical terms. The required principle of activity which we found cannot be represented as an independent vital principle, we now find cannot be represented as a principle inherent in living matter. If, by assuming its inherence, we think the facts are accounted for, we do but cheat ourselves with pseud-ideas.”* Life is unexplainable. If already simple forms of existence in their ultimate properties are inconceivable, this most complicated form of existence is, so to speak, doubly inconceivable.

This magnificent honesty of the great thinker, while not detracting from the value of his biological theorems in general, nevertheless thoroughly shakes the foundations of his system. It may suffice to point out that even in “*First Principles*” additions have been made, which show traces of this skepticism as well as of skepticism referring to the other delicate problem, viz., of the mind. What might we but have expected if the author could have revised his psychology! This work—however rich in thought—is full of untenable generalizations resting upon the current conception of empirical scientists, that sensation is the fundamental psychic factor which as a function of life must be counted with the other functions of the nervous system; psychology in this sense is primarily an explanation of sensory phenomena. Spencer protests already in the second edition of his work against the identification of mind and intellect. Mind (or soul), he says, consists largely and in one sense entirely of feelings. What he means by feeling we learn from the following: “Everywhere feeling is the substance of which, where it is present, intellect is the form.”† He does indeed divide feelings into sensations and emotions, but lays more stress upon the statement that no feeling of any kind could be entirely free from intellectual elements, than upon that which conditions the intellectual act, may it be called affect or will—in Spencer’s language emotion. “Take away all sensations and emotions

* P. 120.

† “*Psychology*,” p. 192.

and there remains no will. Excite some of these and will will, becoming possible, become actual only when one of them or a group of them gains predominance. Until there is a motive there is no will."* Later on, however, Spencer changed in the opposite direction. In his last book, published in 1902, under the title: "Facts and Comments," there is a chapter, headed "Feeling versus Intellect," where he declares the practiced identification of mind with intelligence to be an enormous error, and reaches the conclusion that that part which we generally ignore when we speak of mind, is its essential part. The emotions are the masters, the intellect the servant. Does this not sound like Schopenhauer's "*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*"? To the practical sense of Spencer this truth was of great practical value. He had become extremely critical towards that culture which laid chief stress upon the development of the intellectual element of the mind (or soul); he speaks of a culture-mania growing out of that error. In this respect he is thoroughly Hegelian. "Were it fully understood that the emotions are the masters and the intellect the servant it would be seen that little can be done by improving the servant while the masters remain unimproved."† We would estimate the moral element far higher, the intellectual far lower, we would, *e. g.*, cease from admiring that transcendental criminal Napoleon. Such sentiments clearly show Spencer's position towards all modern culture. Among his regrets published in this last book we read: "I detest that conception of social progress which presents as its aim increase of population, growth of wealth, spread of commerce. In the politico-economic ideal of human existence there is contemplated quantity only and not quality . . . the ideal we cherish is a transitory one . . . a state in which our advance is measured by spread of manufactures, it differs in many ways from the past and is far removed from what we may hope will be attained in the future. One of its evil results is the threatened submergence of those still

* "Psychology," p. 503.

† "Facts and Comments," p. 43.

remaining traces of life, which, though ruder and simpler, left men some leisure in which to live."* A profound melancholy mood permeates the chapter from which these quotations are taken.

We learn in this his last book more of Spencer's personality than from his former writings or his biographical sketches. A superficial observer is prone to consider Spencer a shallow utilitarian, who had no appreciation of the beautiful, no organ for the ideal. But the quoted sentiments disprove such judgment. Spencer's simple mode of life was illuminated by his love for art. He complains that that intellectual error had created deficient concepts of art and the purposes of art. The chief purpose of art is to him the pleasure which it brings, it is therefore for cultured folk the excitation of the noblest and purest feelings. Among arts, music is to him the highest. He wrote more than forty years ago an essay on "the origin and function of music," in the closing sentence of which he says: "We cannot applaud enough the progress in musical culture which is more and more becoming one of the signs of our age." No less than six chapters of his last book are devoted to music. Conscious of his old-fashioned taste he confesses himself a disciple of Meyerbeer, in whose operas he finds more dramatic expression and melody combined than in any other composer known to him. With strong sympathies he speaks of the dignity and sublimity of the organ. This is due to Spencer's *religious feelings*. However far removed he is from any specific belief, except that of the unknowability of the origin of the universe, in which he saw the harmony between religion and philosophy, he nevertheless recognizes in all superstitions this germ of truth, "that the force, which reveals itself in consciousness is only a differently conditioned form of force, which reveals itself outside of consciousness." The object of religion is not destroyed through scientific analysis, and in its concrete forms science even enlarges the realm of religious feeling. The increasing ability of being astonished always accompanies the

* "Facts and Comments," p. 8.

progress of knowledge. "In the midst of the mysteries which become the more mysterious, the more they are thought about, there will remain the one absolute certainty, that we are ever in the presence of an infinite and eternal energy from which all things proceed"—this is the closing sentence of the chapter on "Religious Retrospect and Prospect" in that part of his *Sociology* which deals with ecclesiastical institutions and which was so much talked about when it first appeared. Even in the discussion of the forms of cultus he makes the prognosis that they will not perish, but will (and shall) constantly develop more highly. He holds that it will always remain a necessity to give to the altogether prosaic and material structure of life, so easily lost in the daily run of duty, a higher and loftier aim, and that preacher will always have a thankful task who knows how to communicate to his hearers a vivid appreciation and feeling for the mysterious, in which the origin and the meaning of the universe are enveloped. It is even to be surmised that the musical expression of the feeling which clings to this consciousness will not only have continued life, but will also show itself capable of further development. "Meanwhile, sympathy commands silence towards all, who, suffering under the ills of life, derive comfort from their creed." Many of Spencer's liberal friends were startled over this approach to the believer's point of view, just as those of Kant were when he published his "Religion within the limits of Pure Reason." However, neither Spencer nor Kant have ever given room to the illusion that the "Great Enigma" has ever been touched in its innermost essence by even the most extensive scientific inquiry.

Spencer is and will remain an attractive as well as an eminent personality. His profound sincerity, his rugged honesty and his ceaseless energy are distinctly stamped upon his countenance and deeply interwoven with his whole character. Proud in his simplicity, independent and yet a great friend of man, without the distinction of high office yet with sublime dignity Spencer walked the pathway of life with the sure step of a monarch and the firm faith of a saint.

II.

THE REFORMATION CONTINUED.

REV. EDWARD S. BROMER.

The great Reformation of the sixteenth century was both a protest and an affirmation—a protest against the barriers in the way of the Gospel, an affirmation of its inner life and principles. The accusation that the Reformation was merely negative soon found expression in the name given its adherents when they were first called Protestants, soon after the protest of the Lutheran princes and cities against the decrees of the Diet of Spire. The great protest, however, could exist only because of the positive affirmations of the Gospel realized in the warm experience of the Reformers and their followers. These affirmations were not a new gospel, but as Principal A. M. Fairbairn says: "Taking the Reformation simply by itself, we find it was an attempt to recover the lost or forgotten ideal of the Christian religion, an attempt to return to the real and genuine religion of Christ." Looking forward from the time of the Reformation to the present, Professor A. Harnack says: "As regards the kernel of the matter, no new phase in the history of religion has occurred since the Reformation." Evidently its real inwardness lies in its point of view rather than in its resulting dogmas or institutions.

The subject, "The Reformation Continued," carries with it at once the implication that it was incomplete, or that it rose to the height of the freedom of the Gospel and then relapsed into the bondage of the letter and the institution. Both are true. As the Reformation was a result both of a historic development and a revolution, a return to original fountains, so likewise may our present-day conditions in the Church be characterized not only as the result of the historic continuity

of the Kingdom of Christ, but also the result of an intellectual and spiritual revolution which means a still more real return to original sources, preëminently to the main fountain, to Jesus himself.

The watchword which is the guide and inspiration of the subject is made up of two sayings of the apostle Paul in Galatians, viz., "For Freedom did Christ set us free: stand fast, therefore, and be not entangled again in a yoke of bondage." "For ye are the sons of God through faith in Jesus Christ" (Am. R. V. Gal. 5:1 and 4:26).

Paul of all the New Testament writers best understands the liberty of the Gospel. He did more to bring Christianity out of its Jewish swaddling clothes than all the rest combined. He sets forth in Galatians the relation of the Law and the Gospel. The saying of Jesus in the Gospel of John, "If the son shall make you free you shall be free indeed" is the spirit caught by the great Apostle when he says, "For freedom did Christ set you free: stand fast, therefore, and be not entangled again in a yoke of bondage." This is the exhortation he gave the Galatians who were being influenced by the Judaizers from Jerusalem to forsake the pure gospel of Jesus. To the "weak and beggarly elements of this world" were they turning and despising "the riches of grace in Christ." He beseeches them to return to Christ and to liberty, yea he will be in travail of pain until Christ be formed in them. Speaking allegorically, he says, they are not children of Hagar, the bondwoman, but of Sarah, the freewoman. "For freedom did Christ set us free: stand fast, therefore, and be not entangled again in a yoke of bondage." "For ye are the sons of God through faith in Jesus Christ." This is the central truth of the Gospel. This is the grand height of the New Testament.

I. THE HIGH-TIDE OF THE REFORMATION.

We cannot take more space to write of the nature of the liberty of the Gospel as lived and preached by Paul, but we at once say with reference to the greatest height to which the

great Reformation rose, it was the same to which Paul had reached. In its inner life, at this height, it was a "true restoration of Pauline Christianity in the spirit of a new age." In its outer manifestations it was many other things. Indeed, it involved all the intellectual, social and political complexity of the Renaissance. Even as a religious phenomenon it was an old catholic phenomenon full of the spirit of Mediævalism. But we are not concerned with these things at present. We are seeking to find the inwardness of the Reformation—its high-tide. Historians agree in saying that it consisted in the restoration of a Pauline Christianity in the light and thought-forms of a new age. It was not a new Gospel Luther and Zwingli found, but the old Gospel, the Gospel of liberty through Jesus Christ.

To set this liberty forth more plainly let us refer to the personal experience of Luther, who best of all the Reformers typifies the inner pulse of the Reformation. Both Luther and the Reformation rise to their greatest height in those golden years of 1510–1523, when they were yet in sympathetic touch with all classes, when the rising of the new Sun seemed so imminent, when the new age promised to come full-born in all its glory. But, alas, Luther and Reformation soon drew back, terrified and disheartened, for the time being, at the outbreaking of the sects and the horrors of the Peasant Wars. The Protestant princes were called upon to extinguish the fires of the Reformation's own kindling and to protect the faith against the Catholics. During this reaction the Catholic Church recovered itself and arose in new power with its traditionalism and ecclesiasticism somewhat purified and logically more strongly entrenched than ever. Of this reaction, the ebb-tide of the Reformation, let us have more later. At present we wish to describe the spiritual climax of these hey-day years of the Reformation. For we are reminded of the above-given quotation from Professor Harnack, that "as to the kernel of the matter * * * no new phase in the history of religion has occurred since the Reformation." What is that

kernel? Paul's words lead us to it—"For freedom did Christ set us free." The greatness of the Reformation lies in its vision of the freedom of the Gospel. Herein lies the greatness of Luther and Zwingli and their followers. They restored the religious view of the Gospel over against the traditionalism and ecclesiasticism of the Catholic Church. Defined in Luther's own thought the Gospel is "the act of God through Jesus Christ unto forgiveness of sin and eternal life." This is the old Gospel. According to Paul to preach any other is to be "anathema." This has been called the material principle of the Reformation.

Luther's personal experience makes this all the clearer. In that great struggle through which he passed in the monastic period of his life he thought he was fighting his own sins, whereas he was, in fact, fighting to remove the outer barriers and the inner hindrances which the traditionalism and ecclesiasticism of the day forced upon him and all earnest souls. The story is well known how he tried to find peace through the toilsome ways of works of penance and merit; how in strict honesty, not finding rest with anguish-rent heart, he turned to God; how gradually the creed-musty phrase, "I believe in the forgiveness of sins" dawned upon him; how his friend Dr. Staupitz comforted him; how John Tauler's writings and Augustine's life and experience guided him; how finally Paul led him to Jesus in the saying, "the just shall live by faith." Read his own words describing the climax of his experience: "As I meditated day and night upon the words, 'For therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to faith: as it is written, The just shall live by faith,' I perceived that the righteousness of God is that through which the just man through God's goodness lives, that is to say, faith. On this I felt as though I was born again, and seemed to be entering through the opening portals of Paradise." The central thing for him now was "the gracious God in Christ." This simplified everything. The traditions of men, the forms and ceremonies of the Church, the demands of the "Curia," the man-

dates of the Pope—none of these things could longer move him nor blind him to his personal privilege and fellowship with Christ. He himself said, "Get quit of the Pope, get rid of the priests, rid of all that stands between the individual soul and God. Let God and the soul stand face to face. Let God and the soul know and be known to each. Here in this immediate knowledge of God, given by God, I stand: I can do no other. God help me, for God commands me." Forgiveness, freedom and assurance were now his watchwords. The church was but the assembly of believers for fellowship and inspiration, founded by the Holy Spirit through the Word of God. The Word of God is the proclamation of the revelation of God in Christ in so far as it awakens faith. It is not bound by the letter, but the present living expression of God in Christ. The church has no other province than to nourish and help faith. "Since faith in God through Christ alone is effectual, no particular performance and no particular province, even in the ecclesiastical cultus, is the sphere in which the church and the individual Christian can verify their faith, but in the natural ordering of their life are Christians to prove their faith in loving service of their fellowmen."

II. THE EBB-TIDE OF THE REFORMATION.

Such were the principles, free and strong, which were clearly brought forth in this high-tide period of the Reformation. Luther broke through traditionalism and ecclesiasticism to Christ, but, alas, the momentum of the old currents and the laws of historical development did not permit the high-tide to stand or continue. It began to ebb, but never again to the low-water mark of Mediæval Christianity. A new era had really dawned even though the first sunburst of glory was soon dimmed by the extravagances of the ignorant and the radical in the Peasant wars, by the hesitancy and recoil of the Protestant leaders, by the necessity of protecting the faith with the sword, by the internecine strife of sectarian divisions, and by the renewed aggressiveness of the Catholic church itself. This

period of religious wars, of growing divisions among the Protestants on the historical side, and the return to dogma and Biblicism on the theological side, and a flight for refuge in a new ecclesiasticism on the institutional side,—these in their history are the prolonged story through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of the ebb-tide of the Reformation.

But to be more definite, what are some of the currents of this ebb-tide?

The first one we would note is the continuance of the philosophical presuppositions of Catholicism, so that to-day the system-loving conservatism of Protestantism has returned to the hairsplitting refinements of Mediæval scholasticism in order to define and maintain itself. Luther and his coadjutors were in conflict with an immediate enemy, viz., a corrupt traditional ecclesiasticism, "having the form of godliness but having lost the power thereof." They did not reject dogma as such, nor the church as such but only as these obscured Christ and the forgiveness of sins. At first they did not think of a new church, but they sought a purified church preaching a pure gospel. None of the Reformers show an intimate knowledge of the "old catholic church," the church of the second and third centuries. They went back to the great Ecumenical Councils and on the philosophical presuppositions of the Catholic church they sought to revive them with new life. The Nicean and the Athanasian creeds especially were born again to new life. The Reformers really left the fundamental presuppositions of Catholicism untouched.

It was but a few years after the high-tide of the Reformation that a new dogmatism sprang up. The leaders were forced to give an account of themselves. The old presuppositions were the basis upon which they worked. Here already they in part forsook the liberty of the gospel. Faith was soon confused with the doctrines of faith. Loyalty to a given catechism soon meant more than loyalty to the sin-forgiving and life-giving Christ. The next step was to identify the saving doctrines of salvation with the creeds of the great

Ecumenical councils. This is the current which led upon the rocks on which Protestantism split asunder.

The first result in open controversy was on the Lord's Supper. The Catholic presuppositions of which Luther could not altogether divest himself here and in his doctrine of baptism became manifest. Both these sacraments were in part reinvested with the Aristotelian substantialism of the Catholic Church. In passing it may be noted that of all the Reformers Zwingli at least theoretically, if not experimentally, best maintained the freedom of the Gospel from the bondage of the letter, both on the problem of the Sacraments and of the Word.

Another current springing from the main one is the one which brought the confusion of the Word of God and the Bible as a book. Having rejected the dogma of an infallible church and an authoritative Pope, they must on their accepted catholic presuppositions find another infallible authority. They sought it in the Bible. This is the formal principle of the Reformation. It became the particular shibboleth of the Reformed branch of the Reformation, as the material principle was that of the Lutheran. In the development of the principle the terms *Word of God* and the *Bible* became interchangeable and synonymous. They virtually set up another pope. Again they were brought into the bondage of the letter, only in the course of years to lose its spirit. An infallible Bible demands an infallible interpreter and thus step by step the Protestants were logically driven back to theoretic Catholicism. On the generally accepted philosophical premises of his day Cardinal Newman was truly logical in going back to the Catholic Church. In our day the same inexorable logic makes certain types of Lutherans claim to be the only true Catholic Church and certain Episcopalians desire to change their name to fit their theory and style themselves the American Catholic Church. And all the Protestant bodies have fallen back more or less on these same presuppositions to an emphasis upon episcopal authority of prebytery and synod and classis until we are amazed at the

length to which we have gone, and some of the leaders of the churches do scarcely more than hair-split the constitution and seek to manipulate majorities. In its desperation during these days it is a frequent spectacle to see a narrow conservatism seeking to buttress Bible, creed and church by frantically swinging the whip of episcopal authority. This principle of infallibility of the Bible has logically many ramifications. It ultimately demands uniformity in creed and worship. These are watchwords of Catholicism. In the days of the inquisition they enforced them by threat and punishment; in these days they wait with infinite patience for moral suasion to bring about the same results and with the same motives. They rest on the absolutism of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. These same tendencies on similar presuppositions during the nineteenth century were manifest in every important branch of Protestantism, so that it was not and is not improper to speak of a "catholicizing of Protestantism." The real inwardness of the late Pope Leo XIII.'s encyclical on Church Union was the recognition by Catholics of these logical tendencies in Protestantism toward absolutism in authority, creed and worship.

This deep undercurrent of Catholic presupposition has wrought still worse confusion in another direction. The theory of an infallible Bible coupled with the divine right and privilege of private interpretation for which the Reformers so nobly fought, has been most prolific in producing sects and divisions, until Catholics laugh at our divided forces and we confess in the words of one of our noted historians "O miserable spectacle!" Extreme individualism in mysticism is far more desirable than extreme individualism in a literalism based on infallibility. In much sect-ridden Pennsylvania we have numerous sects founded on the baldest sort of literalism. And where is the denomination that has not felt the effects of this tendency? We criticise it, but let us not forget, it was the same sort of literalism that divided the great Reformation into two streams. The rock which caused the

bifurcation was "Hoc est meum corpus." The same literalism made the term predestination a shibboleth for more than two centuries. The same literalism in the Church of England drove Wesley out among the people and forced Methodism to birth. The same literalism has made the many types of Baptists. Along these lines the principle has almost reduced itself to an absurdity. It involves an untenable theory of inspiration and produces such confusion among the common people as to make many skeptical altogether and thousands indifferent and still more are crying "Which way shall I turn?" "What shall I do to be saved?"

As a natural consequence of such conditions it is not strange that the method of missionary enterprise for the extension of the Kingdom of Christ through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was the method of persecution of one another of the warring sects of Christendom, and even to-day the motive is often one of rivalry or struggle, first to possess the new land in the name of a denomination rather than of Christ. The inner impelling power of the Gospel, the constraining power of the love of Christ, it is true, has not been without witness in all these centuries, but it was manifested mostly in the outbursts of pietistic movements from the very heart of all the historic churches. Each branch of the Reformation and the historic churches growing out of them gave birth to children who could not remain under the parental roof. Nor is it strange that these very sects, after living scarcely a century or a little more, are so fast becoming like their mothers as to be scarcely distinguishable from them. Impulsively and unphilosophically were they born, responding to the pressure of the life within of immediate fellowship with Christ, but hardly born, when the period of reflection and development came they discovered that they held the same presupposition as the churches from which they came. Here again an inexorable logic gradually drove them to realize that they after all are of one blood. Fundamental in their life lay the presuppositions of Catholicism, the presuppositions of the great

Œcumenical councils. The Reformers inherited them from the Catholics; and bequeathed them to the many denominations and sects of Protestantism. The logic of much of the sentiment for Church union in these days is based on premises whose inevitable conclusions lead straight to Rome.

III. THE REFORMATION CONTINUED.

Here let us ask, Is there need to-day for the continuation of the Reformation? Do we need the exhortation, "Stand fast, therefore, and be not entangled again in a yoke of bondage"? Are we in danger to-day of a new legalism? Another bondage of the letter? If the above tendencies are manifest at all it is evident that Protestantism must maintain its protest against the barriers which keep the soul from God and affirm anew the positiveness of the life immediately "hid with Christ in God." The fact of the ebb-tide of the Reformation is an indisputable phenomenon of history. The great question we are asking ourselves to-day is, Was Luther consistent in carrying out his views of the liberty of the Gospel, in resting philosophically and dogmatically on the basis of the great Œcumenical councils, when experimentally and immediately he found his spiritual life and peace in the first century? Is his theology a finality? Or is the theology of any of the Reformers? The same question must be asked about their catechisms. Could they be a finality when none of them are free of the fundamental presuppositions which lie under the structure and fabric of the Catholic Church as an institution. The principle of an infallible authority anywhere in human work leads inevitably to absolutism in government, creed and worship. This has been developed in Catholicism, and, accepting their presuppositions, we must all become Catholics if we be true to the logic of the head. But this we refuse to do. Despite our heads we follow the logic of the heart, and seek the warm impulses of life as we find them by breaking through the barriers of the Gospel and resting immediately in the

bosom of the Father, led thither by the Saviour who ever is "the way, the truth, the life." Our age is growing clearer in the conviction that "The Reformation was a revolt against finality and it would be strange if finality would be its result." Our present-day protest is likewise an affirmation. The days of restatement and revision are upon us. The inner life cannot be hid. As the Koran says of love,

"I was a gem concealed;
Me my burning ray revealed,"

so it is with the Spirit of God in men. It cannot be hidden or smothered. The free access to the Father by faith in Jesus Christ not only must break through the traditionalism and ecclesiasticism of the Middle Ages, but through the creedism and biblicism, the institutional authority, the scientific legalism of a closed circuit of laws, the dust and confusion raised by denominationalism, and the conventional and artificial barriers set up between morality and religion, between the Church and the Kingdom of God.

We believe the Reformation is being continued. What was so nobly and well begun in the sixteenth century we must continue in the twentieth. Alongside of the forces already mentioned, there are others which have been at work to simplify the complexity of conditions and set forth the Gospel again in its central life and light. Some of them were largely negative but most efficient in making straight the crooked ways and levelling the high and filling the low places, and thus preparing the way of the Lord. Let us name some of them in an ascending series: the rise of the critical philosophy, the marvellous discoveries of science and their application to practical life, the new historical spirit, Biblical criticism, and most positive of all, the inner impelling and expanding power of Christ in the individual and the race, so manifest in the ethical and social spirit of the age.

Of course, these can only be characterized briefly.

The rise of the critical philosophy through Immanuel Kant

and since his day has proved to be the undermining of the philosophical absolutism of Thomas Aquinas on the side of the Catholic, and of the idealistic absolutism of Hegel and his multitudinous followers on the side of the Protestant. In the realm of the intellect Kant proved the limitations of the human reason and worked out for philosophy what Luther wrought in the spiritual realm of the sixteenth century. The real link between "The Critique of the Pure Reason" and "The Critique of the Practical Reason" is the principle "The just shall live by faith." The critical philosophy has discredited the conceits of men and thrown us unreservedly on the power and grace of an immanent God to live at first-hand with Him. Kant is grossly misinterpreted when the realities of the "Practical Reason" are regarded as mere evaporations and he is called the "father of materialism." "The judgment of value" is of the very essence of life.

Scientific research and discoveries have revealed a larger heaven and earth than man ever dreamed of. The old vocabulary of the sixteenth century is not large enough. Additional facts have come within the range of telescope, spectroscope and microscope. A half dozen new native elements have been discovered. Since the new biology and physiology and psychology have come the old Greek adage "Know thyself" means more than ever. New conceptions of life and progress have been born. The old wine skins cannot retain the new wine of the age. They are bursting. But with all this we are not disconcerted but filled with rejoicing, since the first fear of a bald monism or materialism has passed away. After all evolution is only an hypothesis. The question of origins and consequently of theism remains untouched. But the facts and methods of life are better understood than ever before. We are made to realize that, however true the heart experiences of the honored fathers of the Church were, their world was a much smaller world than ours, because their eyes were holden to many things which to-day are the possession of our school-boys. The necessity of restatement of religious

truth in the thought-forms of our day is clearly manifest. For the university and college to teach one cosmology and the Church and Sunday-school another is suicidal and must produce the natural fruit of skepticism. From the point of view of a God truly immanent as well as transcendent, how soon science and religion meet and each is a part of the other. We are in days when the prophecy of one of our great men is nearing realization, "When men shall see the identity of the law of gravitation with purity of heart; and shall show that the Ought, that Duty is one thing with Science, with Beauty, and with Joy."

The new historical spirit has given us a new sense of progress. In secular history it has done a work which is being done more and more in the history of the Church and Christianity. With almost infinite patience it leads us through the centuries and teaches us not to despair. Progress is its watchword, and no age is an unnecessary link, nor to be despised. The golden cord of the Gospel is strung through all the Christian centuries. The non-essentials are stripped, the essentials revealed. Thus it is seen that after the first Christian centuries, the supremacy of Greek theology and life was superseded by the Roman, because the latter was more efficient. The Mediæval scholasticism was much superior to the heathenism of the great barbarian conquerors and their followers. The Reformation is a step in advance of Middle Age Catholicism. The seventeenth and eighteenth century Protestant with his infallible Bible stands on higher ground than the Catholic with his infallible Pope. The Bible leads to God more safely than a supposed infallible institution whose history is full of the records of corruption. It is, therefore, with the deepest reverence for the past that the historical spirit of our age bids us search the centuries for their point of view, their truth and glory, not, however, to find arguments for the reality of a God in his world, but to confirm the present witness of the living Father in our own souls.

Biblical criticism is but the application of the critical,

scientific and historical spirit of our age to the study of the Bible. It has attacked the Biblicism of the past three centuries most vigorously, and with seemingly destructive effect; but when all is said and the smoke of the battle clears, it will be found, and in truth it is already found, that the real historical foundations of the Old and New Testament stand out more clearly than ever. The Bible does contain the Word of God; it contains the Gospel. Textual criticism has forever destroyed the worship of the letter for all who will take the pains to study the condition of the manuscripts and the rise of the Old and New Testament canons. The higher criticism has aimed at giving the setting of the books of the Bible in their place in history, and seeks to give us a literary appreciation of them and prepare us to understand the significance of the facts and truth as they appealed to the men and women in whom and for whom they were produced. The Bible is more to us to-day than ever. It is full of the blood-red experience of man and the inspiration of Almighty God. The proper distinction of the *Word of the living God* and the *Book* is again made clear. "God in Christ reconciling the world to himself," is more and more recognized as the living Word, a Word not enshrined merely in a book, but a present living reality and expression of the Father of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. What did Paul mean by the "Word of God" which he spake and wrote in his letters? Not merely the voice of God in the past, in the Old Testament, surely, but the living voice of God through Christ to him and all men who hear and understand. Biblical criticism, at its best, in the hands of reverent followers of Christ, is a truly Christian expression and is loyal to the interests of pure religion, a religion of the Spirit. It has destroyed the claims of many denominations and sects based on mere literalistic interpretations of the Bible, and is forcing them to find the Christ of whom the Scriptures testify and the Heavenly Father whom Jesus revealed. To say, "Thus saith the Lord" is not the prerogative of the prophets of the dawn of history only, but the

privilege of all who have the ears to hear and eyes to see and hearts to understand and tongues to speak. God is, not only was; He speaks, not only spake. The real formal principle of the Reformation, however, from this point of view is most rigidly held. The Bible as we have it is as near the original facts as men have been able to get it. In the rank of religious literature it stands supreme. In thought-forms of an earlier age it enshrines the experience of men who knew God, our God, the Father of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. Let us not worship the thought-forms, the letter, but seek the living God in Christ, as they sought him of old in spirit and in truth.

This leads us to the last point. More than anything else, and most positively of all the forces mentioned, and we believe in and through them all, is the leaven of the Gospel itself. No, let us not even objectify it and call the Gospel "it." The ever-living God in Christ is now. His Gospel, the good news of salvation, is a living word to-day, coming more and more to expression in the individual and the race. That "God in Christ is reconciling the world to himself" is an historic fact. The word which was the living expression of God among men from the beginning became flesh in Christ, an open historic fact. In him it became clear that the Word of God is the living expression of God himself, as a loving and righteous Father. To every one believing the Word is given the privilege of sonship. This great privilege in Christ filled the soul of Paul with joy and freedom and gave the first Christian century its chief characteristic. It lifted Luther and the Reformation to their greatest height. It is the same sense of freedom in Christ which, more or less, has incarnated itself in the constitutions and institutions of every land that has accepted Christianity. The history of the modern world cannot be written without the acknowledgment of Christianity as a fontal and primary source. In our country in particular we believe that it is the leaven of the liberated Gospel which is slowly transforming our political, social and industrial life.

Although not allied with any socialistic program or political creed, the Gospel is furnishing the motive for all that is truly great and good in the modern striving for a kingdom of righteousness on earth among men.

Within the Church, divided though it be, it is the inner impelling, unifying power of the Gospel that is our greatest hope. There are many other forces at work, but they would be of no avail were it not for the present living God, speaking in Christ to a present age, and reconciling the world to himself. Fatherhood, sonship, brotherhood and the Kingdom of love and righteousness,—these are the words giving new expression to our spiritual life. As ever, so to-day, "Faith is the victory that overcomes the world." We trust the Gospel to bring forth the legitimate fruits of the Spirit. As Professor Harnach says, "Protestantism reckons upon the Gospel being something so simple, so divine, and therefore, so truly human, as to be most certain of being understood when left entirely free, and also as to produce essentially the same experiences and convictions in the individual soul." This is what is becoming more and more fundamental in the feeling of truly Evangelical Christians for church union. It is for this freedom of the Gospel that the Continued Reformation will clamor. In the history of the Church every time it was smothered or suppressed it burst out in unexpected quarters, and to the amazement of ecclesiastical conventionalists "publicans and sinners took the Kingdom by storm." And in these days of democracy, being and doing the best for all, it is little to be wondered at that the Church, the creeds, the forms of worship must bear a new scrutiny and everything be made expressive of the law of love and social service. The way has been cleared. The opportunity is at hand for a restatement of Christian truth which will lead men to live more at first-hand with God, under the conditions of a new age. Every phase of life is being questioned. Life, direct, healthy moral and spiritual life is the quest before us.

"'Tis life of which our nerves are scant,
More life and higher that we want."

Our age has a keen sense of dealing with originals in science, history, social life and religion. It is a demonstration of the power of the Spirit of the living God among us. It is a matter not to be settled by the philosopher in his closet but in the stream of life, in our daily life-relations, social, political, religious, in touch with God, our Father, who "is in all and through all and over all." The supreme test of Christianity is right here. We ask concerning Jesus to-day as ever, Is He revealed "as Power, as Love, as Influencing Soul" ? Are men in Christ made "new creatures" to-day ? And do they keep his commandment of love ? It is the test of a life "hid with Christ in God" and of loving service.

On such grounds a new Evangelism is dawning. The heavens and the earth never seemed more open. Simple faith in God through Christ, and the power of God in earth and sea and sky and men, has given us a new age of promise. For the true Christian a genuine Greek sense of this world is possible, because through the processes of time and place he is realizing a new heaven and new earth which are eternal. All things are yours ; for ye are Christ's ; and Christ is God's."

III.

THE EVIDENTIAL VALUE OF CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE.

BY WALTER RUSSELL BREED, D.D.

During the last half of the nineteenth century the human mind has been in a state of almost unparalleled activity. That activity has manifested itself chiefly in two ways—physical science and historical criticism. The physical sciences have extended their dominion in every direction, with the result that the universe has been extended marvelously in space and stretched back endlessly in time. Archbishop Ussher's chronology, which dated the creation 4004 years before the Birth of Christ, is no longer the statement of a fact. The discoveries of the geologists conflict with the book of Genesis. The law of progress from simple to complex, from little to much, has made it necessary that we abandon or modify many traditional doctrines.

Along with this activity in physical science has gone an equally enthusiastic interest in historical criticism. The contemporary records of early civilizations have been diligently studied, the inscriptions on the old monuments deciphered. The Holy Scriptures have been and are subjected to constant investigation. New theories regarding the date, authorship, and historicity of different books in the Bible appear each week. This twofold activity has resulted in vast accumulations of knowledge with which Christianity has not yet had time to adjust itself. Nor can it be denied that many workers in the fields of science and criticism have been hostile to the claims of the Christian Church. Strong and repeated assaults from various quarters, and sustained with great intellectual vigor, have been made on the old strongholds. Some of those old strongholds have been found to be but a house built on the

sand. Twenty years ago there were many good people who thought that science and criticism had destroyed the foundations of faith. And they often spoke with a pathetic regard of those vanished illusions which once sustained and nourished the human heart. But the number of persons offering consolation on the decay of religion becomes fewer each year.

I.

Now there is one fact in the intellectual life of the last generation which has extraordinary interest and value for the purpose of this paper—that *the controversies resulting from science and criticism have not destroyed faith where faith already existed. The persistency of faith in the large majority of Christian believers* is the surprising and perplexing fact as we review the intellectual life of the last half of the nineteenth century. You may verify this statement in your own life and repeatedly verify it in the lives of those you know. Why is this? What is the reason of this fact?

The answer brings us close to our subject. Men have been kept in the faith of Christ through the intellectual skepticism of the last fifty years because that faith was *not* the result of intellectual or syllogistic processes. *That faith was founded in experience*, its source was in feeling. Not being proved by human reasoning, it can as little be disproved.

The question of the "evidential value of religious experience" requires that we first become clear in our minds as to the source or ground of religion. Religion is of the inner nature of man. Does religion belong primarily to the intellect or to feeling or to will? These are the elements of the inner life of man. We answer, *the source of religion, of theology, is not in the intellect, nor in the will, but in the feelings, in experience.* Religion is not a system of dogmas addressed to the intellect, it is not a ritual, nor a collection of moral precepts. *It is a direct personal relationship to God, grounded in the deepest instincts of human life.* It springs from man's endowment in God's own image. Religious faith cannot be

constructed out of the resources of logical processes. Religious faith cannot be proved by any logical method. Faith is sustained by its own buoyancy alone. Faith lies outside the world of human reasoning. Merely intellectual acceptance of doctrines has nothing to do with faith. "Ratiocination is a very unreal path to the Deity." The book of Job went over this whole matter centuries ago. "I will lay mine hand upon my mouth; I have heard of Thee by the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye seeth Thee." Intellectually Job was overwhelmed by the glowing arguments of his three friends. His intellect was perplexed and baffled. But his experience, his trustful sense of God's presence, his faith, kept him.

The great religious thinkers and teachers of Germany during the last century grounded religion in feeling and experience alone. It is of value to trace the succession of their thought. Immanuel Kant may be regarded as the philosopher of Protestantism as Thomas Aquinas is of Romanism. "The general nature of the revolution which Kant accomplished in theology is familiar," says Professor Everett. "He showed that the ideas upon which religion rests cannot be proved by any logical processes. They lie outside the world of human reasoning."* Following Kant come Hegel and Schleiermacher, the "two pillars of Hercules through which entrance was made into the broad ocean of modern theological thought." Hegel built his system within the lines drawn by Kant. His whole system rested upon faith, or rather, it was in interpretation and construction of faith. With Hegel *experience was the great reality*. Schleiermacher rests religion upon feeling—feeling of absolute dependence upon God. Nothing enters into Schleiermacher's theology that does not result from feeling and experience. Abstract dogmas, merely theoretical assumptions fall away. Schleiermacher may be regarded as the greatest exponent among the Germans of the "evidential value of religious experience." The school that followed, known as

* See Kant's "Influence in Theology," in "Essays Theological and Literary," by C. C. Everett, D.D. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1901.

the Meditating School in German theology, represented well by Dorner, followed the same method. A discussion of "Faith as the Precondition of the Knowledge of Christianity as Truth," occupies the first 200 pages of Dorner's "Theology." Faith, or experience, according to Dorner, involves the certainty of the truth of Christianity. Later, in Germany, has risen the school of Ritschl, best represented to-day by Harnack. This school is bound together somewhat loosely, and its members differ on various points among themselves; but on one point they all agree—they reject argumentation or philosophy as having anything to do with the foundation of belief. This school raises a fundamental question, which we must soon try to answer—how much of all this religious experience has value or worth? "Judgments of value" is the catch-word of the school. This question aims at simplification and unification in religious experience, which is much needed.

From these earlier sources—Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher—the movement came into England, but in England also it had an independent origin in Coleridge. Wherever you touch Coleridge in religious criticism, you find this grounding of religion or theology in experience, in the unchanging needs of man. In his "Table Talk," or the "Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit," or the "Aids of Reflection," you find it. "Evidences of Christianity! I am weary of the word. Make a man feel the want of it; rouse him, if you can, to a self-knowledge of the need of it, and you may safely trust it to its own evidence." Maurice followed him, and Robertson adopted the same essential method. It was the secret of Robertson's power and his enduring influence—an influence liberating and elevating—which works to-day among the nobler clergy of all churches. Robertson's illuminating sermon on "Obedience as the Organ of Spiritual Knowledge" contains a characteristic passage bearing closely on our subject, which I may be permitted to quote: "Have we never seen how a child, simple and near to God, cuts asunder a web of sophistry with a single direct question—how, before its steady look and

simple argument, some fashionable utterer of a conventional falsehood has been abashed?—how a believing Christian scatters the forces of skepticism, as a morning ray, touching the mist on the mountain side, makes it vanish into the thin air? And there are few more glorious moments of our humanity than those in which faith does battle against intellectual proof: when, for example, after reading a skeptical book, or hearing a cold-blooded materialist's demonstrations, in which God, the soul, and life to come, are proved impossible, up rises the heart in all the giant might of its immortality to battle with the understanding, and with the simple argument, 'I *feel* them in my best and highest moments to be true,' annihilates the sophistries of logic."

Among the English preachers of to-day, Canon Scott-Holland, the most truly eloquent of them all, Dr. Gore and the late Dr. Robert Dale, appeal to experience, to the inward witness as the great evidence. The title of Canon Holland's best-known volume, "Logic and Life," tells the whole story. In America, it is sufficient to name Bishop Brooks. Perhaps no preacher ever stood more firmly on the evidential value of religious experience—his own and the experience of the ages. With these men no questions of philosophy, no results of science, no claims of Biblical criticism can disturb Faith. "In all sad sincerity," we may adopt Professor James' words, "I think we must conclude that the attempt to demonstrate by purely intellectual processes the truth of the deliverances of religious experience is absolutely hopeless."

II.

What, then, is the function of the intellect, of philosophy, in the field of religion? Has it any special or definite relation to Christian truth? It has a large and important function, especially when you attempt to make an apologetic or evidential statement of religion. It is the work of the intellect to *interpret* the facts, the content of experience, to exhibit them as truth. The intellect classifies and compares various

religious experiences. It shows what elements of your experience or mine are personal and peculiar to ourselves, and what elements are in common and in harmony with the religious experience of all men. The intellect studies the languages in which men of other days and other lands have recorded the facts of their experience. Intellectual operations, therefore, are of immense value; but they are a work of secondary character, consequent upon religious feeling, not coördinate with it. Systems of theology have been called the grammar of religion. They are to religion what grammar is to speech. Speech always precedes grammar, never the reverse. The intellect amplifies and defines our faith, it lends it words and so *expresses* it, but its operations can add nothing in the way of authority. The intellect works in the service of the heart.

III.

Professor William James in his "Varieties of Religious Experience" has come to the subject from a psychological point of view, and his brilliant and fascinating book has brought the entire subject of religious experience before the scientific world. It may have suggested the subject to the Church Congress. In this book there is raised a question which we must now consider.

How far does any religious experience prove a corresponding (objective) reality? In other words, what constitutes proof? This question is fundamental in the consideration of the *evidential value* of religious experience. For we are not concerned with experience simply as interesting subjective phenomena—our concern is with the bearing of experience on the truth of religion. The earlier thinkers assumed that experience was the great reality, and that in the consciousness of man lay the certification and authority of all truth. "All knowledge presupposes experience," says Dörner. But while all knowledge rests on experience, can we say that every and all experience argues a corresponding reality? Religious experience engenders myths, superstitions, dogmas. The delu-

sions of Christian Science rest on experience. The marvelous collection of extreme individual experiences which Professor James gives us cannot all argue a corresponding reality. Often, in the aftermath of a glowing religious experience, we doubt its reality. Was it anything other, we ask, than the delusion of a fevered brain? And we begin to distrust our own consciousness. Religion has its source in experience; but how far is experience valid? This question touches, in my judgment, the nerve of the subject which we are considering. Let us say, *my experience is valid and argues and proves a corresponding reality when it is fitted to be the experience of humanity.* My experience must enter into the experience of humanity and live in it. My doubt whether my experience can be trusted is removed when I find that the experience of other men corroborates my own. If my experience that Jesus forgives my sin and frees me from an awful burden of guilt were unmatched among all the experiences of men, then I might distrust my own consciousness and say my experience does not prove a corresponding reality, and so is without evidential value. But when my experience is matched by similar experiences of groups of men, men of different countries, races, languages, churches, traditions; when I find that men of bygone ages have left in biographies, letters and confessions records of religious experiences well-nigh identical with my own; men remote from me in all the conditions and influences which determine their religious development, my doubts vanish. The universal experience of religious men corroborates mine. Universal experience is real and true. This is, in brief, the argument of Dr. R. W. Dale.

Dr. George A. Gordon presents a different argument.* If universal *religious* experience is entirely subjective, or is an illusion, then the whole law and content of the human mind is an illusion. If religious experience gives only a subjective knowledge and reality, then *all knowledge is subjective.* The

* "A New Epoch for Faith," by George A. Gordon. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, 1900.

negative must be an impartial one. It must hold over the whole field of experience, and if universal experience involves reality and brings back knowledge, then religion is established as true. We may safely assume that universal experience involves reality. The serious work of the world goes on this basis. The human intellect, when it finds itself in harmony with the experience of the ages, trusts itself.

It being, therefore, agreed that it is the universal religious experience which proves truth and a corresponding reality, it would also be agreed that Professor William James, in discarding the universal religious experience and turning to individual and extreme cases, has chosen a wrong method in the making of his book, "*Varieties of Religious Experience*."* "We learn most about a thing," he writes, "when we view it in its most exaggerated form. This is as true of religious phenomena as of any other kind of fact. The only cases likely to be *profitable* enough to repay our attention will, therefore, be cases where the religious spirit is extreme. Its familiar manifestations we may, therefore, pass tranquilly by." The experience of most members of the Church Congress is, then, valueless. This method of examining extreme cases and regarding them all as of equal value, leads to meager results, unsatisfactory to the reader and also to Professor James. The last chapters are disappointing in their conclusions and of slight value as a statement of the "Evidential Value of Religious Experience." Professor James, as the result of a "laborious attempt to extract from the privacies of religious experiences some general facts which can be defined in formulas upon which everybody may agree," reaches this result—there is a certain deliverance in which religions appear to meet. It consists of two parts:

1. *An uneasiness*, which is a sense that there is something wrong about us as we naturally stand; and
2. *Its solution*, which is a sense that we are saved from the wrongness by making proper connection with the higher powers.

* "*Varieties of Religious Experience*," p. 39.

These two general impersonal statements are all Professor James can extract from an intellectual examination of multitudes of *exaggerated* experiences. That these statements are true no one would question. To defend them would be to "elaborate the obvious."

From this it is clear that, however interesting and valuable to the psychologist or pathologist may be extreme and scientific individual experiences, *these experiences are worthless to the Christian apologist*. They must be explained, and, if possible, explained away. Extreme individual experiences may discredit the whole argument, for personal experience needs to be modified, controlled, guided by the larger experience of the Church as a whole. Thus the Church, as a whole, has never accepted the extreme individualistic experience of St. Augustine. Therefore we must be careful not to identify religious experience with the phenomena of revivals. In treating experience for the purpose of apologetics, we must transfer the emphasis from the new birth, which, in "acute cases," is eccentric, to the general, *present* consciousness of fellowship with God in Christ which comes to experience in every act of Christian life. The Rev. George Jackson, Superintendent of the Wesleyan Mission in Scotland, in a most thoughtful address before the Methodists of Boston at the recent Wesley Centennial, says: "We do not lay the same emphasis as our fathers did on the definite moment of transition from death to life, and it is not for us to insist on any particular type of conversion as the sole passport into the kingdom of God, or to assume that the highest kind of religious experience must always be able to date its beginning by the clock. We believe, not in the necessity, but in the possibility of conversion—not that men must, but that men *may*, in the twinkling of an eye, be delivered from sin."

IV.

We must now ask, and try to answer: *What is the content of this experience which all men have in common? Universal religious experience is true and real. What truth does uni-*

versal religious experience establish? These truths we may proclaim without fear of their being modified next week by discoveries in science and criticism.

This examination of the content of universal religious experience has been made by many men; by Doverer and Harnack; Dr. R. W. Dale, in "The Living Christ and the Four Gospels"; by Dr. William Newton Clarke, in his valuable little book, "What Shall We Think of Christianity?"; by Maurice and Robertson; by Scott-Holland; and by Brooks. Let us make the examination, and we shall, in the main, agree with the findings of these men I have named as they agree with each other. What is the experience of all Christian men?

1. Jesus is the Saviour of men. There is deliverance for man in the life, teaching and death of Jesus. He has answered my prayers for strength, for patience, for relief from anxiety. He has loosed the chains of some evil habit which enslaved me when I prayed for deliverance. My conscience tells me He is divine. This was the experience of my fathers, who have told me, and of those who lived in the old time before them. It will be the experience of my children's children. "He that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in himself."

2. I am conscious of the being of God and of a relation to God. In that consciousness I live and act. And this is the experience of all men, of families, of nations, of the life of humanity. And in and through Jesus I know God as a Father. "When ye pray, say our Father which art," said Jesus. Then I am God's son, and all men are His children. "Beloved, now are we the sons of God." This truth of Jesus, that man may enter into filial and family relation with the Great and Holy God, has come down the way of experience from John and Paul to you and me.

"So the All-Great were the All-Loving too;
So through the thunder comes a human voice
Saying oh, heart I made a heart beats here."

3. The Holy Spirit which Jesus promised, and which He

exquisitely called the Comforter, has been experienced as a reality. "I will send you another comforter that he may abide with you forever, even the Spirit of truth." This gift of the indwelling Spirit has been known in experience from generation to generation. And the value and measure of all ritual forms is that they express and embody the life of the Spirit.

This knowledge of Jesus as a Saviour, of God known through Jesus as a Father, later of the Holy Spirit as a Comforter; and the Father and the Son through the Spirit, was a living, experienced knowledge, a conscious relationship in the Apostolic Church. The formula of the Trinity was but an attempt to give this experience intellectual expression and interpretation in poor human speech. The formula was intended to guard and express *the realities disclosed in the consciousness of the Apostolic Church*. Hence, the doctrine of the Trinity is not to be defended by the wit of man. It is not a field for intellectual sport, as Professor Pain seems to maintain. To accept the Trinity as a doctrinal statement of an intellectual puzzle, without any experience or consciousness of the divine relations which it expresses, is worthless. The symbol is an intellectual statement, and behind it is the deepest and widest of realities.

4. The transforming power of divine grace (or help). Experience shows that Jesus' high ethical demands are realized not by the human will alone, but by the strong operation of the indwelling Spirit, and by His gifts of strength and peace. Through prayer and in Sacrament, Jesus enters unstinted into our souls. The experience of the ages tells us that the Eucharist is not alone an outward and visible sign. In it the inward and spiritual grace is "given to us." The doctrine of the "Real Presence" is no other than an intellectual statement of the Christian consciousness or experience of most Churchmen regarding the Holy Supper. If that doctrine is not witnessed and verified by experience, no intellectual process will

give it warrant. Experience teaches us to hold with joy the doctrine of the Transforming Power.

5. May I add one more statement which is, I think, witnessed by the experience and life of two thousand years. *The Teachings of Jesus are ultimate truth.* "It is not sufficiently enforced by apologists," writes Romanes in his "Thoughts on Religion." "The absence from the 'Teachings of Jesus' of any doctrines which the subsequent growth of human knowledge—whether in natural sciences, ethics or economy—has had to discount. In literal truth there is no reason why any of His words should ever pass away." The experience of all sorts and conditions of men has found no weak spot in His teaching. Those teaching are to be identified with ultimate truth. Contrast the teachings of Jesus in this respect with the teachings of any other thinker of antiquity. Think of the absurdities of some of the golden pages of Plato's dialogues, and the sayings shocking to the moral sense.

Here now are certain great realities which come through universal religious experience to be assured possessions. They have come down the way of experience from the days when Christianity was first proclaimed by Peter and Paul. Christian people of all churches and all ages have experienced Jesus as a Saviour, God as a Father, the Holy Spirit as Comforter and Guide, the transforming power of Divine Grace, the ultimate truth of the teaching of Jesus. This knowledge is an immediate knowledge. It is not an inference from experience; it is given in experience. I doubt whether there are any other truths which deserve to rank with them. Your experience and mine may give us a much larger content for faith—your faith and mine. But it may not be a part of the content of universal religious experience. But what I have stated is, I am sure, true and real. Many other truths may, as Professor Clarke suggests, be *implied* in these. The doctrine of Immortality is a corollary from the consciousness of God. If I am the child of the Eternal, I must be eternal. Immortality follows from the great affirmations of Christian experience which I have named.

If I have read those great affirmations of the universal Christian consciousness aright, and I think I have, then here is a body of ultimate truth which no advance in science and criticism has or can ever change. These great realities being given in Experience need no help from the intellect save in the way of statement and interpretation. The precious and supreme value of this central body of experimental truth is what we need to learn and teach. The permanent and unchanging elements are given in experience; the changing and passing elements consist in the various interpretations of these truths made by different intellects. But the intellect did not prove them, neither can it disprove them. And ultimate Christian truth is freed from the control of any man's mental processes.

I cannot too strongly state my convictions that what the Church needs in her ministry is men who have lived in the religious experience of humanity until it has become their personal experience; men who can then stand in her pulpits and proclaim these realities. The man who preaches some scheme of theology simply because it was taught him in some seminary, or because he read it in some book; the man who bends all his energies to the revival of some pre-Reformation use of ritual, will never do much to hasten the Kingdom of God. For in theology and ritual use we do not agree. Let us strike clear and strong notes out of the eternal. Who can do this so well as a Churchman? Show me a Romanist or a minister of any great Protestant church who has struck the universal note as clear and sure as Bishop Brooks or Maurice, and I will show you a man who might be an Anglican. Let us go into our colleges and our cities and towns and set men and women right regarding the source of religion and its dependence on experience; tell them what abides, give them the truths which hold men in living and carry them in death. We may not agree in theology nor in ritual use—this is secondary. Are the truths of universal religious experience real to us? Frederick Maurice speaks somewhere of a type of man who builds a vast structure of dogma and ritual, but between whose feet

and a bottomless pit of atheism there is only a thick plank. God grant that we be not of this number.

V.

The statement that the great truths of universal religious experience proclaimed by men who have made them their own is the great and effective method of freeing men from sin and doubt is not simply a bold assertion. It is illustrated and verified in history and in biography. History shows us that the syllogistic processes are powerless to lift men from sin and doubt. I have time for but two brief illustrations, one from English history, the other from biography. The suggestion of the historical illustration I owe to Dr. Dale, the greatest and most helpful of all the English Nonconformists of the last century.

The early half of the eighteenth century witnessed the culmination of a great movement of infidelity which had gathered force throughout the seventeenth century in England, France, Holland and Germany. Many and great were the intellectual attempts to check this infidelity by argument. Grotius, in Holland, wrote his "Truth of the Christian Religion"; Pascal, in France, projected a great apologetic of which we have the fragments in his "Pensées"; Richard Baxter, in England, had written his "Reasons for the Christian Religion," and his "More Reasons for the Christian Religion and No Reason against It." About 1690 Robert Boyle, an Irish nobleman, founded his famous Boyle Lectureship for the defense of Christianity against the fierce attacks of atheism and deism. The first Boyle lecturer was Richard Bentley, who, in 1692, discoursed on "The Folly of Atheism and Deism with Respect to the Present Life." He was followed year after year by England's most eminent theologians, who brought great learning and intellectual force to defeat in an intellectual encounter the atheists and deists. Their lectures were everywhere read. After fifty years of lectures, the atheists and deists claimed the victory. When Bishop

Butler published his "Analogy," in 1736, he says in the preface: "It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted that Christianity is not so much a subject of inquiry, but that it is now at length discovered to be fictitious; and, accordingly, they treat it as if nothing remained but to set it up as a subject of mirth and ridicule as it were, by way of reprisals for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the world." This, after more than forty annual volumes of Boyle Lectures had been read by the English public. A half century later all is changed. The names and writings of the deists were well-nigh forgotten. The huge volumes of Boyle Lectures lay undisturbed on library shelves. John Wesley, one of the English Church's best gifts to mankind, had arisen. What cared he for the disputes of deist or atheist? He spoke from *experience*. He smote the rock and the water flowed. Wesley had the conscious experience of the forgiveness of sins and of divine sonship. He believed that his was not an exceptional experience, inaccessible to other men. His heart had been "strangely warmed," and so might the heart of every Englishman be "strangely warmed." His religious experience, or much of it, might be the experience of all men.

Hear ye, O hear! that ceaseless, pleading voice
Which storm, nor suffering, nor age could still.
Chief prophet voice through nigh a century's span!
And gladly was he heard; and rich the fruit
While still the harvest ripens round the earth.

There is much in the rant and cant of revivals which has no part in universal religious experience, and therefore, according to my contention, does not argue reality. Instantaneous conversion was necessary for Paul, but not for John; for Wesley, but not for Bishop Butler. It can never be insisted upon! But no candid person would deny that the source of power in the Wesleyan movement, which now numbers twenty-five million adherents, was the value which they placed on the evidence of religious experience; and my assertion that the evidence of experience is worth tons of syllogistic

reasoning in freeing men from sin and doubt is here verified on a large and imposing scale.

VL

I beg now to cite one case in the value of experience in the life of a man of finest culture. No man was more typical of the intellectual life of the last half of the nineteenth century than George John Romanes. A man of singular sweetness, purity and honesty, surrounded from childhood by wealth and refinement and love, he was one of the most original of the young scientists who followed the lead of Darwin and Huxley. He had great interest in theology.

In 1878, he published a "Candid Examination of Theism"—a book of subtle intellectual power and moral earnestness. He examines the theistic arguments based on the world of external nature. If you read his book you agree with his conclusions, that these arguments are worthless except as a field for intellectual gymnastics. His investigations led him into the mood of atheism. The book closes with a frank statement that his intellectual doubt has led him into sadness and despair: "I must confess that with this virtual negation of God the universe has lost to me its soul of loveliness. When I think of the hallowed glory of the faith which once was mine, and the mystery of existence as I now find it, I cannot avoid the sharpest pang of which my nature is susceptible." And this burden of intellectual doubt he carried for years—a heavy load. Many perplexing questions arose. Should he attend public worship? Should his children, whom he dearly loved, be educated in the Christian faith which he had renounced? And the load became heavier and heavier. Should he allow the *needs* of his heart, his instinctive longing, the deepening experience of his life to draw him back to the peace of that early, hallowed faith? In 1885, he moved to Oxford. Here he constantly saw his old friend, Dr. Paget, then Dean of Christ Church; and he came to know intimately Gore, Moberley and Aubrey Moore.

But there was no discussion or argumentation. Gradually his friends noticed a return toward faith. He writes Dr. Paget: "I have begun to discover the truth of what you once wrote about logical processes not being the only means of research in regions transcendental." Returning from a Whitsuntide Communion, he said, "I feel the service of this morning is a means of grace." At last the burden of doubt was lifted, but he could not tell the exact moment when he found it gone, and himself standing like the Pilgrim of old at the foot of the Cross.

His life was early cut off; but before he died he made notes of a "Candid Examination of Religion." After his death, these notes came to Dr. Gore, who published them, enriched with many notes, with the title, "Thoughts on Religion." The book is of great interest, especially the confessional part. "The modifications of my views are not so much due to purely logical processes of the intellect," he writes, "as to the ripening experience of life and the sobering caution which advancing age exercises on the mind. In my first book I placed undue confidence in merely syllogistic conclusions." And at the last he said he could reproach himself only for what he called sins of the intellect—mental arrogance, undue regard for intellectual supremacy. Romanes' return to faith was due to the value which he placed on experience, his own, his friends and that of the ages.*

VII.

Let us now ask, in conclusion, what we have tried to establish.

First. The discoveries in science and criticism do not disturb faith; because the source of religion is in feeling, or experience, and not in the intellect.

Second. The function of the intellect is to interpret experience; to classify and compare the facts of experience, to

*"Life and Letters of George John Romanes." Fifth Edition. Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1902.

exhibit them as truth, and thus to discover the universal elements of religious experience.

Third. Universal experience argues and proves a corresponding reality and truth. It is, therefore, of supreme value in an evidential statement of religion.

Fourth. When examined as to its content, universal religious experience establishes these articles of faith:

Jesus is my Divine Saviour.

God is my Father.

The Holy Spirit comforts and guides me.

The grace of God works in human life as a Transforming Power.

Jesus' teachings are Ultimate Truth.

Fifth. These truths proclaimed by men who know them in experience will make men everywhere experience them, and so lift men from doubt and sin.

IV.

THE LINGUISTIC PROBLEM IN JAPAN.

BY REV. CHRISTOPHER NOSS.

Ulphilas, to whom we owe the preservation of the oldest specimen of the speech of our barbarian ancestors, and Luther, whose translation of the Bible into good Saxon colloquial forms the basis of modern German literature, are classic illustrations of the influence of Christianity on the development of language. The annals of modern missionary effort tell of many enterprises which may be compared with those of Ulphilas and Luther. But never before in the history of the Church have Christian missionaries had to face a more complicated linguistic problem than that which confronts them to-day in Japan.

The Japanese type of civilization is the most elaborate that has been developed independently of Christian influences since the age of the Roman Empire. For the study of the conflict between Christianity and that civilization we find no adequate analogy on this side of the apostolic age. Roughly speaking, there are three great barriers in the way of the missionary, namely, race-prejudice, the difficulty of the language, and the effect of perverted religious ideas on the minds of the people.

The racial differences which appear so conspicuously in physiognomy and complexion do profoundly affect missionary work. They keep alive instinctive prejudices which belong properly to the age of savagery, but persist, at least latently, in the minds of the best of us. That which makes or unmakes a missionary in a country like Japan is the degree of ability to eliminate race-prejudice from his own mind, while constantly aware of its presence in the minds of the people before him. We may go so far as to say that the question of race-

prejudice is of more importance even than the linguistic problem; for a man or woman filled with genuine, loving, respect for the people will, though unable to say a word in the native tongue, accomplish a greater work among them than an eloquent preacher whose ministrations are tainted with the presumption that he is dealing with an essentially inferior race. The Japanese readily forgive in a stranger anything but an indication, however slight, of contempt for them as a race.

Yet these considerations, important as they are, have to do with subjective feelings and not with essential differences. In reality it is not flesh and blood that differentiates nationalities. The factor which determines the type of civilization to which one belongs is not the blood that flows in his veins, be it Teutonic, Mongolian, Malayan, or Celtic; it is the influence that pulses in the mother-tongue. Language, not lineage, keeps men and nations apart. It is natural then that linguistic problems should largely occupy the student of the science of missions.

In the Philippines our government is trying the great experiment of uniting polyglot tribes into one nation by teaching them the English language. It is not unlikely that the effort will prove successful. The Japanese martyr-statesman Mori is said to have proposed the same plan to his people many years ago. Now it is certain that in some instances missionary enthusiasm over native languages has gone too far. Mr. Batchelor, who has devoted his life to the Ainu, the aborigines of North Japan, once said in the writer's hearing that he would not advise young missionaries to study the language as he has done; for within a generation or two the Ainu are destined to be assimilated by the Japanese, and even now the young men and women converse among themselves in Japanese. The sooner such people learn the language of the civilization around them, the better. But in regard to the desirability of the adoption by the Japanese of the English language there may well be a difference of opinion. It is not certain that it would be well for the nation or for the world

at large could this be accomplished. It may be that the peculiar national genius which finds expression in the Japanese language, and could hardly exist apart from it, is destined in the Providence of God to make its special contribution to the progress of the Kingdom. But even if it seemed desirable to make English the national language, it is evidently not feasible to do so. It is no more likely that the Japanese will give up their mother-tongue than that the Germans will give up theirs.

The English language is, however, made a principal part of the curriculum in all academies and higher institutions of learning. Students of military and naval affairs, of medicine, law and philosophy may substitute for it German or French. The student classes are, therefore, largely accessible to the missionary from the very beginning of his ministry. By means of English Bible classes many Japanese can be led to a saving faith. The writer has known young men to attend such classes who really desired instruction in the Bible more than instruction in English, but, having the timid spirit of a Nicodemus, would have been afraid to come to a class using the vernacular, thus openly proclaiming themselves seekers. While some excellent believers have been won through a foreign language, the method is unsatisfactory for several reasons. In the first place the number of Japanese with whom it is easy to hold a conversation in a foreign language is surprisingly small. Japanese educators have been successful in many directions, but have failed conspicuously in the teaching of modern languages. Secondly, when the missionary has any reason to feel that his inquirer comes chiefly for the sake of the language, the whole performance has an air of duplicity and insincerity which is quite intolerable to a conscientious worker. Finally, it is our experience that ordinarily a Japanese who attempts to converse in a foreign tongue has, as it were, a double consciousness and does not reveal his true self until the conversation passes over into the vernacular: he says not what he would, but what he can say.

It scarcely needs an argument to establish the principle that the missionary who would be on intimate terms with, and have much influence over, the people to whom he is sent, must make it his first aim to master the vernacular. Even those foreigners whose only business it is to teach English find that a knowledge of the native idiom simplifies their tasks. Much more is this true of missionary teachers who desire to be spiritually efficient.

But in the case of the Japanese language, which is, all things considered, for a Westerner at least, the most difficult language in the world, it is debatable whether mastery is feasible. Captain Brinkley, editor of the *Japan Mail*, than whom no one is better qualified to speak, has more than once declared that it is not. It is his opinion that none of us can learn the language so as to be able to make a public address with becoming dignity. Indeed it is much easier to imagine a Galilean fisherman conversing freely, preaching acceptably and composing readable books in Greek than it has been for one knowing the situation to imagine one of our university-trained missionaries doing the same in Japanese.

It is harder to bridge the chasm between English and Japanese than between English and Chinese. It is a fact that missionaries in China have been more successful in language-study than their brethren in Japan, who, it is reasonable to suppose, are not inferior in point of ability and consecration. To be sure, the fact that missions in China are older, and more helps for beginners have been available, must be taken into the account. But there is the other fact that the Chinese seem to have less difficulty with English than the Japanese have.

There is a difficulty inherent in the language itself, and it is not only foreigners that are troubled by it in our days. Japanese educated abroad, and even those educated at home, who have devoted themselves more to a foreign language or to a scientific specialty than to their own national literature, are prone to speak and write more or less like the foreigners.

When Warneck in his *Evangelische Missionslehre* says that "every foreign language in which the Gospel is proclaimed must go through a process of Christianization" the context makes it evident that he has in mind principally religious words and expressions. This principle holds in Japan no less than in any other pagan country, as we shall see later; but there is a more important, though less direct, relation between religion and language. It is not merely the vocabulary that presents an obstacle to missionary efforts. The very structure of the language is a hindrance to Christian progress.

The root of all linguistic evil in Japan is to be found in the divorce of the literary and colloquial styles. For centuries the language of the common people has been despised, as was the case in Europe when Latin was the language of scholars. Such contempt for the colloquial is not in harmony with the spirit of the Gospel, as the trend of modern history plainly shows. In Japan a double evolution has been in progress for centuries. The result is that the spoken language has become too clumsy for literary purposes, while the rich vocabulary of the written style has become largely unavailable for conversational purposes. The difference between the two is even greater than that between Hegelian German and the Pennsylvania dialect.

It is said of a certain town in east Pennsylvania that the people there pray in seven languages and swear in eight, the jest being aimed at the German dialect, which is supposed to be better adapted to the latter use than to the former. The opposite happens to be true of Japanese colloquial. But, generally speaking, the two are alike in this: they are good for every-day purposes and for story-telling, but in their present form are hardly capable of the nobler uses of language.

In regard to the curious fact that the Japanese *patois* lends itself more readily to blessing God than to cursing men, a digression may be welcome. Analogies to our vice of profanity are not entirely wanting. There are mild exclamations like *Namu Sambō* (Hail, Three Treasures!), a Buddhistic phrase

corresponding to the German *Gott im Himmel*. Nor are the Japanese without resource when they want to express their detestation of a person. But the devilish tone, the sulphurous odor of American profanity is happily not much in evidence. This negative virtue is not due to any extraordinary reverence for things divine. Men may jest freely about the gods and it is hard to teach even Christians to be properly reverent on all occasions. But woe to the man who betrays a spirit of irreverence toward the Emperor! Indeed one can hardly imagine such a Japanese. Self-repression, circumspection in speech, strict regard for the relative rank of the speaker and the person spoken to or spoken of, is the most striking feature of the Japanese character and the Japanese language. The colloquial affords a great variety of polite expressions indicating respect for a superior. The most exalted of these terms are available for use in Christian prayer. Consequently the Japanese prayer-language is very refined. But there is another side to the matter.

A Japanese man uses four kinds of language, according as he speaks to a superior, an inferior, an intimate friend, or his wife. A woman is so hopelessly inferior to almost any one that she has little occasion to use any but the most polite language. The analogy of the German *Sie* and *du* will help the reader to understand the distinctions between the following equivalents of "you": *anata* (superior), *kisama* (inferior), *kimi* (among comrades) and *omae* (in the family).^{*} The same distinctions extend to other parts of speech. When I speak politely, not only must the one to whom I speak be addressed as *anata*, but all his acts and everything related to him must be described by means of special honorific words, while I and all my connections, from my "rude self" and my "foolish wife" down to my "dirty house" and my "vile shop" must be appropriately abased by means of humiliating nouns and verbs. "He goes," when there is no need to

^{*} In Japanese words vowels are pronounced as in German; consonants as in English.

be concerned about the rank of the person in question, is simply *yuku*; but when I or any other contemptible person goes, the only proper verb is *mairu*; and when you or any of your relatives go, it is *irassharu*; while the Emperor can only *o miyuki asobasareru* or, more exactly, *gyōkō ni naru*. The corresponding words for "speak" are *iu*, *mōsu*, *ossharu*, *notamau*; and there are numerous synonyms for each form. Foreigners naturally find this feature of the language embarrassing, especially since there is danger not only of speaking rudely, but also of using excessively polite words, which are liable to be taken in an ironical sense, according to the proverb that "excessive politeness amounts to the same thing as rudeness."

But in this respect the colloquial is being profoundly modified by Christian influences at work in the new civilization. The principle of the essential equality of bond and free, of male and female, is driving into oblivion forms of speech designed to guard the dignity of a superior as against an inferior, and absurdly exaggerated humiliative expressions cannot endure the light of Christian sincerity.

Another indictment to be brought against the colloquial concerns the lack of grammatical precision. The grammar of the spoken language has never been satisfactorily reduced to rules. It was not until the year 1901 that native works on colloquial grammar began to appear. The surprising neglect by the Japanese of the study of their own mother-tongue is due partly to their contempt for what they call the "vulgar speech," and partly to the fact that in the feudal age the country was divided among clans, each having its own dialectical peculiarities. Under the new regime the common dialects of Edo and Kyōto have been undergoing a process of fusion, together with the provincial dialects—a natural process much accelerated by the policy of the educational authorities. At such a time students are embarrassed by the lack of a standard grammar. It would not be difficult to make a list of a thousand and one grammatical points in regard to which the

Japanese themselves cannot agree. Moreover, the language is being profoundly modified, largely by the influence of students of English. There is a marked difference between the speech of a gentleman of the old school and that of a young man at college. The idiom of the former is often exasperatingly evasive and noncommittal, so that one is tempted to say that it fully verifies the theory of that cynical Frenchman who declared that the purpose of words is to conceal thought. Subjectless, impersonal sentences abound. On the other hand, a sentence may have several subjects and several predicates, apparently. Logical precision, as for instance in translating from the English, is not impossible, but involves a cumbersome, ungraceful and monotonous style at variance with the genius of the language. There is, however, a promising movement known as *Gembun Itchi* (union of the spoken and written languages), which aims at the use of the colloquial for all literary purposes. In this movement Christians take a leading part.

There are several varieties of literary language, which have been developed from two types. The native classical style has elaborate conjugations of the agglutinative kind and a considerable stock of words, many of which are now, unhappily, obsolete in the colloquial. The Chinese classical style is based on translation as literal as possible from the Chinese classics. The literary language of to-day derives its grammar in the main from native sources and its vocabulary mostly from Chinese sources.

The Chinese language differs entirely from the native Japanese, not only in vocabulary but also in grammatical structure. Chinese words are essentially monosyllabic; Japanese words are composed of syllables which are either single vowels or simple consonants followed by vowels. The order of words in Chinese is quite like the English order; but the Japanese is so different that in translating it is usually a most convenient rule to begin at the end of a sentence and work backward.

Chinese words have been imported so largely not only because the Chinese vocabulary is richer than the native but also because Chinese expressions are wonderfully concise and to the point. Even in the colloquial they drive out the native words much as the English sparrows drive out our warblers. Who could resist such a convenient word as *den-sha* for trolley-car (from *den*, lightning or electricity, and *sha*, vehicle), or *mu-sen-den-shin* marconigram (without line lightning tidings)? The peasant now calls his front gate *mon* and thunder *rai*, while the native words *kado* and *kaminari* are passing into desuetude. Most Chinese derivatives occur in compounds, usually of two words each; e. g., *fuku-in*, Gospel, from *fuku*, happiness, and *in*, voice. These Chinese words and compounds, with very few exceptions, have not been assimilated in the same way that Greek and Latin words are anglicized. They are not inflected like genuine Japanese words. They are regarded as substantives. When they denote an act or a state they may be made to serve as verbs by adding forms of the verb "to do." By the addition of certain particles they are made available as adjectives or adverbs.

A brief inspection of the most comprehensive native dictionary, that of Ochiai, indicates that it contains about 90,000 words, or nearly as many as Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon. But the Japanese collection is still far from complete. Moreover, to meet the demands of our times, new words are being coined daily, the metal for which is mined from the classical Chinese. Very few European words are being absorbed.

Now, this is all very satisfactory for those who have mastered thousands of Chinese characters and can read; but, as has been said, much of this rich material is not available for conversational purposes. The most eloquent preacher we have ever had in North Japan was Mr. Oshikawa, but often his sermons were so full of sonorous Chinese derivatives that those who filled the place of the unlearned were mystified and could never tell where to say "Amen." For, excepting the common compounds, which by daily use have become thor-

oughly naturalized in the colloquial, the classical Chinese sounds suggest no sense whatever to the mind. Nor is the difficulty felt only by the unlearned.

It must be remembered that the Japanese pronunciation of the Chinese vocables differs more or less from that which now prevails in the Chinese dialects, since it was derived from China about the time when Christianity was being established in the Roman Empire. Naturally, the original sounds have in the course of the centuries suffered much corruption. The writer has before him a list of the four thousand Chinese characters most commonly used in Japan. Of these over one hundred are pronounced *kō*. There are besides eighteen whose proper sound is *kwō*, corrupted in most parts of the country likewise to *kō*. The count does not include a host of ideograms pronounced *ko*, with a short *o*, which to the Japanese ear is a very different sound. There are seventy-seven characters answering to the sound *tō*. These examples are chosen at random. The sounds *kō* and *tō* are derived from a greater number of sounds in an ancient Chinese dialect (probably *kau*, *kou*, *kang*, *kong*, etc.). The modern Chinese have less difficulty. Not only have they preserved distinctions such as those indicated above, but they also have their tones by which homonyms are carefully distinguished. These tones are studied by the Japanese in a theoretical way, just as we study quantities in classical prosody, but are no longer a practical element in pronunciation. Quantity, however, is carefully observed. The long *ō* and the short *o* have the same sound. They differ only in length as an eighth note in music differs from a quarter.

But, with seventy-seven *tō*'s and nearly twice as many *kō*'s, it is no wonder that when a man hears in a public address a compound like *kō-tō*, or has it in the Roman script before his eyes, he finds it difficult to guess its meaning and longs to see the characters, if he is so happy as to know even a few. *Kō-tō* may mean "high rank" or "obeisance" (the same as the Chinese "kowtow" found in our English dictionaries), and

it may have many other meanings, according to the characters which the sounds represent. Making the *ko* short we have *ko-tō*, which may mean "ancient sword" or "solitary island," etc. On the other hand, *kō-to* may mean a "later plan" or a "tricky hare" or it may serve as a transliteration of the English word "coat." Finally, making both syllables short, we have *ko-to*, a Chinese derivative meaning "brought over from abroad in ancient times," or the native word *koto*, which may denote the Japanese musical instrument of that name, or may mean "word" or "affair" or "different." This is a very fair example of the conditions that obtain in the modern Japanese language. The few simple sounds which it uses are very much overworked. This is the reason why it is impracticable to abolish the Chinese characters and difficult to convey unusual or lofty ideas in a public address.

When Mr. Fukuzawa, the greatest educator of the new Japan, first asserted that it was possible to deliver a lecture in the colloquial, his friends declared that the thing could not be done. He immediately proceeded to deliver a lecture and so convinced them that profound thought could be conveyed by means of the colloquial. Since that time hosts of teachers, lecturers and preachers have been experimenting with the colloquial. Mr. Fukuzawa's friends were not, however, altogether in the wrong. The Japanese government will one of these days adopt the heroic policy of throwing the Chinese characters overboard and so lighten the educational ship. Such a policy will involve great damage for awhile, but it will hasten the evolution of the new Japanese language, compelling, as it will, the rejection of the Chinese derivatives that are not fit for oral discourse.

The translators of the authorized version of the Bible wisely avoided the Chinese derivatives as much as possible, though they did not venture to adopt the colloquial style. The time has not yet come for that. The writer, by way of experiment, has attempted to colloquialize the simple narrative of the importunate friend (Luke 11, 5-7). In the authorized version

of these three verses there are at least fifteen words and a number of grammatical inflections and constructions not found in ordinary colloquial and not all clear to an uneducated person. But if the friends are made to use very polite language the result is incongruous. If they are made to speak familiarly, the conversation sounds too much like slang for the Bible. It may be remarked, by the way, that the writer after devoting eight years to the study of the Japanese colloquial finds in himself an alarming predilection for English slang. This may throw some light on missionary perplexities in regard to the language. The translators of the Bible, while they could not adopt a colloquial style, did the next best thing in choosing the "Yamato language," *i. e.*, pure native words. Their work is much admired and will no doubt have an important influence on the future of the language.

The radical evil, as has been said, lies in the divorce of the literary and colloquial forms of speech. Such an abuse is impossible in a truly Christian civilization, where there is regard for the essential dignity of man as man, but is entirely consonant with the Buddhistic doctrine of pure and undefiled religion for the learned only, while the multitude which knows not the law is cheerfully abandoned to a second-class religion of idolatry and superstition. It is this consideration that makes the missionary to Japan feel that he has to deal not only with pagan temples and pagan customs but even with a pagan language.

A few words should be added in regard to the more obvious phase of the matter, the question of the religious vocabulary. The Buddhists have an elaborate terminology derived from India through the Chinese. Their pronunciation of the Chinese elements, being derived originally from the southern provinces of China, is also peculiar. The modern reaction of nationalism against Buddhism has extended even to the question of pronunciation. Many Japanese, for example, pronounce the name *Tōkyō* (East Capital) *Tōkei*. Sounds

like *kyō*, *myō*, *shō*, for *kei*, *mei*, *sei*, have Buddhistic associations. The new compounds which now flood the language follow the purer, classical sounds known as *Kanon* (sounds of *Kan* or *Han*).

It is almost needless to say that the distinctive Buddhistic terms are carefully avoided by Christians. Theologians have comparatively little difficulty in forming new compounds free from Buddhistic taint. As compared with the language of a barbarous people, Japanese offers many advantages to the scholar. But in interpreting the Gospel to the common people the preacher is much hampered by the pagan and even anti-christian associations of some of the words which he must use.

The word for "God" is *kami*. Etymologically it means "above." Like the German "*Herr*" it has been used also of human lords, and in the form *o kami san* may even denote "the lady of the house." In the sense of "God" *kami* is represented by a Chinese character commonly applied to any one of the "eight hundred myriads" of deities of the native *Shintō* cult, as in the phrase so often used by the government, *kami hotoke* (gods and buddhas). As there is ordinarily no distinction between singular and plural in the colloquial, the reader may imagine how cautious a speaker must be in using the term, usually qualifying it by such adjectives as "one, true, living," etc.

Not to weary the reader too much, only a few more examples may be given. The word for "righteousness" utterly lacks the virility of the English word. The dictionary defines it as "disinterestedness." In the minds of the people it denotes being faithful to an engagement, doing what one's relations to other men demand without regard to selfish considerations. It perplexes the Japanese to be told of the righteousness or love of God. To them "love" is fondness, a weakness of which a man ought to be ashamed. "Sin" is associated with offenses of which the police take cognizance. "Liberty" suggests being free from the restrictions of poverty, being able to do as one pleases. "Chastity" is defined as the constancy

or loyalty of a woman to her husband. We are still groping about for a word to denote social purity in general.

Finally, a word in regard to the nature of the Chinese characters may be in order; for some of them are indelibly stamped with the spirit of paganism.

The ideograms are of two kinds. The simplest and most common are evidently derived from picture-writing, or originated in the fancy of some ancient scribe. Thus the character made by combining "woman" and "child" is "loveliness" or "fondness"; a woman under a roof indicates "tranquility"; but the sign for woman thrice repeated makes the ideogram for "depravity." This last character, so long as it remains in use, will shout from the housetops the doctrine of the essential wickedness of the feminine nature.

The great majority of the characters are composed of two parts, one, the "radical," indicating the kind of object, the other the "phonetic" used in an arbitrary way to indicate the sound. In ancient times "city" was *shi* and "elder sister" was also *shi*. Now by combining "woman" and *shi* (city) we get the feminine thing called *shi*, i. e., elder sister. A glance over the characters that come under the radical for "woman" is a lesson in the pagan conception of the feminine nature. The feminine thing called *mō* is "disorder"; the feminine thing called *bō* is "hindrance," etc. The ancients were evidently misogynists.

A leading native professor in one of our Christian institutions once hazarded the assertion that "a Japanese is not thoroughly converted until he has learned the English language." This startling dictum is intended to be epigrammatic, of course, and is not to be taken literally. English is named not because it is inherently superior to the German or any other language of Christendom. The professor himself is master of both German and English and personally prefers the former. But English happens to be the missionary language in Japan. It would not be right to give the impression that a Japanese who reads and thinks only in his mother-tongue cannot have the

faith that overcomes the world and persevere in his personal Christian life. But, after all proper deductions are made, the saying quoted above does but emphasize a fact abundantly proved by missionary experience. The Christian who breathes no intellectual atmosphere but that afforded by the Japanese language is, humanly speaking, not so able to stand alone and not so fit to be a leader in the Church as the man who has learned to think in English. English not only gives the Japanese student access to a rich Christian literature, but it also helps unconsciously to alter his whole mental habit. Our educational institutions in Japan exist for the sake of the few chosen of the Lord to lead His Church there. They are intended to sift out the spiritually and intellectually elect. These chosen few will in time dominate not only Christian thought but also linguistic development in Japan. For their sake we continue to make English the principal item in our curricula, though this involves exposing ourselves to the reproaches of a Warneck, who says that our American version of the Lord's last command is, "Go and teach all nations English."

V.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JUSTIN MARTYR IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.

BY CALVIN K. STAUDT, A.M.

Nothing is of greater importance in the history of Christian doctrine than a study of landmarks. As there are epochs and crises in the political and social sphere, so there are epochs and crises in the development of Christian doctrine. Whenever the Christian religion was confronted with a crisis, God had prepared a man to carry out his divine plans. When Roman Catholicism had degenerated and had held the people in ecclesiastical bondage, Luther appeared and led them into the path of grace and freedom. When men were longing for a knowledge of sin and grace in terms of legalism, Augustine came forth and wrought out his theology. Likewise, when Christianity and Greek philosophy were antagonistic to each other, Justin rose and bridged the chasm which existed between these two systems.

The period to which Justin belongs—the first three quarters of the second century—is the most significant, the most interesting, and yet, in a way, the most obscure section in all Church history. Because of its nearness to the Apostolic Age, and because of the sudden and subtle transformation of the religion of Christ at this time, this period has always aroused careful and repeated investigation from students both of the New Testament and of Church history. Justin has become a bone of contention between Catholics and Protestants, between conservatives and radicals. And because of the scantiness of literary remains of the age, his writings are differently interpreted and his place in history variously estimated.

In order to show the significance of Justin in the development of doctrine, it is necessary to assume a point of view.

Everything depends on the view-point. A man, as well as a system, may be of little significance from one point of view, but from another standpoint we may see a world of meanings. Thus, viewing Justin within the scope of Christian doctrine, there are at least three methods of procedure which must be dismissed. In the first place, one might proceed to compare the writings of Justin with the teachings of Jesus. This would be in order, if our object were to sever doctrine—using it in the restricted sense—from what is gospel. Secondly, the Catholic historian would compare the doctrines of Justin with the Œcumenical Councils, endeavoring to find in the teachings of Justin the same advanced and developed doctrines to which the Church has always and does still adhere. Thirdly, the Protestant theologian might endeavor to point out similarities between the teachings of Justin and what he considers the prevalent and fundamental doctrinal conceptions of to-day, and in this way attempt to show the significance of Justin.

But the above three methods will be unhistorical, inorganic, and incompatible with our subject. Our purpose must be to estimate the Martyr altogether in his historical relation and setting. Within the stream of the development of Christian doctrine, we will view him in his organic relation to the past and to the future. We will endeavor to discern him in his relation to the people of his age, and also compare him with parallel efforts and movements. We will always work out from the fundamental basis that in him we have a union of two elements—Christian and philosophic. We will point out the fact that he successfully bridged a yearning chasm. In doing this we will especially note that he transformed Christianity and laid the foundation of ecclesiastical doctrine. All this we desire to view under a unifying principle, viz., that *Justin stands out in the development of Christian doctrine as an epoch-making feature*. The problem involves much more than a mere statement of Justin's theology or doctrine, even though that theology is the product of a purely historico-grammatico-exegetical study. This, after all, is only preliminary

and elementary to the larger problem of significance. The scheme involves or rather presupposes a thorough analysis of his theology for the sake of building upon a higher synthesis. The task is comprehensive, requiring not merely an understanding of Justin's doctrine; but also a thorough knowledge of Hellenic thought, and a true perspective and vivid grasp of the development of Christianity at least within the first three centuries.

But before we attempt to elucidate the significance of Justin, it is necessary to state succinctly and refer briefly to certain *data*, which should or must be presupposed.

1. The writings of Justin. All scholars admit that the only authentic writings of Justin still extant are the two Apologies, longer and shorter, and the Dialogue with Trypho; and these survive in only a single manuscript. Fragments of his work against Marcion have been gathered from quotations of later writers. His lost works addressed to the Christian Church, no doubt, gave a fuller exposition of his Christianity than we find in his apologetic writings; "but we can never suppose that the fundamental principles were different." The two Apologies were addressed to the Emperor Antoninus Pius. Both are a defense of the Christians and their religion against heathen calumnies and persecutions; and their chief purpose, according to Engelhardt, is to justify the worship of Christ beside the Father under the title, Son of God. The teachings are concerning the Logos; concerning God; concerning the righteousness of man, which involves an explanation of freedom, salvation, faith, repentance, sacraments; and concerning future rewards and punishments. The Dialogue, on the other hand, was with a Jew, and it discusses Christianity as the true philosophy, as a new law, and as the true Israel. A cursive reading might lead us to conclude that these two writings cannot come from the same hand, but a closer study reveals the same underlying principles; the writer merely speaks in other terms and employs another method of argumentation. These writings come forth from about the middle of the second century.

2. History of the interpretation of Justin. The object is not to give a complete history of the estimate of Justin; but simply to deal in an historic way with the various standpoints, in order that we may better appreciate the position already assumed. When Justin was first brought under the analysis of critical study, it was supposed that he represented one phase of the conflict between Jewish and Gentile Christianity. Credner, the great exponent of this view, said, "Although a Gentile, yet Justin stood on the ground of Ebionite Jewish Christianity with the Platonic Logos doctrine attached as an appendix to his creed." Baur, who was under the influence of Hegelian philosophy, maintained that Justin's Christianity was an outcome of the union of Jewish Christianity (thesis) with Gentile Christianity (antithesis). This view was prevalent in the Tübingen school until the time of Ritschl, who gave a new turn to the problem, and looked upon Justin from an entirely new standpoint. He concluded that Jewish Christianity was incapable of development, and that the Catholic Church did not come forth from a union of Jewish with Gentile Christianity; but that Justin is merely a degree in Gentile Christianity. "He is a degenerate Paulinist" and "a true representative of Gentile Christianity which was in the process of becoming the Catholic Church." The standpoint was somewhat changed again by Engelhardt, who gave little attention to Justin's relation to Paul; but who strongly emphasized the influences of Hellenic heathenism, and the Platonic and Stoic modes of thought. He says, "Justin was both a heathen and a Christian. We must acknowledge his Christianity and his heathenism in order to understand him." This position has since been maintained. Scholars at present only differ in regard to emphasis. Some like Dörner, Otto, Stähelin, Holland, and Purves have labored to show that he grew substantially on the soil of orthodox Apostolic tradition; while others like Harnack, Hatch, Weizsäcker and Aubé have labored to show that his theology was substantially Hellenic, and not merely in form but also in content. Aubé even goes to the utmost ex-

treme, and states that Justin's theology is nothing more than a "popularized heathen philosophy."

3. Source of his religious knowledge. At this point the attempt is merely to show his formal dependence on religious sources. It is one thing to point out one's formal relation to the source of his knowledge and another thing to show the inner and organic relationship of sources as they become embodied in one's thinking and *weltanschauung*. Justin derived his source of Christian knowledge partly from living tradition, and partly from the Holy Scriptures. The Old Testament he cited frequently, and often inaccurately. Had some knowledge of Hebrew, but frequently copied the blunders and interpolations of the Septuagint. His exegesis was apologetic, typological and allegorical in accordance with the Alexandrian method of interpretation. "He finds references to Christ everywhere, and carries the whole New Testament into the Old without discrimination." The Gospels from which he drew were Matthew and Luke. He cites Mark once, and perhaps also the Gospel of John. Harnack and E. A. Abbott declare that he made use of the Fourth Gospel; but it is disputed whether he used it authoritatively, as he used the Synoptics. As to what is meant by the "Memoirs, which were called the Gospels," there is as yet no consensus of opinion. Some maintain that he meant only Matthew and Luke; others, that the Memoirs were the common stock out of which the Gospels had grown. Engelhardt claims that Justin used a harmony based on our synoptists themselves; while Westcott holds that the canonical Gospels alone, together with oral tradition, supplied Justin with his knowledge of evangelical history. He also made use of the Epistles of Paul—using the text, as Engelhardt conclusively proves—the Apocalypse, Hebrews, Acts and the Gospel of Peter, whatever that was. Also used two or three times the Sibylline Oracles and Hystaspes for genuine prophecies; and appeals to the Apocryphal Acts of Pilate as an authority.

Now, after having referred to his writings and interpreters

and religious sources, we have the necessary data to elaborate and work out our theme. The real significance of Justin underlies the following proposition: he marks a decisive epoch in the development of Christian doctrine. Our aim is to see this truth from two points of view. In the first part let us endeavor to find Justin as an epoch-making feature; in the second part let us try to point out how he became an epoch-making feature. In the first or distant view, Justin will be seen to stand out boldly and abruptly as an epoch, just as a mountain peak towers over the mountain chain; in the second or nearer view, we propose to see what was in him that caused him to mark an epoch, just as we decide to come closer to the peak and study the strata and faults to discover why it ever became a peak. The former problem is the more general, in which we grope for a true perspective in the stream of Christian doctrine; the latter, the more specific, in which we draw our inferences largely from his doctrine by referring it to the two great channels—Christian tradition and Hellenic philosophy.

I.

That Justin stands in the development of Christian doctrine at the threshold of a new era and of a new order of the apprehension of Christian truth is evident. And if we accept Harnack's definition of Christian doctrine, the history of the dogma of the Church, he stands out not merely at the beginning of a new order, but at the very origin of doctrine itself. Even if we merely hold on to the more general and broader view of doctrine, the definite exposition of the contents of Christianity in clear and self-consistent propositions, it always remains true that in Justin may be seen the first great theological issue which divided the Ancient Church. The Catholic Church has really its origin in Justin, if by Catholic we mean the Church of doctrine and law.

Not only did Justin, when Christianity was assailed, strengthen and confirm the believers to become more earnest and zealous Christians; not only did he bravely die for his

faith, being lauded ever since as the great martyr of the Early Church; but, in addition, he rose to the task of pointing out the way through which the Gospel of Christ might find entrance into the inner chambers of Hellenic philosophy, and there also become a molding and leavening power. One of the great theologians of this country once said that since the second century Christianity was never in such a critical state as it is to-day. The import of this statement is evident. Christianity to-day must adjust itself to science. In the second century it had to adjust itself to Græco-Roman culture. Such transitions are always a test. But Justin was the man for the hour. He brought the two elements together in such a way that he became the forerunner of Greek theology. The process, of course, meant a complete transformation of early Christianity. Doctrines became the philosophical means for making the Gospel intelligible. Christianity had to yield to some alloy, which changed its form and colored its content. Yet, beneath the integument of this doctrine which he introduced, and which was so necessary to bridge the chasm, there remained the essence of Christianity.

Before developing this line of thought any further, it is well to examine various attempts of explaining Justin, "the great enigma in history," as the resultant of other and more dominant forces than those above assumed. These scholars admit that in the development of doctrine he marks a decisive epoch, but they pervert in essence his true epoch-making feature.

The Ebionite or Jewish type of Christianity dare not be overlooked. There are certain elements in the writings of Justin which give occasion to believe with the Tübingen critics; and it is not fair to dismiss this with a single stroke of the hand. The fact that he laid stress on the Old Testament, that he decided on the Twelve but did not name Paul have been used as evidences of Jewish Christian influences and sympathies. But, on the other hand, there is a decisive line of evidences against this. The greatest argument against such

influences is Justin's failure to understand how God could choose one nation from among the nations (Apol. II., 6). He mentions Socrates and Heraclitus before Abraham and Elias and other Hebrews as an example of men who lived conformably to truth before Christ came (Apol. I., 46). He speaks of the unbelief of the Jews and states that if the Jews are distinguished at all from Gentiles, it is because of their unbelief, and even quotes Isaiah to this effect (Apol. I., 31). In quoting Micah II., 2, as it is quoted in Matt. II., 6, he significantly omits from the clause, "who shall rule my people Israel," the word Israel (Apol. I., 34, and Dia. 78). He entirely distrusts the Jews' copies of their Scriptures, alleging that they had been altered through hostility to the Christians (Dia. 71-73). Although a Jewish doctrine, yet the "chiliasm to which Justin adhered has a strong anti-Judaic form." Justin's reference to the eating of meat offered to idols was to oppose heretics, and not to conciliate with Jewish Christian doctrines. Moreover, his monotheism, says Engelhardt, "was non-Jewish, yea anti-Jewish in character."

The relation Justin sustained to Paul, the representative of Gentile Christian doctrine, has likewise been overdrawn. Justin was not anti-Pauline, in the sense that he deliberately fell back on primitive Apostolic Christianity; nor was he in sympathy with Paul, in the sense that he was antipathetic to the other Apostles. On the one hand, we note that he never mentioned Paul by name, and yet he spoke of the Twelve. We wonder why he opposed Marcion, who attempted to restore Pauline Christianity, when we know that he made use of Paul's Epistles and approved of Pauline doctrines. In the face of all this we will not stand upon either dilemma by saying, "He is Pauline without being willing to own the name, or non-Pauline, although he intends to be it." But we will agree with Engelhardt's conclusion, viz., that it is no matter to Justin whether he is Pauline or whether he does not adhere to Paul; he wants to be a Christian, and one Apostle has no more interest to him than another.*

* "Das Christenthum Justins des Märtyrers," pp. 352-375.

Thus the significance of Justin as an epoch-making feature in the development of the doctrine cannot be understood or verified in that he followed one or another Christian party, or that he was the result of a conflict between these two parties, or that he was a direct or indirect product of Pauline theology. But we can alone see his true historic significance when we behold him altogether in his relation to Greek thought. In him we have the interpenetration of two elements, the coming together of two currents, the one carrying the Gospel, the other philosophical material. The union of these two streams was the formation of doctrine in the true sense of the word. But we must also remember that when Christianity knocked at the door of Græco-Roman culture the former was still encased in its Judaic type of thinking. We are greatly indebted to modern critics like Hatch and Harnack, who point out fundamental mental differences between the Jews and the Greeks; who note differences of conceptions underlying similar terms, *e. g.*, God, preëxistence, the relation of matter and spirit, dualism, etc.; and who remind us of the fact "that no permanent change takes place in the religious beliefs or usages of a race which is not rooted in the existing beliefs and usages of that race." Hence, we can readily see how great the separating gulf was, what it meant to make the adjustment, and what the natural result was—the formation of a new system of doctrine.

But, after all, is it true that Justin stands for such a *marked* epoch in the history of Christian doctrine, considering that the Apostolic fathers preceded him; that Paul was the Apostle to the Greeks; that the Gospel record itself came forth in the Greek tongue; and that even Judaism, in which Christianity was born, had come under Greek influences already in the time of Alexander the Great? It is very true that there was an alliance between Christianity and Hellenism before Christianity came on the stage of history as a world power; "but this alliance had no significance as to the origin of the Gospel, but merely for its propagation and for the development of

Christianity into a universal religion." The New Testament shows Hellenic influences, but Hellenic ideas do not form the presuppositions of New Testament writings. They are determined by the spirit of the Old Testament and Judaism. It is only when we come down to Justin that the mode of thought is thoroughly determined by the Hellenic spirit and governed by an undercurrent Stoico-Platonical philosophy. It is very necessary to distinguish here between a spirit or atmosphere and a fundamental *weltanschauung*.

Likewise, Paul's Epistles deal with Greek forms and Hellenic modes of expression, but as regards content, Paul's idea of the Gospel is independent of Hellenism. Paul looked at Christianity through the colored spectacles of Pharisaism, in which he was trained, and not through the refractory medium of Hellenism. And Harnack, who is a special student of the material sources of the first three centuries, states that Paul prepared the way for the introduction of the Gospel into the Græco-Roman world of thought; but at the same time he emphasizes that Paul nowhere allowed that world of thought to influence his doctrine of salvation, and that little more could pass into the common consciousness of men than the universal idea of salvation.

But how about the sub-Apostolic Age? Fairbairn says, "The Apostolic fathers have hardly begun to understand the alphabet of the religion; their world is smaller, meaner, emptier than the Apostolic." They are merely imitators and show us very little of their individuality. Since they manifest little originality, we observe little of the philosophical element; and yet we have enough to discern inroads of an Hellenic spirit: the very presuppositions of forces which awaited the coming of a personality like Justin's.

Among the Apologists, he is virtually the first. The Epistle to Diognetus may have priority. But it is really Justin who begins to move on new ground, who "pioneers and ventures along unexamined roads," and who gives a new turn to Christianity. He stands out as an alpine peak. Under his hands

Christian doctrine formed itself into some of its most essential and cardinal points; and in his steps followed a host of others who turned this philosophy of Christianity, which was then hanging together somewhat loosely, more and more into a system, until it was formed into a true theology under the Alexandrian school, and until it received the sanction of the state under Athanasius.

But how about the Logos doctrine, which is the significant doctrine of Justin? Do we not have a similar doctrine already in the Gospel of John and the writings of Philo? Whatever be our idea as to Justin's dependence on these two writings, or as to the dependence of John on Philo (and scholars are all at variance on these problems), still this is true, that there is a world of difference between the Logos doctrine of John and Philo on the one hand, and that of Justin on the other. "The prologue of John's Gospel was not a Greek conception, though it was more Greek than the rest of the Gospel, intending to prepare the readers." The Incarnate Logos is not the dominant thought. The dominant thought is that Christ is the Son of God. When John formulates the proposition, "the Logos is Jesus Christ," he merely wants to designate that among the many predicates of Jesus the Logos is one. With John the Logos does not become the basis of every speculative thought about Christ. The same is true of Philo. But by Justin the Logos was transformed into a cosmic force, and an inalienable part of a general philosophy of the world. "It gave," says Harnack, in his epoch-making book, "a metaphysical significance to an historic fact; it drew into the domain of cosmology and religious philosophy a person who had appeared in time and space." And in the same connection he also says that the most significant step that was ever taken in the domain of Christian doctrine was when the Christian Apologists at the beginning of the second century drew the equation: the Logos = Jesus Christ.

Thus we see that the influx of Hellenism (Greek spirit and philosophy), and the union of the gospel with it forms the

greatest fact in the history of the Church of the second century. It was the birth throes of the dogma of the Church. The life and spirit of the gospel took hold of the inmost heart of a philosopher. He felt its power, he saw its concreteness, he became convinced of its saneness. When the opportunity presented itself he gave expression to the religion of Christ in forms and contents consonant with his former training and compatible with his philosophical bent of mind. The effect was of no little consequence. It became significant in history. A system of doctrine was formed which became the weapon which the Gospel used to wedge its way into Graeco-Roman culture, and which has remained an intrinsic part of Christianity ever since.

But it must not appear from all this that Justin had no connection with the past, and that he stood aloof from everybody else. God does not work in history by severing a new movement from the past. Divine evolution is God's only true method. And should Justin have severed himself entirely from the past, and should he not have embodied in himself the social consciousness and the peculiar type of piety of the people already converted to the new faith, he would not have a place in the development of Christian doctrine. He might have received a place with the Gnostics, but then he would have fallen outside the stream of orthodox doctrine. His conformity to the unexpressed beliefs of the masses, we may safely depict. He both represented the common faith and he departed from it. Moreover, Justin himself openly claimed to be a fair representation of the great body of Christians. And we also know that if writers during the early centuries stated anything in their books which was not generally accepted or which was not in accordance with the "then" belief, they were either considered unorthodox or their writings were left unnoticed. We may thus say that he thought what the people thought, but deeper; that he saw the real as they did, but clearer; that he worked towards the goal towards which they worked, but faster; that he served humanity as they did,

but better. He was great because he was commonplace. He was followed because he embodied in himself these two moments: the Christian with all its hopes and saving power; the Hellenic with all its philosophical speculation and theological conceptions. What others imperfectly comprehended and confusedly conceived, he expressed clearly and forcibly. He was a prophet, and was followed; and has, therefore, become significant in the development of doctrine, and in the formation of the Catholic Church as a Church of doctrine.

Let us now try to see how Justin influenced later historical developments. Let us try to discern how he colored the stream of doctrine, and how and in what way later writers were dependent on him. However, in order to remain scientific, we must guard against being dogmatic at this point. We will not attempt to point out certain doctrines in Justin, and conclude that because these doctrines are found in subsequent writers, they must, therefore, have been derived from Justin, as has often been done. Yet if we would be called upon to show his influence on doctrine, it might be in order to go into a more elaborate historical discussion of doctrine until it became embodied in the Nicene and Chalcedonian Creeds. Our purpose is merely to deal with general and fundamental principles. Hatch reminds us that we can deal with the causes and effects of this period, but not with the processes. Engelhardt, likewise, reminds us that there is danger on the part of the historian to overrate the influences of writings that have accidentally come down to us.

Still, we have in later writers a direct reference to Justin's works. Tatian, his pupil, Athenagoras, Theophilus, Irenæus, Minucius Felix, Tertullian, and Melito made use of the *Larger Apology* and the *Dialogue*. His lost writings were also quoted by many of the Church Fathers. Eusebius, Hieronymus, and Epiphanius speak very highly of him. There is no doubt but that the early church held him in high esteem. When we come to consider the unconscious influence of his doctrine, we find it much more difficult. Justin formulated

the contents of the Gospel in a manner which appealed to all serious thinkers of his age. The Apologists, knowing his teachings, could not do otherwise but follow in his footsteps. The Logos doctrine became the inevitable doctrine through which Christianity and philosophy could adjust themselves. The times were groaning and in travail for a system of doctrine like Justin's Logos doctrine. As soon as he had clearly and forcibly expressed it, it found a receptive soil. As we would naturally expect, Justin remained the greatest and most Christian in contrast with his ready followers.

After the formation of the canon, which was enhanced by foes within the Church, Origen came upon the stage of history. He took up the work of the Apologists and the New Testament writers, and produced a new and real theology. He carried forward the philosophizing or Hellenizing of Christianity already begun by Justin. The Logos doctrine remained a prominent feature. But it was changed by him from a mere cosmological to a soteriological principle. Justin's Logos was fundamentally cosmological. Through it he explained how God shut up in his supra-cosmic abyss could create the world. Origen's Logos, on the other hand, was redemptive. He emphasized its relation and significance to man. This affected his whole system, and became, in truth, a point of departure from Justin.

Athanasius was the next step in doctrinal development. He was a direct outgrowth of the Alexandrian school in which he appeared as a reformer, having prevented a "complete Hellenization of Christianity." With him the Logos doctrine was more than a soteriological principle: it became Christological. In Justin it was a *cosmic force*; in Athanasius it became a *Christological principle*; in Origen, who was the connecting link, it had been a *redeeming power*. How unprofitable, mechanical, and uncritical is the attempt of comparing Justin's doctrine without understanding the intervening doctrinal developments, and without comprehending the fundamental changes wrought in the Logos doctrine!

Thus, for instance, it has been shown that "Justin holds both to the divinity and the subordination. Should he have seen the dilemma, which would he have taken? His faith being more pronounced than his Platonic logic, he would have taken the reverse of Arius."* Many such subtleties, which at the bottom are absurdities, might be pointed out. Justin's significance in relation to the future is simply this. He introduced the Logos doctrine to gain a desired end, viz., to unite Christianity and Philosophy. He made it a cosmological force, and it served a noble purpose. Later writers took up this doctrine, analyzed, broadened, and furthered it until it budded and opened into a beautiful Christology.

II.

We have just seen what the epoch-making feature of Justin in the development of Christian doctrine was from a broad historical standpoint. We viewed him in every possible relation; dismissed false views about him; and observed him in relation to Greek thought, as he bridged a yearning chasm, and as he stood at the head of a new system of doctrine. Let us now come closer, limit our scope of vision and concentrate our efforts more intensely on his theology. Let us give special attention to find out how the two elements that entered his system were combined. And finally let us ask the pertinent question, what was the significance of this union. This will bring out the inner forces of Justin himself which raised him to an alpine height and made him an epoch-making man.

A study of the life and conversion of a man is usually the key to the understanding of his principles. Modern interpreters apply the latest conclusions of science to understand the psychological and spiritual changes which were wrought in Paul, in Augustine, in Luther, and, likewise, in Justin. We must enter into the soul-struggles and religious experiences of these men before we can endeavor to under-

* See Holland's "Justin Martyr," Dict. of Chr. Lit.

stand their teachings. In the opening chapters of the Dialogue a beautiful account is given of the efforts made by Justin to find the true philosophy. "Thirsting for truth as the greatest possession, he made the round of the systems of philosophy and knocked at every gate of ancient wisdom, except Epicurean, which he despised." He first went to the Stoic, then the Peripatetic, then the Pythagorean, and "at last he threw himself with great zeal into the arms of Platonism." Thinking he had almost reached the goal of this philosophy—the vision of God, he was confronted by a Christian who told him of the Hebrew prophets, who were older than the philosophers, and who had seen and spoken the truth "not as reasoners but as witnesses." He also told him of Christ as the embodiment of the truth. Justin meditated over this until he came to the conclusion that Christ is the embodiment of the whole truth and the Logos come among men. A new light, a new truth dawned upon him. In Christianity he found the solution of every contradiction in which the wisdom of the world was held, that which was fragmentary in other systems was complete in the new faith. "Christianity was the true Philosophy" (Dia). It must always be born in mind that the philosophies in which he was schooled, especially Platonism, remained a constituent part of his Christian doctrine.

Moreover, Justin even does not endeavor to sunder himself from the former systems through which he passed. He often quoted from Plato and other Greek authors. He admired the ethics of the Stoics (Apol. II., 7, 8). He appealed to Heraclitus and Musonius as being put to death because the Logos dwelt in them (Apol. II., 7). Like Christians, Plato taught future judgments, human responsibility, the second and third power in the universe (Apol. I., 8, 44, 60). Those not knowing Christ who lived rationally (*μετὰ λόγου*) were Christians, while those who lived irrationally (*ἀνευ λόγου*) were wicked (Apol. I., 46). Socrates was a Christian as well as Abraham though he did not know it. Besides we also know that eclecticism was the spirit of the age. All

the philosophies and movements of this period were colored by this fad. His life naturally indicates that he was one who selected the good and the true from various systems, and his writings, in turn, show that he was thoroughly eclectic.

To outline his theology is an irrelevant matter, but to analyze the two elements that entered his system is pertinent in order to reveal his significance. Let us, therefore, point out where the Christian and Platonic moments are combined, where both moments underlie the same expression but dis-united, and where only one moment enters. Beginning with the idea of God, to which all other religious knowledge is attached, we will find that it is altogether the philosophic conception. It was, however, not his intention to represent a God different in conception from that of the Hebrews or the Christians; "but he was so rooted in the barriers of the Platonic conception," says Engelhardt, "that he not once even implicitly takes up the moment of the Christian conception of God." God, according to Justin, is transcendent, super-cosmic, even dwells in super-celestial places. The terms, Father, Lord, God, Creator, and Master do not describe Him. Unchangeable, unbegotten, passionless, incorruptible, is He. "He neither comes to any place, nor walks, nor sleeps, nor rises, but abides in his own place wherever that place may be. He sees keenly and hears keenly, not with eyes or ears, but with His unspeakable power; so that He sees all things and hears all things, nor is any one of us hid from Him; nor does he move, he who is uncontained by space and by the whole world, seeing that He was before the world was born" (Dia. 127). He is shut up in an infinite abyss, is nothing more than absolute being, *ens, το ὄν, rein sein*. He is Lord and Ruler of the world because He exists for the good of men and justly distributes the rewards and punishments. He calls God "Father of All," and yet this is entirely in the ontological sense, never in the ethical sense as it is used in the New Testament. He points to God as a living being, but it is not the God of the Old Testament and the God who through love and

grace is revealed in His Son. This is evident, for in the connection in which he speaks of a living God, he sets forth the predicates of God, as hidden, inconceivable, unspeakable, and unknowable. He knows nothing of an immanent God and a God with whom we can have communion.

But now the question arises, how can this absolute, supra-cosmic Being, opposed to the world, create the world and govern it? How can the Creator bring forth the creature? And how can this God who speaks with no one, and appears at no time reveal Himself to the world? Justin does not dismiss the matter with the simple statement that God through His will made the impossible possible; but he frankly states that God created the world and revealed Himself through the Logos. Here the opportunity is given to combine the philosophical and Christian elements into a common world philosophy. Here comes forth the real import of the Logos doctrine. The Logos becomes the great cosmic principle which made the connection between God and the world intelligible. The divine Logos, of which the whole human race is partaking, which worked through philosophers, poets, and prophets, which appeared at one time in the form of fire, at another in the form of angels, is become man. He is called the Holy Spirit, Glory of God, Son, Wisdom, Angel, God, Lord. He is the medium between the transcendent One and the finite universe. "He is the first begotten"; "first in force after the Father"; "second to God, second numerically but not in will." Not only did Justin through the Logos show how God could create the world, but he also made him the bearer of the revelation of God to the world. Here Justin moves smoothly over to the Christian moment. The Stoico-Platonical Logos is interwoven with the Christian tradition of the Son of God; he is the instrument of creation, the instructor of prophets, born of a virgin. The Christian idea of the preexistence of the Son hangs on to the Hellenic idea of the pre-incarnate state of the Logos. The two moments are really combined, and the opportunity is given to Justin to justify through keen logic the wor-

ship of Christ, who is the Logos on the one hand, and the Son of God on the other; for which principle our hero lived and wrote and died.

The idea of anthropology is still more difficult. Christian tradition and the teachings of the New Testament in regard to redemption do not harmonize with his cosmological principles. Justin, however, did not fall into the temptation of slighting the Gospel of Jesus, or of changing the content of New Testament teaching to make it agreeable to his philosophic bent of mind, as was done by the Gnostics. Christian tradition and New Testament teaching, he takes bodily into his system. Salvation was primarily by knowledge; Christ revealed the whole truth; sin heaped up mass of guilt, but did not change the nature of man; the spermatik logos needs the help of the whole Logos; grace is merely the stimulation of the powers of reason existing in man; sending of Son does not bring personal communion between God and man; belief in God does not change the original nature of man; "belief in God is nothing more than a perception that God is the Father, Lord of the world, Creator, Ruler, and the Dispenser of rational power, law and eternal life." All this, which, of course, comes from the philosophical side, is incompatible with the maxims of Jesus, the New Testament teachings and Christian tradition, which he constantly quotes, and in which he thoroughly believes. He quotes the Baptismal Formula, and, yet, the traditional conception does not harmonize with his conception of the relation of the second and third Being to the first. He holds on to the traditional conception of immortality, intending to differ from Plato, while, as a matter of fact, he is very close to Plato. "He speaks of the cross," says Harnack, "and yet it is the greatest mystery to him, and he sees all things possible in it."

Such, in brief, is our interpretation of Justin from an endeavor of discovering the two elements which entered his theology, with the help of the latest and best scholars on Justin and his age.* What now is the significance of this

* Cf. Engelhardt, "Das Christenthum Justins des Märtyrs"; Harnack, "History of Dogma," Eng. trans., Vol. I.-II.; Hatch, "Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church."

doctrine behind which lies "Greek Philosophy (Platonic Metaphysics, Logos doctrine of the Stoics, Platonic and Stoic Ethics) maxims of Jesus, and the religious speeches of the Christian Church"? How can this system which sometimes merely holds on to the philosophic conception, *e. g.*, the doctrine of God; and which sometimes combines the Hellenic and Christian moments, *e. g.*, the ideas of the Logos; and which sometimes bodily brings together a philosophic and a Christian moment without question of content, and without correlation, *e. g.*, the principle of anthropology,—be of any significance in the development of Christian doctrine?

Without doubt, his teaching caused the transformation of the Gospel into a system of doctrine. The process meant the legitimizing of Greek philosophy into the sphere of the rule of faith. And, yet, Justin stands within the conservative stream of doctrinal development. We can only appreciate the import of this statement, when we compare him with parallel efforts made to bridge this yearning chasm. The Gnostics (the parallel effort) were sincere and earnest and by no means inspired by the demons. They saw the conflict and the precipitous abyss that separated the cultured Greeks and the Christian tradition. They undertook to solve the problem, but, in doing so, they broke loose from the Old Testament and robbed Christianity of its dearest possession. "They changed the content of Christian tradition, and dragged the Gospel to the level of the Greek world, where it was lost in the bewildering maze of history." "Justin and the other Christian Apologists held together a motley multitude of primitive ideas and hopes derived from the Old and New Testament, too brittle to be completely recast." He prevented the amalgamation of the concrete and historical material with natural philosophy. He made Christianity rational without taking from or adding to its traditional historic material. He retained the Gospel of Jesus beneath his philosophical point of view. He did not seek so much for a religion as he sought for an assurance of a theistic and moral

concept of the world. He did not use the Gospel to Hellenize it; but to overthrow polytheism, and to secure a better moral and religious life. His doctrine appealed to all classes. He formulated the contents of the Gospel without losing sight of the concrete and historical; and with it he won the intelligent and the uncultured, and brought them on a common plane and a common basis. "The theology of the Gnostics was not even very convincing to serious thinkers." They were like some schools and sects to-day, who, feeling the chasm between science and religion, bring religion entirely on the plane of science. Justin represents that conservative school, which also feels the sharp line of demarkation, but which holds the two somewhat loosely together, awaiting a gradual adjustment in the course of progress; in which the truth of the Gospel will not be swallowed up. Justin was great, because in spirit he was a Christian as well as a philosopher.

Thus we have seen the significance of Justin in the development of Christian doctrine in its entirety and from various standpoints. Our purpose was to watch the scenery of this vanquished age as a panorama moving before our eyes. Sometimes we took the part of an actor, in which we tried to feel and think as our hero did. At times we looked at him from the distant centuries; just as we leave the base of the peak and look at it from a distant point to discover its relation to the mountain.

We read the Sermon on the Mount, and then we read the Nicene Creed; we exclaim, "What a difference between these two documents!" We study the intervening history, and we discover that once upon a time there was a yearning and precipitous chasm between Christianity and Græco-Roman culture. We would like to know how the chasm was bridged and who successfully reduced the abyss. We linger over the middle of the second century and we find our man—Justin Martyr. To accomplish this task, he had to encase the Gospel in a doctrine. This is the significance of Justin in the development of Christian doctrine.

VI.

A WORKING CATECHISM FOR THE REFORMED CHURCH.

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One of the most highly prized books in my library is a copy of the tercentenary edition of the Heidelberg Catechism. Not only on account of the manner in which it came into my possession and the sacred associations which cling to it on that account but more particularly because of the very fine introduction by the sainted Dr. Nevin and the four-fold text of the catechism itself, I value the book so highly that I would not part with it at any price if I knew that it could not be replaced. And yet it is mostly as a memento and a curiosity that I value this particular book. While it true that I usually refer to it when I attempt to make a serious study of the history of some dogma yet I never think of it as a working catechism for the Reformed Church. All of which goes to show that a catechism may be good, yea, very good and yet be not at all adapted for use in preparing catechumens to assume the duties and responsibilities of full membership in the church. It may be an excellent book for reference but not a working catechism.

What then do we mean by a working catechism? We mean a catechism to work with as a text-book, as a tool, in the catechetical work of the church, as practiced to-day. A book to be placed into the hands of catechumens such as we usually have in our catechetical classes, with the hope and expectation that they, in a measure, master it; a catechism of which the words will be committed to memory and their meaning impressed upon the minds and hearts of those under instruction; a catechism that will fit present day theology without being wrenched or twisted; a catechism that will meet modern

catechetical conditions without adding to it or subtracting from it; not a catechism which contains everything that a church member is ever expected to learn in this world but a catechism which contains all that, and only that, which is essential to make an intelligent confession of faith and choice of service such as is implied in a voluntary assumption of full church membership.

Does any one say that we already have such a work in the Palatinate edition of the Heidelberg Catechism? I answer, what then mean these many other editions? Why have we a Gerhart's Child's Heidelberg Catechism, and Good's and Harbaugh's and Mosser's and Snyder's and Bahner's and many others too numerous to mention? Why has Pastor R. prepared a little catechism of twelve pages for use especially with adult catechumens? Why is Pastor H. looking for some briefer catechism somewhat like the abridged catechism used in the Moravian Church? I venture to say that there are few if any pastors of the Reformed Church to-day who use the Heidelberg Catechism just as it is, without abbreviating or supplementing it, not to speak of even worse treatment than that. We have heard of the story of the Irishman's knife which notwithstanding a new blade and a new handle, was the same old knife still. We wonder whether the old Heidelberg Catechism has fared much better after all the individualistic efforts with pastepot and scissors and differences of interpretation in the vain attempt to construct a working catechism for the Reformed Church.

We call it a vain attempt and verily we believe it to be such. For altogether apart from all theological considerations and the particular purpose for which the catechism was originally prepared, the conditions under which it was then to be used were so different from the conditions prevailing to-day that the same catechism could not possibly be a satisfactory working catechism under both sets of conditions.

Frederick the Pious is rightly called the father of the Heidelberg Catechism. His introduction to the book begins

with a salutation "to all and every, our superintendents, pastors, preachers, sacristans and school masters." To all these the catechism was commended; and this indicates how at that time the entire structure of society was related to religious instruction and how large a part of the life of the people was to be brought under catechetical training. Nor was this all. The pulpit was bound by the catechism as a perpetual directory and rule. The Bible was to be preached "in the sense of the catechism" and care was to be taken to quote and bring in the language of the catechism to enforce and support the preaching. In addition to this, the catechism must be formally read before the people from the pulpit, a section or lesson each Sunday, as a part of the morning service, so as to go over the whole work in ten weeks. "To crown all, an afternoon service was established for the sole object of expounding and enforcing the instructions of the catechism. For this purpose it was divided into fifty-two Sundays or parts, on each one of which the minister was to preach in turn so as to cover the whole book in the course of a year."

"But care was taken, at the same time, that the work of the pulpit, in this form, should be properly supported by a corresponding work in the school. The whole business of education, from the mother's knee up to the theological chair in the university, must be so ordered as to have its religious basis throughout in the catechism. The school teachers were in fact a part of the ecclesiastical establishment of the land; and it was their province in particular to see that the young were diligently trained in the knowledge of the catechism from the beginning, so as to be qualified in due time for a full religious profession."

This was the condition of things in the Palatinate in 1563; to meet such conditions the catechism was prepared and under such conditions the book was a good working catechism. There was none better then, and where these conditions can be reproduced, there is probably none better now.

But the excellent working catechism for the Palatinate in

1563 is not at all likely to be a good working catechism in the United States in 1904. Then and there it was the text-book "from the mother's knee to the theological chair in the university" and all the time under church supervision and government encouragement and control: here and now it is the text-book for perhaps fifty hours in a lifetime; excluded from the school like the small-pox; used in the church, with the government indifferent, parents often careless and the whole process largely subject to the sweet will of immature boys and girls who in many cases must be persistently humored or they will not come to instruction at all.

You may say that all this is not as it should be. We know it. But it is as it is and most of it is beyond our power to alter. Even in the pulpit and in the Sunday-school, it would be impossible to reproduce the conditions which the Palatinate Heidelberg catechism was made to meet. Therefore, however excellent it was in its time, both in itself and as compared with other Reformation catechisms, it is not a good working catechism under present-day conditions.

For one thing, as a book to be used in preparing candidates for confirmation, its length is against it. This is practically admitted by everybody. There is probably not a single pastor in the church who even attempts to cover the entire book in a course of catechetical instruction. Dr. Gerhart used to take the theological students through the book once in three years giving them one lecture a week. When these students enter the ministry, the boldest of them would scarcely attempt to do in six months that for which their own instructor took three years. And so they select what they consider the most important questions, each one using his own judgment as to what questions are the most important. Rev. Stanley L. Krebs, whose catechetical work has been referred to as a grand success, recommends that the class "commit only the most important or cardinal questions"; eleven selected from the whole number, which in his opinion, form a complete and comprehensive system by themselves. That is to say,

his working catechism consists of eleven questions which make a complete system. Assuming that Rev. Krebs knows what a complete system is, why should not his eleven questions be published in a separate pamphlet and be the properly authorized working catechism for the Reformed Church? Why confront a candidate for confirmation with a book of 129 questions when eleven of these 129 make a complete system and when these eleven are fully as many as even the best catechist can hope to teach thoroughly in the time usually given for catechetical instruction? Surely this were better than to have each minister select parts here and there according to his own notion of propriety. For we have learned this to be true and the experience of others confirms our own, that as soon as the minister begins to skip questions the class begins to lose interest. For ourselves, we have tried to solve the problem of a working catechism by using Gerhart's Child's Heidelberg Catechism in all our catechetical work. In this catechism the controversial and the abstract theological questions are omitted and the remaining questions are broken up and thus simplified, making a book about two-thirds as large as the original Palatinate catechism. This book especially as now published in the Twentieth Century edition makes a fairly satisfactory working catechism for the Reformed Church. This Twentieth Century Heidelberg Catechism puts the unabridged catechism within easy reach for ready reference, and the junior catechism for class use and study, and this arrangement will do provided the pastor has the children under catechetical instruction from early childhood up to at least confirmation age and provided he be allowed very considerable liberty and latitude of interpretation to bring the theology of the catechism up to present day standards as fixed by the spiritual scholarship of the age.

But however desirable it may be to have a practical working catechism for use in the Reformed Church, it may well be questioned whether we can afford to mutilate and abuse the good old Heidelberg Catechism in the attempt to make it fit

modern social and religious conditions. For our part we are of the opinion that this ought not to be done. Let the original Heidelberg Catechism remain unaltered in form and interpretation, as a monumental achievement in the process of theological evolution. Let it have an honored place in the library of every Reformed minister. Let it be carefully studied by every student of historical theology. For this purpose it still has and always will have inestimable value. But in order that it may retain this value unimpaired it must be carefully and sacredly preserved in its integrity and it dare not be mutilated by altering its form, changing its language or wresting its meaning even though these things were done with the laudable purpose of producing a working catechism for the Reformed Church.

Since then general usage throughout the Church demonstrates the need of a practical working catechism and since the present catechism ought not to be altered for this purpose it would seem that the church ought to address herself earnestly to the task of preparing a new catechism, embodying the admirable spirit of the old in the statement of present day conceptions of spiritual truths in forms adapted to modern conditions and answering to modern needs. And when we consider the magnitude of this task as well as the need that it should be accomplished we will no doubt admit that it is none to early to begin.

To undertake this work from right motives and in the right spirit is no sign of disrespect for the venerable symbol which we will always hold in highest honor; rather is it an evidence of the presence of the unquenchable life of the spirit in the church ever seeking new forms to give it fuller and more adequate expression. Thus "dogma outlives its own defective logic because it does not live by that kind of bread alone. It is an outward sign of an inward experience. Generation after generation this life has gripped men and the system of doctrine is a stammering effort to testify to this fact." The highest honor that can be paid to the Heidelberg Cate-

chism is to recognize the fact that it has helped to cultivate a life and to foster a spirit which seeks better forms of expression than any which are extant to-day.

We believe that Frederick the Pious was directed by the Lord to attempt to heal the divisions among his people by means of this new rule for the study of God's word. We believe that he was guided by the Holy Spirit in his choice of Ursinus and Oliveanus to prepare the Heidelberg Catechism. They proved themselves masters in giving expression to the spiritual conceptions of their time; but we do not believe that they were qualified to foresee the social and theological developments of all times so as to relieve all subsequent generations from the obligation to study their own needs and making provision for their supply. To assume differently and especially to act on a contrary assumption is to do a wrong to the memory of the fathers, a wrong to the catechism which they produced and a wrong to the theologians, the catechists and the catechumens of to-day. There is now a need as distinctive as that of Reformation times; there is a right and an obligation to supply this need as clear as was the right of the church to do so under the leadership of Frederick the Pious; and there ought surely to be spiritual insight and theological ability to provide for the needs of this age as preeminent as was the ability of Ursinus to write a catechism for the Reformation church. Indeed if it were incumbent upon any one age to supply a catechism for all subsequent ages why should this be the age of the Inquisition and the Thirty Years' War rather than the age of the World's Congress of Religion, the Hague Tribunal and the International Red Cross Society?

Assuming now that a working catechism is desirable for use in the Reformed Church; that the unabridged Heidelberg Catechism is not such a working catechism as is needed; that it is not wise to prune, mutilate or alter the present catechism in any way, either by General Synodical action or by private manipulation or interpretation; that we have a right to prepare and adopt a new catechism adapted to our present needs:

assuming all this to be true, what must be the nature of the catechism which the church should strive to produce?

To answer this question it is necessary to take into account the usual makeup of our catechetical classes, the purpose of catechization and the present status of Christian doctrine as to the objective essentials of the Christian faith.

Our catechetical classes are usually made up partly of the children of Christian parents, children who have been carefully brought up in the family, the Sunday school and the church, in the nurture and admonition of the Lord: partly of the children of nominal Christians, children who have been indifferently brought up and yet sufficiently subject to the control of their parents to come to catechetical instruction at their command; and partly of those who have grown up—and some of them grown old—in the world and whom watchful pastors succeed in finding and persuading to join the catechetical class.

The catechetical classes thus made up usually pass through a course of instruction consisting of perhaps twenty-five lessons and extending over a period of from three to six months. Largely as a result of this instruction the members of these classes are to become eager to make an intelligent public confession of Christ and a sincere, intelligent choice of the church as the best environment for spiritual growth and the most attractive sphere of effective, Christlike service.

To bring about such results with such materials and under such conditions even the most skillful catechist feels that he has great need of the very best help which the church can provide for him in the form of a working catechism containing all the essentials, and only the essentials, necessary to prepare for the assumption of full membership in the church of Christ.

What has already been said will in a general way indicate the form and contents of the new working catechism for the Reformed Church. As to form, it will be brief, as compared with the Heidelberg Catechism, very brief; brief, so that it will not repel by its formidable appearance, and brief, because there is no necessity for its being lengthy. It will emphasize

a few things which it is absolutely necessary to know well in order to assume the vows of full membership intelligently and it will leave much to be learned from the present Heidelberg Catechism after full membership has been assumed. There are a few things about the service which a man ought to understand thoroughly before he enlists as a soldier, but there remain a great many things for him to learn after he has enlisted, if he is to become a thoroughly good soldier.

As to contents, the working catechism will exclude everything which does not readily fall in with the following group of ideas and tendencies: "the employment of the scientific method in the study of religious as well as other facts; the application of the theory of evolution to the whole of man's nature; belief in the immanence of God in nature and in man; the employment of literary and historical methods in the study of scripture; the social interpretation of the teachings of Jesus; the increasing emphasis upon love as the supreme quality of the divine character and finally the recognition of likeness to Jesus as the adequate and only test of Christian discipleship."

Further, the new catechism should not be constructed on the theory that repulsion from sin and desire to escape its consequences are the central motives for coming to Christ and for living the Christ-life. The theory of a manufactured, a man-made experience, an artificial terror, whether it be produced by the anxious bench and its appropriate accessories or by means of the catechisms of an outgrown theology will be left to the sects to which it rightfully belongs.

All this, however, is negative. Coming now to the positive statement of the contents of the working catechism for use in the Reformed Church, we would say that these are comparatively simple and that they all circle around several primary religious ideas, which, however, are of such fundamental and far-reaching importance that all the catechetical efforts of the church in the catechetical class may well be expended in explaining them and impressing them thoroughly upon the minds and hearts of her catechumens.

These primary ideas are:

First. The goodness of God as revealed in Jesus Christ—the chief good, the only good which can fully satisfy the soul of man; a goodness which is as incompatible with evil as light is with darkness, a goodness unceasingly active in the world and always making for righteousness, peace and joy.

Second. The nobility of man as revealed in Jesus Christ—a nobility due to his origin, his purpose and his destiny, a nobility to be personally realized in its fulness only by communion with God in Christ.

Third. Salvation as revealed in Jesus Christ—a salvation which consists in overcoming and leaving behind the lower nature in consequence of an unceasing struggle after the divine ideals, the Christ within us straining after the Christ beyond us.

Fourth. The Church as revealed in Jesus Christ—the divine life upon earth going about and doing good, first in His natural body and now in His mystical body, all the members being animated by the same divine Spirit, a chosen communion in the unity of the true faith wherein mutual fellowship is a necessary consequence and a consequent necessity of participation in the divine life.

Fifth. The world as revealed in Jesus Christ—God's world, with boundless opportunities for just such service as is absolutely and indispensably necessary in order that His children may grow into the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ.

These five subjects must find a place in the working catechism to be used in preparing catechumens for the assumption of the vows of full membership in the Reformed Church. To teach them only in their broad outlines will require all the time that is usually given to catechetical instruction. To teach them in all their details and bearings may well engage all the teaching and learning attention of pastors and members from the day of confirmation to the day of death. Or, if it be thought necessary and desirable, provision can be made for

further systematic instruction subsequent to union with the church. For that instruction let the text-books be as elaborate as you please. Let them embody all the theology which men have lived and died for throughout all the ages, if the church thinks it desirable that this should be so. Disciples eventually ought to be taught to observe all that Christ has commanded; but in preparing a book for use *in making disciples* of all nations let the church follow the example of the first council at Jerusalem and learn from Christ himself to insist at first only upon the most necessary things.

VII.

THE LAYMAN'S WORK FOR CHRIST.

REV. HENRY H. RANCK.

A noted preacher once said that there is an expression widely used by Christians which ought to be abolished—viz., "my work for Christ," because it indicates a wrong attitude towards our Lord, and that in its stead one should say, "Christ's work through me," after the usage of Paul and the apostles. Every Christian, of course, feels that the chief factor in his endeavor is not himself, but the grace of God which is in him; but it is distasteful to many of us to speak familiarly of the Savior's intimate relation with us, and a reticence on this subject by no means implies that we are unmindful of it. In discussing "The Layman's Work for Christ," therefore, the background of all our thought is, that "it is God which worketh in us to will and to work, for his good pleasure."

It is important, first of all, to make clear what we mean by work for Christ. Various answers will undoubtedly be given to this question, according to the views held of the work Christ came into the world to do. "To save the world, to save men" are words often used to indicate it, but professing Christians are not all a unit on what salvation means. I was in company, recently, with a family who are members of a sister denomination, and the conversation drifted to the fact of our belonging to different churches, whereupon the wife remarked, "We are all trying to get to the same place," and the husband said, "Yes, we are all striving to be good." I felt that the meaning of the Church of Christ and membership therein was much more than was implied in either of these remarks, and they struck me as being typical of widely held conceptions of the Christian's chief purpose. It is true we want to get to heaven; but if that is our prime object it is supremely selfish

and may have, in the minds of many, little to do with a life of integrity, rectitude and love. We desire to be good, but the striving after personal virtue may be with us, as with the hermits and ascetics of the middle ages, so all-absorbing that we may think little of helping others. These narrow and defective views of Christianity and the Church, prevailing widely among the professing followers of Jesus, leave out altogether vital elements which must come before our minds would we rightly understand the meaning of work for Christ. The neglected truth, which the world is pitifully calling on the Church to proclaim and practice to-day, is the Gospel of the Kingdom of God—not simply that the Kingdom is the future heaven of bliss beyond this vale of tears; not simply that it is that body of the baptized, the confirmed, the elect, or the converted which we call the visible Church; nor that it is simply that invisible company of chosen souls within the Church, or without, who strive after righteousness, but that it is a Kingdom which takes in the whole world of whose organized life man is the head and crown.

The burden of Jesus' preaching was the Kingdom—a word used forty-five times in Matthew, and over one hundred times in the synoptic gospels. The Kingdom was his initial message, taken up from the lips of John the Baptist—the Kingdom, which, however narrowly and grossly conceived, was the century-long anticipation of Israel. This Kingdom, by which he undoubtedly meant an ideal world here on this earth, the reign of God in men's hearts and in all society, he explained and illustrated in many parables. To preach the good tidings of the Kingdom was that whereunto, he says explicitly, he was sent. It was that which first of all his disciples were to seek, and the backbone of the prayer which they were to use day by day. The message of the Kingdom they were to carry to the ends of the earth.

In the simple society of Jesus' day and in the short time permitted for his mission on earth, his work was needs largely with and for individuals, but in those words, spoken as never

man spake, and in that life absorbed continually in doing good, we see the seed truths which will heal the whole body of society and solve the problems of every age. In the many-sided, complicated, social, industrial, and political life of our day, there is inter-relation and mutual dependence in larger measure than ever in the world's history, and we must preach and practice a gospel, and we have a gospel which is not only for the individual, but for all relations of men to one another:—a gospel concerning the home and professional life, the education of the nation's youth, and the spreading of intelligence; a gospel for employer and employed, the conduct of industry and the manipulation of corporations; a gospel for dealing with criminals, ne'er-do-weels, and the morally and intellectually delinquent; a gospel for citizens and officials, for the conduct of government, the supervision of trade and the administration of the law; a gospel for the intercourse of nations touching friendship, commerce, and war; a gospel for the world.

Society is a vast organism impelled by life and to move harmoniously must be ruled by love, but we have as yet only a faint semblance of the universal reign of justice, mercy, and peace. There is much wrong amongst men; in the institutions through which operate the powers that be, there is much injustice appearing to-day in new and evasive forms; there is appalling discrepancy between holy and just ideals and human customs, and what is the church with its members to do about it? Is the Church here simply to save individuals out of this wicked, imperfect world, or is it here as the representative of Jesus to save the world itself from this wickedness and to transform what has defect and shortcoming into perfection? Is work for Christ simply "getting jewels out of the mudpuddle, not trying to clean up the mudpuddle," as a minister once expressed his idea of his call?—the folly whereof is evident, from the illustration itself. Clean up the puddle and let it be transformed into the garden of the Lord.

Environment is an essential factor in the growth of character and cannot be ignored. It is made up of elements not

only physical and social but moral and spiritual as well, and they react with eternal effect upon the soul. For the great body of people a holy life is impossible in vicious surroundings, and if individual redemption were alone the object of endeavor, favorable environment would be necessary and social salvation imperative. If it be true, that the world is irretrievably depraved with no possibility of betterment, that there is no hope for the leavening of the entire lump, that individual salvation is the whole truth, then let us away to monastery and mountain, as the sensible and logical course. This, however, was not Jesus' teaching. How he lived amongst men with a passion to help them! His prayer was, not that the disciples should be taken out of the world, but that they should be kept out of evil; therefore are Christians the salt of the earth and the light of the world.

The subject of salvation, therefore, is society and not merely individuals. The vision of St. John, the holy city Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God is to become a reality here on this earth; and it is gradually being realized by the brooding of God's spirit over men—cities, nations, the world of interdependent human life into which shall not enter nor in which shall be, "any thing unclean, nor he that maketh an abomination and a lie." Thousands of years will pass no doubt before this comes to pass, but with the courage of our ideals and with a high faith in Him who said, "ye therefore shall be perfect, as your heavenly father is perfect," we will labor toward this end. We look upon the Church, therefore, not as an end in itself but as a means. Jesus delegated to his disciples the work which had been given Him. The Church to-day is the representative of Jesus in the world and is to carry on His work under the Spirit's guidance. Work for Christ, therefore, is work for the coming of the Kingdom. Whatever helps toward the reign of justice and truth is honored by Jesus. Righteousness, doing the will of God, is Christian, wherever and by whomsoever done. This may seem a broad view but is the unmistakable teaching of Jesus,

of scripture, and of the light of truth from whatever source. In common acceptation, 'tis true, Christian work is held to mean only work in immediate connection with the Church and with the direct purpose of having people accept Jesus as a personal Savior—work to make men Christians and to help them become better Christians. This is a high type of activity and may we have much of it! It is only a part, however, of the great, comprehensive purpose for which Christians are to labor.

It used to be thought that only the clergyman should do Christian work. His was a sacred calling, all others were secular. The unholy wall between sacred and secular is being broken down and we are coming to feel now that every valid calling is holy, that the Christian must be occupied only in what contributes to human well-being and that he must carry God and conscience with him in all he does. So long as persons believe that only ministers are to work for Christ and other peoples' business is simply to make money or a name, we cannot look for a greatly improved society. If the chief end of man is not to glorify God and enjoy Him forever but to pile up a fortune and keep it together, it is not far to think and practice that the end justifies the means and that very crooked means may be used to get the fortune. Our Christian layman wants to have as clear and commanding a call to do good as the minister has to preach Christ.

The Reformation restored to the Church the truth of the priesthood of believers and we know that the Spirit of God moves in channels not necessarily marked out by ecclesiastical finger-tips. We realize that the chief thing about either the clergyman or the layman is the man. It is convenient to use these terms to distinguish the two classes of Christians, to whom we look for the coming of the Kingdom. The clergyman's work for Christ is direct, specific, it has to do most largely with the Church as his parish, though with John Wesley every minister must say too, "The world is my parish." The layman may be most useful in the work of the

Church and if possible should be engaged therein, but his time is largely taken up in breadwinning, in doing the world's commonplace every-day work and his prime obligation is to do it well and honestly. We sometimes hear it said that if every Church member would speak of Christ to every unconverted man he meets the world would soon be won. Much good as this might accomplish, we feel that what is needed far more than preaching is practice. Men as a rule know, let them do. We want more of the preaching which is done by the silent influence of example. Emerson said, "What you are speaks so loud I cannot hear what you say." What we need to-day is a revival of righteousness, a challenge heard in every man's heart, "woe is me if I do not the right." The temptations in business and in every walk are mighty. Every man thinks he must succeed. The world puts its stigma on failure. It takes a high type of character to be willing to fail rather than compromise with wrong. Our theme will call us to consider the layman's function in the Church, but first, and as we believe, most important is his work for Christ in the ordinary avenues of life.

The church's laymen are fathers and mothers, business men, artisans, workers, professional men, citizens, the units which make up society. It is not enough that all men be simply church members, converts to Jesus Christ. It will not follow that they are holy and blameless, that in their dealings with their fellows their conduct will be beyond reproach. It is a notorious fact that many most devoted church members, active along religious lines, are found sadly wanting in home virtues, professional loyalty, business integrity, and in performing the functions of citizenship. The current and accepted standards along these lines are in many particulars far from exemplifying the spirit of Christ. The layman must learn to put into all the lines of life the mind of the Master, to raise human standards to the divine, to introduce into home, society, business, and politics the veritable Kingdom of God, to make himself and others realize that every occupation for

necessary uses is holy, that the six working days are as sacred as the seventh day, and that men are stewards of time, talent, and means and must render account to their Lord for all their doings.

There is no arena where a more telling Christian work can be done than in the home. A godly family is a beacon light in a community, the worth of whose radiant example is beyond all human reckoning. It is woman's divinely appointed sphere. There she is queen. Not relieving fathers of responsibility, we must yet grant that strong mothers are the makers of the great men. This old-fashioned truth calls for emphatic iteration, when there is an itching zeal on the part of many women to neglect the home in order to have time for outside work, and when multitudes of families are left to their own rearing in vicious surroundings and to the chance training of the visiting missionary and the primary teacher.

The professional man's first call is to be a Christian physician, lawyer, teacher, journalist. To magnify his office in unselfish search for truth, in faithful helping, and in honest dealing with pupil, client, patient, clientele, is an opportunity for extending the Kingdom as great as any could wish. If this is not done our preaching is, for these men, of little avail. If the guardians and promoters of health, justice, and education will labor, impelled by the love of Jesus, with the prime object of doing good, nothing else that they can possibly do will be so distinctly work for Christ. An old-time country doctor, after spending fifty years in unceasing devotion to his profession, responding as cheerfully by night as by day, to poor as to rich, died. His ceaseless work of charity made him a benediction to the community, who as one family mourned. His busy life did not permit much time for church, so that an old aunty's judgment was, "If Dr. Beeson had only been sure on the doctrines, he'd a been just about a saint." We concur in the narrator's comment, "and he was just about that—without the doctrines."

St. Paul showed his marvelous insight into the weakness

and corruptibility of human nature when he said, "the love of money is a root of all evils." Covetousness is the characteristic sin of our time. The devil comes in the shape of the dollar. This is not surprising when we see commercialism so rampant. Here is a realm in which the guardianship of holy angels is needed to keep a man straight and true. So subtle are the temptations, so specious are the arguments—"it is the way of business," "we must do it to live"—that it is a grand witness to the power of God, that there are so many honest men. The splendid liberality of certain wealthy men must not blind us to the actual status of our industrial conditions. It is the business man's work to make all the money he can, and use it for God, but the crying need of our time, especially in the operations of corporations, is honesty and justice to all concerned. Not simply a living wage but a just and equitable distribution of returns to all who make the product, a bringing of the law of Christ into industrial affairs. The worldly man laughs at such a suggestion and says, "business is business"; but the strikes and the sounds of conflict, coming up from every town and city of the land and of the world, tell us of industrial war, tell us that something is wrong, and when we come to see that the industrial philosophy prevailing is that of the Manchester school:—labor is a commodity—we are not surprised to see the employer striving to get the most work for the least wage, nor the laborer trying to get the largest wage for the least work—pure unadulterated selfishness. What we have suffered because of this, especially during the last few years, ought to teach us that love, even as a policy, is better than selfishness, that we absolutely cannot get on even in business without religion. The employer is no more open to censure than the employed; the same principle governs both, nor is there any possibility of adjustment on a wrong basis. There is no use in crying peace when there is and can be no peace. The church and the world must hear and heed the gospel of brotherhood. It must be the Christian layman's supreme purpose to introduce the prin-

ciples of righteous love into his everyday business affairs whether he hires men or works for them. That such practice is not visionary is proven by the many beautiful examples of ideal relations between employer and employed, where equitable profit sharing is continually enjoyed, whether there is a sliding scale of wages or not. The many devoted workers who put conscience into their labor, and the considerate employers, who have run their establishments at a loss and have refused to remove their plants to distant and more advantageous places out of sympathy for their faithful employees, give us ground for expectation that such relations may become general.

If honesty is the chief concern in business it is likewise the paramount issue in politics. Americans are awaking to the fact that Christian men have civic duties. While many have been too much engrossed in business to pay attention to politics, others with small scruples have been making politics a business. The great New York boss testified on the witness stand, when cornered, what everyone knew before, "I'm in it for my pocket, of course." We are getting past the notion, fortunately, that if one is interested in the administration of city and state affairs his life is bound to be contaminated. Good men who would conscientiously work for Christ, therefore, will take a lively interest in politics and will feel that they are guilty of criminal neglect if they do not. Nothing poisons the morals of a community like corruption in high places. Our preaching and Sunday-school teaching is well nigh wasted on the desert air when our church members wink and connive at iniquity, even in the supposed holy name of partisan loyalty. The carnival of political debauchery in Delaware for the ten years past under the management of J. Edward Addicks, who has spent hundreds of thousands of dollars to buy his way into the U. S. Senate, is not devoid of connection, first of all, with the fiendish murder committed by White, the negro, nor with the short work the mob made of him. It is only to be expected that the anarchy, permitted by cowardly officials at Wilmington and encouraged by so-called respectable citizens,

should serve as a brand to ignite combustible anarchistic material at a multitude of places throughout the land. If we sow the wind we may expect to reap the whirlwind. The same page of the *Philadelphia Ledger*, which gave the first account of the lynching of the negro in Delaware, had four other notices of law-breaking in the way of dishonesty in officials: school directors, charged with taking "rake-off" from teachers; councilmen, charged with seeking bribes from the promoters of a street railway company; conspiracy to defraud the Post Office Department; defalcation in the U. S. Treasury. With such crime only firm dealing can cope and if it is not checked, there results an undermining of morals which the Church in its teaching function alone can do little to stem. If it is not wrong or at most a slight offense for men of prominence to rob the public, how can we convince people in the ordinary walks that it is not right to steal in private life. The corruption of state and city governments, giving to favored magnates a monopoly in franchises which are a city's property as clearly as the house owned by the freeholder, the making barter of office, the intrigue of corporations in legislative lobbies, the league of city governments with crime in the way of blackmail, the delay and uncertainty of justice because of influence; these are glaring evils, amazingly widespread, but the worst feature, by far, is the acquiescence of the people therein. Such defects call for work on the part of the Christian layman and we are glad that there are signs, even in our large cities, the worst centers of corruption, that the purification of politics is not "an iridescent dream." On Fourth of July evening while taking a trolley ride over the beautiful Neversink mountain at Reading, all in the car were greatly annoyed by the unseemly behavior of a trio of drunken men on the front seats. I bade the conductor correct them, which he did. A man sitting by me said he once similarly reminded the conductor and, as a consequence, lost his position, doubtless through a brewer's influence, and was not disposed to try it again. Fortunately I have not yet lost

my place through trying to get men to behave themselves, but the remark of my friend shows how men are deterred from seeing to it that law is enforced, that justice is done—it will hurt them in business, it will jeopardize their position, all of which shows how covetousness makes cowards of us, how we neglect the work for Christ which is next to us, in leaving undone the things which we ought to do. Public opinion rules, in America, and there is an awakening of conscience in these matters. Voters are seeing that if politics are corrupt, it is their fault. Campaigns like those led by Mayor Low and Justice Jerome recently, in New York city and the enthusiastic appreciation of Joseph W. Folk's prosecutions in St. Louis, in spite of reverses, show that the people at heart want honesty in public affairs and will gladly follow courageous leaders.

The chief glory of our advanced civilization is the high moral status of the people generally, their sensitiveness to wrong, our just laws and our benevolent institutions. Civilization is an accomplishment. What we are is the product of the agonizing struggles after better things of multitudes of men moved by the spirit of God. Abuses, wrongs, interwoven with the social fabric, sustained by the prestige of centuries, have, after mighty agitation, been eliminated, but it has cost devoted lives. The grandest roll of honor is made up of the benefactors of mankind, who have come from every station in life and have wrought in a thousand ways. The names of Bright and Gladstone in English liberties; of Washington and Adams in American Independence; of Wilberforce, Phillips and Lincoln in the abolition of slavery; of John Howard and prison reform; of Elbridge T. Gerry and Charles Loring Brace in the protection and care of children; of Miss Barton and the Red Cross; of Miss Willard and Temperance; of Jacob Riis and the elimination of the slum; these are names identified with great beneficent causes, suggesting many other workers and giving a glimpse of the marvelous work done by laymen for Christ and the abundant opportunities for similar

endeavor along various lines to-day. Regarding these I give only a few hints, but here are fields of effort to challenge the mettle of the noblest and best.

To this high, difficult, and heroic task of bringing the rule of God into all the affairs of men is the layman called by Christ. Let him be a worker along the lines of organized church activity, if time permits him, but let not such work be a cloak for crookedness in business, nor a salve to a guilty conscience for neglect of civic duty. Honesty and faithful service in one's chosen calling, public spirit and unselfish endeavor in civic affairs—here is the layman's work for Christ, a work which must be done not only for the preservation of the nation, but also for the uplifting of the race and its transformation into the holy people destined of God. Let our pulpits ring with this message of social and civic righteousness and let not the dulcet tones of a donation organ, nor however great favors, which of course we should thankfully receive, deafen us to groaning wrongs—to the cries of those whose hire is kept back by fraud, cries which have entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth. May the ministry address themselves to the understanding of the peculiar difficulties and needs of twentieth century life and may we have insight to see and apply the truth of Christ which is all sufficient to heal and help. Thus will laymen get instruction and inspiration for their arduous work.

There is left me but little time to discuss the layman's work for Christ in the church which I am sure we must have in mind on this subject; but you are by no means to infer that such work is in the least disparaged. The great good godly laymen have done in our Protestant churches is only a hint at the marvelous possibilities. When men of affairs who have a passion for righteousness and can do things—holy men but not goodies—when such men come into our churches and organizations to teach and help, crowned with victory in striving for pure government and moral reform, and approved of God by faithfulness and rectitude in their chosen callings,

they instill into our incipient citizens an inspiration for uprightness and usefulness such as no minister can give.

Let us as ministers proclaim to our people that every man has a talent as a gift of God and that there is an opportunity to use it in the churches, that there is a need into which his special gift will fit. Let it be understood that there is no aristocracy of workers, no chosen few, but a splendid democracy of varied and complementing activities. Let the layman feel that there is nothing in church work that he may not do, if he is fitted for it. Jesus was a layman. Hard and fast methods cannot be used indiscriminately. They must be adapted to the traditions and temper of each congregation and the peculiar needs of the community in which it is called to serve. The main thing is to recognize that there is work to be done and talent available to do it, and if the minister has a little tact and energy and the layman a bit of gumption, the way will be found for the worker to do the work. Much depends on the minister as a leader. He can do most by putting others to work. In a certain sense the church is his parish and the world is the church's parish. He will be wise too, if he can find and develop leaders for the different departments of church activity.

Business men can be of immense help in applying business principles to the business end of the congregation, getting the people to give systematically, making records, carefully rendering reports, judiciously using the mail to keep the membership informed of the work in hand. Many members can be employed in visiting—the congregation can be districted and if this is systematically done, help and sympathy can be extended, acquaintance can be fostered, and invitations to service given. As teacher in Sunday-school, as worker in Young People's society, as usher, as librarian, the layman or laywoman has a fine field. "God hath set in the church *helps*," amongst many other and greater gifts. Any service therein, though outward and temporal, when done according to the "more excellent way" of love, is spiritual and Christian.

There may be much of this. Let our congregations be known as "working churches,"—we are saved to serve. Let us not encourage indifference and laziness by speaking of the church as the ark of safety. It is an army, every member is a soldier and is expected to do something. Dead wood is worse in a church than on a tree; it poisons, burdens, robs of efficiency. Let our motto be "no unemployed," and then let us try to see to it that every one has a work and above all let us strive under God to instill into the people "a mind to work"—surely this is "the mind of Christ." We know that "Christ alone can save the world"; we know equally well that "Christ can't save the world alone."

In a city of eastern Pennsylvania there is a young man who is editor and proprietor of a newspaper. Six days every week he brings before the people the happenings of the community, the nation, the world, and the doings of men, good and bad. In his editorial column the conduct of citizens and officials is brought to judgment. Unpartizan, fearless of financial consequences, scathing iniquity wherever it shows its head, heartily approving everything unselfish and good, he is a moral tonic to the town, and as such is feared and loved. This is one side of his work which of course is widely known. There is another side which is known by comparatively few. He has gathered together a large number of boys, without good home influences, outside of the Sunday-school, the toughs and terrors, and if unredeemed, the future criminals of the town. By athletics, games and whatsoever will interest, he holds them, tells them Bible stories, teaches them the holy scriptures, and tactfully leads them to "behold the man!" the Christ. His Sunday evenings and odd hours, his money, education and culture are consecrated to this. Every Sunday morning and evening he is seen quietly and devoutly sitting in the front part of his church. Around him are a group of choice young men. Their fine faces and manly mien are full of promise, but not many know whence they are and how they came to be interested in the things of God. Oh, what a reward—what a

crown of glory! Over two hundred boys have been in his class and under his care. His redeeming touch has been felt in many families and he is an angel of blessing to many a one in need. He is a man of God and his work is definitely for Christ, in his profession, as journalist, and in his membership in the church. Thank God there are many laymen doing likewise according to their ability and opportunity. May their tribe increase. Through them will emerge new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness. Yea all things will be made new.

Not long since Five Points in New York city, which had been notorious as a retreat for thugs, a nest of iniquity, was cleaned up and made the annex of Paradise Park. This world is the vestibule and under God is destined to become a veritable annex to Paradise. The church is chief, central and originative amongst a multitude of agencies making for this end, and it is the meaning of church membership and the privilege and high call of every layman to lend a hand toward effecting this glorious consummation.

VIII.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

RELIGIONS OF AUTHORITY AND THE RELIGION OF THE SPIRIT. By Auguste Sabatier, Late Dean of the Protestant Faculty of Theology in the University of Paris. Translated by Louise Seymour Houghton. New York, McClure, Phillips and Co., 1904. Pp. 410.

The author of this posthumous volume became generally known to American students of theology by the publication, in 1891, of a translation of the work entitled, "The Apostle Paul." His reputation among us was still further enhanced when, in 1897, his brilliant treatise on the Philosophy of Religion was issued in English. The present work, however, is the crown of his theological labors. It is the most comprehensive of all his works and, indeed, incorporates the essential substance and most important conclusions of his earlier writings. To its production he gave the maturest thought of his later years. It bears on every page the evidence of intense conviction and burning enthusiasm. It is replete with knowledge, but what is more, it is full of fire. It bears the marks of wide reading and ample learning, but the learning is never paraded; it is, in fact, remanded to the background; it is obviously but a means to an end; that end is to persuade the reader of the truth of the author's conception of the nature of the Christian religion. While the book comprises an investigation and a discussion of its theme, it is primarily a message. It is the dying message of an intense, sincere and deeply religious spirit to France and to the world. It is Sabatier's swan-song.

The book contains three main divisions. The first describes the development of the Roman Catholic system of dogma and of ecclesiastical organization. The second deals with the older Protestantism and exhibits in detail the points in which it departed from the assumptions of the Roman system and the particulars in which it remained, in principle, at one with it. These systems, the Roman Catholic and the early Protestant alike, are Religions of Authority; both maintain the notion of an external standard and measure of religious truth and knowledge to which the reason and conscience of man must yield unquestioning assent and obedience. For the Romanist this "authority" is the Church expressing infallibly the divine mind and will through its popes and councils; for the Protestant it is the letter of Scripture whose inspiration is regarded as "plenary" and all whose assertions, alike on matters of faith and of fact, are infallible.

Between the two systems there is perfect agreement in the major premiss: We must have, and do have, an inerrant, external standard and rule of faith; they differed only in the minor premiss as to what the standard was. In the third part the author makes his plea for the religion of the spirit, the freedom of faith, the responsibility of man for the fullest use of his faculties in the ascertainment of religious truth; in a word, for a moral, as opposed to a legal and prescriptive, conception of authority, according to which religion authenticates itself in the conscience and theology becomes, not a supernaturally attested system of speculation, but an exposition of religious experience.

Under the first head he shows how slowly and painfully freedom of investigation and of religious belief has been attained. In the Middle Ages the principle of authority dominated in all sciences. The Church assumed to pronounce on questions of physics, astronomy and philosophy as freely as on problems in theology and morals. Hence the irrepressible conflict which went on, and still goes on, between the Church and whatever form of science may be pushing forward its researches at any given time. The scientific progress of modern times, in all departments of knowledge, has been made in the face of the protests of the Roman Church and, in no small degree, in spite of Protestant suspicion also. The religions of authority have been the sworn foes of science. When Galileo dared to assert the rotundity of the earth, the pope cast him into prison and demanded that he should recant. When Columbus would venture forth upon the seas in search of a passage around the world, grave theologians denounced his scheme as contrary to the revealed cosmology. What ecclesiastical authority did not frown upon Darwin's investigations and conclusions respecting the gradual development of the world's form and life? So has it ever been, and so it is still whenever the principle of authority rules supreme. The ban of the Church upon the scientific investigations of St. George Mivart and upon the "Americanism" of Father Hecker are still well remembered, and just now the brilliant Abbé Loisy is under suspension for exercising too large liberty in Biblical researches. Liberty of thought in any field is a boon which has been gradually won by the labors of such men as Bacon and Descartes, in spite of the unceasing protests of authoritative religion.

In brilliancy, conciseness and vividness the sketch here given of the development of the Catholic system could hardly be surpassed. The evolution of the hierarchical notion of the Church and its authority, the centralization of this authority at Rome, the way in which it buttressed itself with its doctrines of tradition and apostolic succession, and the gradual exaltation of the papacy until it reached, at length, the claim of infallibility—all these events and processes are graphically portrayed. Not less realistic

is the description of the decline of the system in recent times—the collapse of its temporal power, once the most potent political force in Europe, the loss of the papal states and the so-called “imprisonment” of the Pope in the Vatican. It is shown how this theocratic and divinely authorized organization which has ever boasted of its fixity and sameness, has always been subject to the laws and forces which govern all history and which subject all institutions to constant modification and change. Sabatier shows by appeal to the literature of the early Church that the development of this system was natural in the circumstances and that it is entirely capable of historic explanation. Each successive step was taken to safeguard some previous step, each new claim was made to fortify some power actually in exercise. The circular logic of the system became, at length, complete. The Scriptures authenticated the Church and the Church alone had the right to say what the Scriptures meant; the Church was the sole guardian of tradition and tradition was the pillar of the Church’s authority; apostolic succession secured the authority of the priesthood and the unbroken priesthood was the witness and proof of apostolic succession.

It must be remembered that Sabatier lived under the shadow of the Romanism of France and had actively participated for many years in the political and ecclesiastical controversies to which the claims of the Church gave rise. He wrote, therefore, with a keen, fresh sense of what this is, and undertakes, in a country where it is paramount. He knew perfectly the practical, social and educational questions in which the religious orders had involved France. He knew its methods in politics and understood that the Church was in politics in order to gain its ends—by whatever methods and alliances might seem best adapted to success. It is not strange, therefore, that he writes with spirit on this subject. Yet, his Part I. is no mere attack; it is a severe arraignment, but the proofs are given. The author holds that the history of Romanism is its judgment. But that judgment is not an unmixed condemnation. Sabatier can appreciate the true piety and sainthood of Catholicism as well as denounce its sanction of preposterous legends, its profiting by forged decretals and the quarrels and corruptions which have sometimes disgraced its Papal Court. He recognizes a factor of “profound and noble religion, a vital sap of Christian life, a fountain of mystic uplift and heroic devotion,” as well as “a hierarchy that oppresses the conscience, which is the enemy of all free and spontaneous inspiration, filtering the thought in outworn dogmas and the moral life in puerile exercises of devotion” (page 143).

In his Second Part the author describes the process by which Protestantism, which was at first a revolt against the principle of an outward, legal authority in religion, gradually lapsed back

into the application and assertion of the same principle in a new form, having exchanged the Pope for the Bible. This was "Catholicism transposed." He points out that this seventeenth century scholasticism involved a distinct departure from the principles of the Reformer, although these principles of liberty of conscience and freedom of thought and investigation were never clearly defined or consistently carried out by them. It is well known that Luther took up a free view respecting the investigation and testing of the worth of the Biblical books. Those books only deserve to be regarded as authoritative, he said, which teach Christ. Such are apostolic, though written by a Judas or a Herod. On the other hand, no book which did not exalt Christ would be canonical, though written by Peter or Paul. On this principle he designated those which were of chief value, and re-manded the others to the background. Similarly, Calvin doubted the authenticity of II. Peter and the Apocalypse. His principle of authority was the "*testimonium Spiritus Sancti*," bearing its witness in the heart. It is through the enlightened Christian heart and conscience that we learn and know the truth and power of the Bible. Neither the Church, nor the Bible's own word, can impose its truth upon us as by naked authority from without. He whose Spirit breathes through the Bible must and does illumine and quicken the mind of man to apprehend and embrace the truth, and thus the Bible authenticates itself as the Word of God through its power of appeal to the conscience. But, later, this moral authority, this power of truth to shine in its own light, became transformed into a mere legal, external authority, imposed upon man *ab extra*, silencing reason, denying the right of inquiry, and demanding unquestioning submission. This is, in turn, Protestant Catholicism; this is a new "religion of authority."

The constructive portion of the book appeals from the religions of authority to "the religion of the Spirit." To show that Christianity is a religion of the latter sort, Sabatier goes back to the New Testament and examines the religious consciousness of Jesus and the apostolic conception of inspiration. He finds the atmosphere of the New Testament to be an atmosphere of freedom. "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." Jesus was no tyrannical legislator seeking to fetter independent thought, to stifle inquiry and repress the free action of conscience. On the contrary, he sought to emancipate the spirit of man, bound as it was in his time by the power of unreasonable precedents and traditions. His whole life was a protest against the tyranny of traditionalism and ecclesiastical authority. He himself lived the free and unfettered life of a Son of God and it was his aim to introduce men into the same freedom—the freedom which the truth gives.

The apostolic teaching knows nothing of that arbitrary political

power which the Church later assumed. All believers are kings and priests unto God. He that is spiritual is to judge all things and to hold fast the good. The Gospel is the power of a new life, of a higher and nobler freedom, not the proclamation of a new bondage, the welding of a new fetter on the human mind and heart. The Christian law is a law of liberty. In the closing pages of the book Sabatier sketches a program for the study and development of a theology of Christian experience, based on the idea that theology is a scientific interpretation of the Christian life.

It may be thought from this brief sketch in which it has been impossible to present the author's ideas in that balance and adjustment in which he has developed them, that Sabatier's theology is a mere "subjectivism" according to the notion: "Man is the measure of all things." This conception would be quite unwarranted. Sabatier believes in a revelation from God which is authoritative for us, but he holds that this revelation makes its appeal to the heart and conscience and wins its assent and asserts its power there; it is a *moral* authority, quickening appreciation and awakening response, not oppressing, silencing and overwhelming the reason and the heart. It is authoritative as the sunlight is illuminating—because it is the element in which the soul lives and thrives. He repudiates the conception of a mere outwardly imposed authority; nothing can be *morally* authoritative which does not attest itself in the heart and conscience as true.

If it be true that "the style is the man," then Sabatier must have been a truly remarkable personality. His writings are literature. In lucidity, force, felicity and imaginative power his work is masterly. My own impression is that his greatest gift is, perhaps, his power of historic imagination. He could make the past live again for his reader. By graphic sayings, realistic contrasts and strategic marshalling of facts he was able to impart a living interest to history which makes the reading of his books at once instructive and fascinating.

I venture to add this personal word: I visited Sabatier while he was writing this book. With keen zest he explained to me the idea and method of the work. It was evident that he was then a sick man. As he talked I thought: Will the book ever see the light? He barely finished it, and his work on earth was done. I am thankful for the privilege of paying the lamented author the small tribute of commending this, his last and greatest work, to American readers.

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TWELVE YEARS IN A MONASTERY. By Josephy McCabe (lately Father Antony, O.S.F.). Second Edition. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1903. Pages 246. Price \$1.50.

The fact that a second edition of this work has been demanded speaks well for its merits and popularity. The first edition appeared six years ago and was soon exhausted. The author professes to have made a few minor changes in the present edition. "A few superlatives have been deposed from their high estate; many qualifications have wholly disappeared, and been left to the reader to supply; and the matter has been brought up to date here and there."

The peculiar value of the book becomes apparent when we remember that Mr. Joseph McCabe was formerly Father Antony, a Grey Friar or a member of the English section of the Order of St. Francis. He sums up his experiences in these words: "The writer, after spending twelve years in various monasteries of the Franciscan Order, found himself compelled, in the early part of last year (1896), to secede from the Roman Catholic priesthood. During those years, besides a long familiarity with the tenor of monastic life, a large experience of Catholic educational, polemical, and administrative methods has been accumulated, and it may not be inopportune to set it forth in simple narrative." For the Protestant there is always an air of mystery around the institutions of the Roman Catholic Church. He has often been victimized by the wild and repulsive stories of "the escaped monk." The accounts of monastic life by such men are evidently extremely one-sided and bear the marks of exaggeration, to say the least. Mr. McCabe is not an "escaped monk" of that kind. He has not simply laid off the monastic garb, but he has put on a manner of life differing in principle and practice from that of the monk. He is an intelligent convert from Catholicism and withal a gentleman in the description of the institution he has left behind.

The plan of the narrative is somewhat autobiographical. The life of the author is described from his preparation for the priesthood to his secession from the Roman Church. But, in giving an account of his personal experiences, he presents a vivid picture of the training, life, habits, and character of monks and priests in general. He speaks in a series of chapters on the Novitiate, Studentship, Priesthood, The Confessional, A Year at Louvain, Ministry in London, Other Orders and the London Clergy, Country Ministry, Secession, Critique of Monasticism, the Church of Rome. He weaves a great deal of historic and doctrinal information into the treatment of these subjects. He makes the impression upon the reader that he bears no bitter feelings against the Church of his fathers, but

speaks of it with candor and fairness. In offering objections to various practices, for example that of the Confessional, he does not exploit the immoralities of which it is accused but rather shows how such evils are practically impossible. He says: "The attacks upon the confessional have usually defeated their own object by emphasizing too strongly the accidental rather than the inherent or essential evil of the institution. Dark stories—which may quite possibly be true as exceptional cases—are circulated in connection with it, and the impression is at once urged that such practices are a normal, or at least a large part of what is hidden under the veil of secrecy. The generalization is fatal, for the Catholic apologist has little difficulty in pointing out the impossibility of such a state of things; besides the days are happily gone by when the Catholic priesthood as a body could be accused of systematic and conscious immorality." The real evil of the confessional he finds in the unnatural demand made on young and old, men and women, "to tell every unworthy thought or act into which they have been betrayed." "For girls and young women to discuss their inmost thoughts and feelings with a person of the opposite sex is vicious and lamentable. If they are of a refined temper such a practice causes much pain, and often leads to duplicity or to actual debasement; to those of a coarser complexion the temptation to abuse the occasion is very severe."

He pursues the same method of argument in regard to monasticism. It is not the isolated cases of moral corruption that are its strongest condemnation, but the unhuman, unnatural and unsocial principles which it represents. Of the character of the monks he says: "There are, of course, isolated members who are deeply corrupted in monasteries and nunneries, as in all other spheres; there are also many individuals of unusually exalted character." He divides the monks into two categories. The one category consists of those who have "bound themselves to a certain system of religious services, through which they pass mechanically and with much resignation, and which they alleviate by as much harmless pleasure and distraction as they can procure." The other category consists of those who "have exhausted their moral heroism in the taking of the vows; for the rest of their lives they chafe under the discipline they have undertaken, modify and withdraw from it as much as possible, and add to it as much worldly pleasure as circumstances permit." Among his chief objections to this manner of life he mentions the habit of idleness, the want of a refining contact with the other sex, a selfish individualism out of which grow intrigue, meanness and dissension.

In the concluding chapter the author gives his estimate of the Church of Rome, her strength and weakness. He pays a

tribute to her past achievements. "During its protracted existence it has encountered and triumphed over many kinds of opposition. It emerged brilliantly victorious from its secular struggle with polytheistic Rome and with the destructive neo-Hellenism of Alexandria; it met confidently and rose upon the flood of barbarism that poured out over Southern Europe; it guided its fortunes safely through the age of iron that followed, and then controlled the fierce intellectual activity of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; it subdued and repressed the Renaissance and almost compensated its losses in the great Reformation. But the Church has never had so varied and so powerful a host of adversaries to encounter as it has at the present day." These adversaries he finds in the intellectual, ethical, political, and æsthetical tendencies of the age.

The whole implication of the book is that the doctrines, institutions and practices of the Church of Rome are antiquated, wrong in principle, contrary to normal human nature and to the dominant spirit of the modern age. Herein lies the weakness of Rome, more than in any one flagrant abuse or error. She cannot face the light which emanates from every direction and conceal the inconsistencies, inaccuracies, and the hollowness of her claims. The last sentence of the book contains a prophecy. "If the new light is to penetrate to every part of our social structure, it cannot be many centuries before the last faint flicker of the historic lamp will die out—nay, will even be voluntarily extinguished in the blaze of the coming day."

GEORGE W. RICHARDS, D.D.

ST. ANSELM, *PROSLGIUM; MONOLOGIUM; AN APPENDIX IN BEHALF OF THE FOOL* BY GAUNILLOU; AND *CUR DEUS HOMO*. Translated from the Latin by Sidney Norton Deane, B.A. With introduction, bibliography and reprints of the opinions of leading philosophers and writers on the ontological argument. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Company, 1903. Pages 288. Cloth, \$1.00; Paper, 50 cents.

This book is the ninth of the series of Philosophical Classics, published by the Open Court Company. Among the previous publications are such epoch-making works as the *Discourse on Method* by Descartes, the *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* by Hume, Leibnitz's *Metaphysics* and Kant's *Prolegomena*. For the study of philosophy from the sources by the college student or the graduate we know of no more helpful publications than these. They are well translated, prepared in a cheap and yet attractive form. In the work before us we have a translation of Anselm's greatest writings. A study of them is indispensable for the understanding of Medieval theology and philosophy.

In the *Proslogium* the author presents his famous argument

for the existence of God known as the ontological argument. In the Monologium he discusses, under the form of a meditation, the Being of God, basing his argument not on authority of Scripture, but on the force of reason. Probably the best known and most widely discussed, though little read, writing is the *Cur Deus Homo*. In it the famous doctrine of the Atonement is expounded, now known as the Anselmic theory. It is presented in the form of a dialogue which makes the whole discussion simple and easily understood. In chapter 2 of this work the author states briefly his theory of knowledge. "As the right order requires us to believe the deep things of Christian faith before we undertake to discuss them by reason; so to my mind it appears a neglect if, after we are established in the faith, we do not seek to understand what we believe." In this proposition we find a reason for the reading of the works of the great authorities in theology and philosophy. No one has a right to accept or reject with authority the Anselmic theory of the Atonement if he has not read Anselm's own exposition of it. Otherwise we fall into blind traditionalism or into irrational radicalism. The spirit of the age demands a consultation of the sources. These publications make the leading sources easily accessible to all English readers. For the College, the Theological Seminary, and the student in general, this volume will throw more light on a particular period in the history of philosophy than many histories of philosophy.

In an introduction of 25 pages there are abstracts from Weber's History of Philosophy on Anselm's position in the world of thought, and a series of quotations regarding his most characteristic contribution to philosophy—the *ontological argument*—from Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant, Hegel, Dörner, Lotze and Flint. A bibliography has, also, been compiled. Thus the work will give full material and indications for the original study of one of the greatest exponents of Christian doctrine.

G. W. RICHARDS.

THE CANON OF REASON AND VIRTUE. LAO-TZE'S TAO TEH KING. Translated from the Chinese by Dr. Paul Carus. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co. Pages 138. Paper, 25 cents, net.

Dr. Carus gives a brief history of this work in a Foreword. It is "an extract from the author's larger work, Lao-Tze's Tao Teh King, and has been published for the purpose of making our reading public more familiar with that grand and imposing figure Li Er, who was honored with the posthumous title Poh-Yang, i. e., Prince of the Strong Principle; but whom his countrymen simply call Lao-Tze, the Old Philosopher."

Lao-Tze was a senior contemporary of Confucius, both living in the sixth century B. C. He was visited by the latter, but

after a brief interview they separated without coming to an agreement in their philosophical views. They have ever since represented two schools of thought in China. "The disciples of Confucius, the so-called 'Literati,' are tinged with their master's agnosticism and insist on the rules of propriety as their best education, while the Lao-Tze, the believers in the Tao, or divine Reason, are given to philosophical speculation and religious mysticism."

The Canon of Reason and Virtue was written near the close of Lao's life. It is cast in the form of aphoristic utterances and is pregnant with noble moral truths and deep meditation. By an imperial decree it has been given canonical authority. In it one finds many striking analogies with Christian thought. The word Lao corresponds closely with the Greek term Logos. One of his precepts is "requite evil with goodness." He speaks of becoming like a little child, of non-assertion and non-resistance. The crooked will be straightened, the empty will be filled, the worn will be renewed, those who have too little will receive, while those who have too much will be bewildered.

We live in an age of foreign missions and of comparative study of religions, as well as of international commerce and literature. These movements have brought the orient and the occident into close association. The spirit of exclusion is replaced by the spirit of mutual recognition and appreciation. Both theoretically and practically the nations are feeling that the race is essentially one. No one, who claims membership in the society of Christian culture, will absolutely condemn heathen religion or philosophy. It is not a caricature of the true religion nor an inspiration of demons, but rather a noble effort after the true and living God. Their truth comes from God as ours does. The divine spirit works in all nations and is gradually leading from one stage to another, until they will meet before Him who is the Way, the Truth and the Life. An intelligent foreign missionary enthusiasm will result as much from the appreciation of our kinship with the heathen as of our difference from them. Such a lesson of fellowship can be best learnt by reading the writings of the sages who have shaped the ideals of the nations among whom Christian missionaries now labor. The pastor, therefore, who desires to maintain a missionary spirit among his people would do well to read this booklet. The student interested in the study of religions need not be told that here is a gem of which he can not well afford to be ignorant.

We heartily concur with the conclusion of the Foreword, by Dr. Carus. "May this little book fulfil its mission and be a witness to the religious spirit and philosophical depth of a foreign nation whose habits, speech and dress are strange to us. We are not alone in the world; there are others who search for the truth

and are groping after it. Let us become better acquainted with them, let us greet them as brothers, let us understand them and appreciate their ideals!"

G. W. RICHARDS.

VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY. *Divine Heritage of Man* by Swami Abhedānanda. New York, published by the Vedānta Society. 12mo. Cloth, \$1.00. Postage, 8 cents. Pages 215.

Since the Parliament of Religions at the World's Fair in Chicago the Vedānta philosophy has been expounded in this country by the Swamis or Spiritual Teachers from India. In New York city a Vedānta Society was organized, while a series of lectures were delivered by Swami Vivekananda in 1894 and 1895. This society has fixed headquarters for its office and library, and for the dissemination of literature and the instruction of its members. The object of Vedānta, which means literally "end of all wisdom," is not to form a new sect or creed or to make proselytes, but to explain through logic and reason the spiritual laws that govern our lives; to show that the true religion of the soul is in harmony with philosophy and science; to establish that universal religion which underlies all the various sects and creeds of special religions; to propagate the principles taught by the great seers of truth and religious leaders of different countries and illustrated by their lives; and to help mankind in the practical application of those principles in their spiritual, moral, intellectual and physical needs. Such is the aim of Vedānta according to a tract published by the New York society.

It professes to be the universal and ultimate philosophy and religion. It accepts all systems of religion as phases of the true religion; and all religious teachers, East and West, as organs of the Divine Spirit for the revelation of truth. It does not, however, profess to be built around any personality nor does it depend on any particular book as its Scriptures. It accepts all the different religious books and finds in them imperfect expressions of the Universal Religion. To an American Christian the Vedānta philosophy is certainly not a religion, whatever it may be as a philosophy. Its universalism and want of personality make it colorless and unsatisfactory as a religion. It, doubtless, contains many profound truths and as such serves its purpose in philosophy, yet that it is the absolute philosophy, even, it is somewhat difficult to admit. Yet its writers have all the positiveness of one who proclaims finality.

Among this class is the author of the *Divine Heritage of Man*. The contents of the book is contained under the following topics: I. Existence of God. II. Attributes of God. III. Has God any Form? IV. Fatherhood and Motherhood of God. V. Re-

lation of Soul to God. VI. What is an Incarnation of God? VII. Son of God. VIII. Divine Principle in Man.

The subjects are treated from an historical and scientific standpoint. The author usually explains the theories held by the several religions and philosophies and then proceeds to show how all the elements of truth in each of these are summed up in the Vedanta philosophy. He shows wide knowledge of history and a rather close acquaintance with the development of Christianity. The reader, however, cannot help but feel that if the Christian misunderstands the Vedanta in as many points as the author seems to misunderstand the Christianity of our age, there is a rather sad misunderstanding all around. We have no fears that this system will make any perceptible invasions in the territory of Christianity, though it may attract individuals here and there whose minds are more attuned to oriental vagueness than to the occidental desire for personality and fact. To get a clear and brief survey, however, of the Vedanta philosophy one can find few books more helpful than this by Swami Abhedānanda.

G. W. RICHARDS.

SYSTEM OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. By Henry C. Sheldon. Cincinnati, Jennings and Pye. Pages 635. Price, \$2.50.

For several years Dr. Sheldon occupied the chair of Church History in Boston University School of Theology (Methodist). While in this position, he published in 1885 a "History of Christian Doctrine" in two volumes, of which a second edition was called for in 1895, and a "History of the Christian Church," in five volumes, in 1894. The studies incidental to the production of these works constitute the best possible preparation for the chair of Dogmatics, which he now holds.

The volume before us is a valuable contribution to current theological literature, illustrating those characteristics of the author which have always won the confidence and respect of his students—perfect intellectual candor, independence of thought and a religious spirit.

The first question we ask nowadays about a work on dogmatics is, "What attitude does it assume toward modern biblical criticism?" If we find this attitude appreciative, the next question we ask is, "In how far has the author felt called upon to modify the traditional method of dogmatics?"

The friendly attitude of the present work toward biblical criticism is attested by its treatment of the doctrine of inspiration, although many, no doubt, will find that it does not go far enough to be in complete harmony with the standpoint of most competent, but devout, critics. Inspiration is defined as "an interior divine agency auxiliary to the grasp and expression of truth, and therefore serving as a factor in the process of revelation." It "does

not suppress the use of the natural faculties in its subject, but rather carries them up to a higher stage of activity." It must be "dynamical rather than mechanical." But the "intuitional theory" is rejected as disparaging "the direct operation of the Holy Spirit." Inspiration has not excluded from the Bible errors of language, of fact, and even of moral teaching. "To attribute to divine inspiration such words as are contained in Psalms LVIII. 10, CIX. 10-12, and CXXXVII. 9, is to dishonor both God and the Bible." But it should be noted that "so far as the errors have any moral or religious bearing, the progress of revelation has provided an adequate corrective." The tribunal which is to distinguish moral and religious truth from moral and religious error would seem to be the individual mind as enlightened by the completed biblical revelation. In connection with this subject, it is significantly remarked that "there is no warrant for connecting inspiration exclusively with the act of writing."

Whether the fallibility of the Bible extends to theoretical truth is not expressly declared. It is everywhere assumed, however, that what the Bible gives us is not the raw material for constructive thinking, together with the first tentative efforts at construction, but a relatively complete, self-consistent system of thought authoritatively revealed through inspiration; for the biblical teaching on any point, whether practical or theoretical, is always treated as final. The most plausible objection to this assumption would be the difficulty of reconciling it with the author's conception of inspiration as a dynamic operation of the Divine Spirit that "does not suppress the use of the natural faculties," but only "carries them up to a higher stage of activity." Ideas can be possessed by the human mind only by thinking them, and "an interior divine agency" which determines ideas would have to control thinking, *i. e.*, in so far "suppress" the natural use of human faculties. The assumption referred to is in fact difficult to harmonize with any but a mechanical theory of inspiration.

The acceptance of biblical statements in the theoretical, metaphysical sphere as final and authoritative, accounts for the extent to which the author has followed the traditional method of dogmatics, and also for the fact that, despite notable modifications of individual doctrines, he has not materially contracted the sphere of assumed doctrinal certainty, finding biblical grounds for a definite doctrine of angels, for a definite scheme in regard to an intermediate state, etc.

Concerning the Atonement, he finds "inadequate in the light of scripture teaching" the theories of Schleiermacher, Bushnell and Ritschl, for the reason that they ignore or reject "the objective value, the Godward bearing, of Christ's work." Ritschl's

theory, proceeding on the basis that the whole ethical nature of God is absorbed in His loving will, pays no adequate respect to the claims of divine righteousness." As "exaggerating some phase of Christ's work of atonement" he regards various mystical theories and those of Swedenborg, F. D. Maurice and Dr. Hodge. He himself can accept no more definite view of the matter than this: "The claims of divine holiness and justice conditioned the method of grace and determined that the Son of God, who came with the message of forgiving love, should also clearly expose the sinfulness of sin, and render, through his humiliation, obedience and suffering, the profoundest tribute to righteous law, and to the divine holiness and justice which it reflects." But it is only language accommodated to man's apprehension, when Christ's atoning work is described as a sacrifice to God, a ransom, or a propitiation.

First among the conditions of the appropriation of salvation is faith. This is defined as "an attitude of trust and self-surrender toward God as revealed in Jesus Christ." This presupposes, of course, a knowledge of Christ. But "a self-surrender to the highest ideal that is known" is not a bad pledge of surrender to Christ, when he shall become known. The theory which shuts out the heathen *en masse* from salvation is, of course, rejected as reflecting too seriously on the equity and mercy of God. It is noteworthy that, according to his definition, faith is in no sense an intellectual assent to a doctrine.

His views of the Church exclude as unfounded and impertinent the mechanical theories of Romanists and high-church Episcopalians, his refutation of the claims of the Roman Church being especially able and complete.

In his treatment of the sacraments we find no assumption of their magical or mystical efficacy. Baptism is viewed as "an expression of faith," and as "a symbol of regeneration," but by no means as a condition of regeneration or of salvation. The Lord's Supper is only (1) a memorial of the death of Christ, (2) a sign of a close personal relation between the Lord and the communicant, (3) a token of the Lord's gracious will, (4) on the part of the communicant, a solemn confession of discipleship, and (5) a sign of the unity of believers.

His treatment of some points in Eschatology will probably provoke hostile criticism, especially within his own communion. Without expressly deciding whether there is continued probation after death, he states very fully the reasons that may be urged in support of the hypothesis. In regard to the destiny of the incorrigibly wicked, he thinks there is no escape from the conclusion that their doom is "irremediable"; but he refuses to dogmatize further, leaving us free to accept, if we choose, the theory of annihilation.

ELMER E. POWELL, PH.D.

CHRISTIAN FAITH IN AN AGE OF SCIENCE. By William North Rice, Ph.D., LL.D., Professor of Geology in Wesleyan University. New York, A. C. Armstrong and Son. Price, \$1.50, net. Pages 425.

To review thoroughly all the matters treated in this volume from the pen of Dr. Rice would be to rewrite the book itself. There are so many points discussed, and such a wealth of scientific information contained therein, that the reader will at once feel that he has found a treasure indeed. Under such circumstances, a bare review is a most inadequate treatment. To be appreciated, the book must be read and studied, and re-read again and again.

"Christian Faith in an Age of Science" is a presentation of religious truth from a scientific aspect. We hear much in these days of a "reasonable religion." Religion must be scientific; it must authenticate itself to the scientific consciousness, as well as appeal to the heart and soul. There is much reasonableness in this demand. The day is past when things were looked upon as true in the degree in which they were improbable and impossible. The present age demands a religion that will satisfy the claims of a scientific investigation. These demands this present volume attempts to meet.

The first part of the book reviews the history of those scientific discoveries which have resulted in developing the three characteristic ideas of the extension of the universe in space, the extension of the universe in time, and the unity of the universe. The history is partly chronological and partly logical. In discussing the first of these three ideas, the author shows how the sphericity of the globe was finally proven by Magellan's circumnavigation of the earth; how the Ptolemaic conception of the geocentric nature of the solar system was followed by the heliocentric conception, under the teachings of Copernicus and Galileo; and how Newton, with the discovery of his three laws, gave us a basis for astronomy in its modern form. The enlarged conception of the universe in point of space had its effect upon religious teaching. It exalted Jehovah, and made him a far greater Creator than he was at first supposed to be. The result is a deeper reverence for, and a higher and a more spiritual worship of God.

In the same way the author treats the conception of the universe in its extension in time. Geology has shown that the earth was thousands and thousands of years in the making, instead of six days of twenty-four hours each, and that ages have passed since the dawn of the creation of man, instead of the 4004 years deduced in Archbishop Usher's chronology. These facts have altered our conception of the Bible, and instead of Genesis being a literal and scientific account of the history of creation, it is shown to be a poem written for a religious purpose, *i. e.*, to show

the hand of a beneficent Master in all the works of creation. And so likewise the modern theory of the unity of the universe, as proven by several lines of investigation, especially along the lines of evolution: It has done away with the idea of a "carpenter God," and has given us a more spiritual God and a more kindly Father.

The second part of the book discusses the status of certain doctrines of Christianity in this age of science. The doctrines of "Human Personality," "Natural Law," "Providence," "Prayer," "Miracle" and "Revelation" are discussed in a clear and scientific way. Modern science, instead of overthrowing these doctrines, has simply lopped off some of the exotics, and has given us more healthy doctrines instead. The accretions of time have been removed, and as a result these doctrines are seen to be both rational and scientific, natural as well as religious. For example, miracles are possible according to a law which is yet unknown to men, but which Jesus knew how to use. Under this conception, the author finds no difficulty in accepting most of the miracles of the Bible. Of course, the miracles of Jonah and the whale, of the sun standing still at the command of Joshua, and others of a similar nature, the author deems both absurd and impossible. They contain no moral significance, and are, therefore, unnecessary for a rational belief.

Part three discusses the general status of Christian evidences. The various convergent lines of evidence are two: first, the effect of Christianity itself. The world beholds the daily miracle of souls dead in sin rising into the life of goodness, and, as in the ancient days, the multitudes glorify God, who has given such power unto men." Secondly, the personality of Jesus himself. He is the greatest evidence of Christianity.

The whole volume is a very sane discussion of a most interesting subject. The author is, indeed, religious, but he is at the same time both fair and frank. Therefore the book is a model of exposition, and with its clear type and numerous drawings, is a valuable contribution to the present day religio-scientific thought.

H. H. RUPP.

CONTROL IN EVOLUTION, A Discussion of the Fundamental Principles of Social Order and Progress. By George F. Wilkin, Ph.D. New York, A. C. Armstrong and Son. Pages xxi + 284. Price, \$1.25.

This book is a scientific treatment of the underlying principles of society, the conclusions of which are in harmony with the teachings of Christianity. Believing that the "true starting point for a scientific study of any social problem is in a cosmic philosophy," and that "the doctrine of evolution furnishes such a basis for the scientific study of society," the author goes back to the beginning of things, and, before taking up sociology proper,

tells how the world, according to the theory of evolution, came into existence. The book is divided into five parts. I. Cosmic Control. II. Individual Control. III. Social Control. IV. The Subversion of Control. V. The Restoration of Control.

I. *Cosmic Control*.—In the process of world building there have been four periods: 1. The drawing together of nebulous matter into the shape of planets, etc. The controlling principle of the first period was gravitation. 2. The combination of atoms by which the solid substance of the earth was compounded. While gravitation remained in force, chemical affinity was the great controlling factor in this period. 3. The introducing of living things, vegetable and animal. Here life is the predominant and controlling fact. 4. The appearance of man. In this human period of evolution control is the dominance of *rational will* or practical reason.

As these are four stages of one onward and upward movement, cosmic control, which is defined as "a uniform tendency to order and progress," is a unity. There must, therefore, be a Unit Power that has caused this wonderful unity of movement. No stream rises higher than its source; "the creator of intelligent beings must be an intelligent personality."

II. *Individual Control*.—Man has a threefold character and three corresponding species of control which are: (1) The animal appetites and passions, (2) the intellect (a man may be intellectual without being moral) and (3) the rational will. "The normal man is the man whose intellect dominates his animal nature, and whose ethical will dominates both the animal nature and the intellect and subordinates them to the active pursuit of the ideal Right." "The possibility of such attainment lies in the fact that human nature is at the bottom and essentially evolutionary. And this means that our higher powers, in their normal operation, are mightier than our lower powers." Furthermore, "the sovereign power of evolution that has ordained the normal course and character of human life is in league with the man who walks in that path." Persons who yield to their passions are out of harmony with the creative plan of the universe, with evolution and with environment and are at war with themselves. "Such an abnormal attitude of the rational nature and the consequent moral deformity" is sin.

III. *Social Control*.—By this term is meant the force or agency that determines the existence of a progressive social order; it is the "principle by virtue of which society is, and is what it is." After dwelling at some length on "Society as an Evolution," the author has a chapter on "Nature of Social Control," in which he shows how, by the exchange of ideas and in various ways, public opinion is formed, and how society becomes organized. Social control is a later evolution, and therefore a higher

form of control, than the rational will of the individual, which it presupposes as an element. But as society has to do with only some of the interests of the individual, those he has in common with other people, there is a "residuary sphere of control remaining in the individual."

IV. *The Subversion of Control*.—Some people follow the lower instead of the higher inclinations. They form evil habits, lose faith in the true and the good, and eventually direct their rational will against the evolutionary order and champion the cause of evil. This evil disposition is transmitted to posterity.

The author draws two inferences from the fact that moral evil has been so universal: (1) "The subversion of the rational will of man by an evil choice took place very early; (2) sin was probably caused by the base choice of the first being worthy the name man. There has been in all human history a conflict between two directly antagonistic evolutions, the upward and the downward.

V. *Restoration of Control*.—(To a discussion of this is devoted more than half the book.) Evolution is superior to counter-evolution; for there has been a gradual advance and triumph of the upward movement, and it is unreasonable to suppose that evolution which advanced through all preliminary stages up to man will be defeated by that in man which is its climax and consummation. That evolution may triumph, rational will must control the individual and society. Every one should live the evolutionary life and commend it to others. But people will not turn from evil and undergo self-sacrifice unless they believe in immortality.

The chapter on "Immortality" and the chapters on the "Power behind Evolution" are most interesting and worthy of careful study. The same may be said of the chapter on "Christianity Scientific."

We feel sure that thoughtful persons who read this book will heartily agree with Dr. A. H. Strong, who in an Introductory Note says: "I am confident that our author has in this work done much to put science and religion at rights with one another, and to give the Christian faith a new hold upon all thoughtful men."

This book is interesting throughout, is suggestive and is well worth reading. It is profound, but the author has a good style and expresses himself clearly.

J. L. BARNHART.

SUN-RISE. Addresses from a City Pulpit. By The Rev. G. H. Morrison, M.A., Glasgow. New York, A. C. Armstrong and Son.

Here is a man with a message. He has something to say, and he says it in the most delightful English. There is nothing maudlin or mystic about his mind. He knows whereof he speaks.

And this clarity of mind is seen in his manner as well as in his method. I do not remember having read such pleasant English since rereading the *Essays of Elia* last year. His style is frank and clean. As a model he is worth some attention. There is a lightness and delicacy of touch here which we miss so sadly in modern sermon literature. He writes modern English; not anglicised Latin of the Middle Ages—M. A. English, so to speak. He never offends good taste. He is a real gentleman. I apprehend he secured his theology from the poets and not from the theologians of the day. The very selection of topics suggests this. Amongst them, are the following: "the homesickness of the soul," "the wonder and bloom of the world," "mistaken magnitudes," "the pagan duty of disdain," "near-cut's not God's," "the departing of the angel," "undeveloped lives," "after that the dark," "wasted gains," "the leisure of faith," "the glory and the gate," "a soul to let," "the prerequisites of vision," "the note of the heroic." I judge he knows the poets, not only from these topics nor from his delightful English, but from the general trend of his thought. He does not reason deeply but lightly; not ponderously, but simply. He gets at things by intuition; not so much by a long course of reasoning. He has great feelings on some subjects and of these he has told us in this volume. But I have failed to find in him the dominant note of modern theology—the note that vibrates whenever you read the masters of the modern mind. I do not know where he stands in the present transition, though I suspect he is not one of the advance guard. He is liberal. He pleases the ear, stirs the emotions, stimulates the mind; but fails to move the will. This may be because of the selection here published. Perhaps one ought not to strike such an authoritative tone when one knows only one volume of a man's writings. I confess this volume is all I know of the author. Withal I like him. He reminds me somewhat of Dr. Jefferson, of Broadway Tabernacle fame; but he does not wrestle with giants or demons, as does the latter. He is a Scotchman; you can tell it by his strict integrity, his simplicity, his occasional references to his fellow-countrymen; and also by such words as "dourly," "gaol," "claimant," "bairn," "kirk," et al. Nevertheless, here is good, clean stimulating reading for any one.

V. W. DIPPILL, PH.D.

THINGS FUNDAMENTAL. By Charles Edward Jefferson, Pastor of Broadway Tabernacle. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell and Co. Pages 372. Price, \$1.50, net.

The title of this book at once suggests a convenient way to make a preliminary test of its probable merits. One needs but to examine the table of contents to form an estimate of the qualifications of the author for the task which he has set for himself.

For in theology, perhaps even more than in most other sciences, an unflinching mark of sound and profound scholarship is the ability to distinguish clearly and unerringly between things incidental and things fundamental. Our author meets this test very well. Here is the list of things which he considers fundamental. "The Nature and Place of Faith in the Christian Life"; "The Nature and Place of Reason in the Christian Life"; "The Cause of the Present Uneasiness in the Christian Church"; "How the Old Conception of the Scriptures Differs from the New"; "The Deity of Jesus"; "The Miracles"; "Sin, and its Forgiveness"; "Sin, and its Punishment"; "The Church of the Living God"; "The Immortality of the Soul," and "The Person and Work of the Holy Spirit." Surely these are things fundamental; and in these days when so many intelligent people seem inclined to think and speak slightly of the Church it is worthy of notice that our author feels constrained to put the Church of the living God into his short list of things fundamental; and he was a teacher of chemistry and a student of law even before he was a preacher and a theologian.

The full title of the volume under consideration is "Things Fundamental: A Course of Thirteen Discourses in Modern Apologetics." The discourses were primarily prepared for and delivered in Dr. Jefferson's Broadway Tabernacle. This fact explains the method and style in which things fundamental are presented. The treatment is characterized by a frankness that inspires confidence and a thoroughness which enforces conviction. We have read somewhere of a scholar who "looked difficulties squarely in the face and then passed by on the other side." Not so our author. All the questions which harass the mind of those who think upon things fundamental are fairly stated and every difficulty is squarely met even though it may not in every case be fully overcome. By perfectly legitimate methods he reduces these difficulties to their lowest terms and then, contrasting the residuum with alternative propositions, he shows that the foundations of the faith are more satisfactory than any proposed substitutes and that they are as secure as ever. While Dr. Jefferson's treatment of these subjects is such as to steady the wavering it at the same time defines clearly where and how the superstructure of the faith is to be reared if it is to abide forever. While he is ready to meet all those who insist on proving—putting to the test—all things he does not fail to impress upon his readers the importance of holding fast that which is good.

It is well that an author who can write so instructively and convincingly on things fundamental can be not only interesting but even fascinating. The discourses are rich with a wealth of apt, popular illustrations which bring out very clearly the most profound truths and bring them easily within the comprehension of any reader of average intelligence. Pastors and teachers

should by all means read the book both for its style and for the truths which it presents. It will help them to deal successfully with the half-knowledge of a sceptical age.

We close this review with a few sentences from the chapter on "The Church of the Living God." Speaking of the world's great need of the Church at this time, the author says: "In an age when wealth is increasing in such amazing ways, when gold is piled in mountainous heaps which dazzle the eyes of those who have it not, and harden the hearts of those who have it, do we not need an institution which will keep on repeating the old story of the man who paid more attention to his barns than to his soul, and the thrilling parable of the man who had fine linen and a hard heart? In an age of machinery when the ear is filled with the thunder and roar of the turning wheels, and when men are so massed and so used that they tend to become mere contrivances in the colossal engine room of our modern civilization, do we not need an institution which shall keep crying, 'Souls! souls! souls!'

"And in an age when competition is so intense that it is furious, and when men in order to keep up with their ambitious rivals are tempted to overreach and to do the thing which is not right, and when the managers of corporations are tempted to use men as so many tools, picking them up and casting them off at their own good pleasure, sapping them of their strength and life and then throwing them aside as so many waste rags—do we not need an institution which shall force upon men's conscience the fact that every man is a child of God, and that the masters of this world have a Master in heaven?

"And in an age which everybody says is materialistic, whose atmosphere is darkened with dust and whose skies are blackened with clouds which keep out the light of the sun, do we not need an institution to remind us that God is in his heaven and still sits on his throne?

"And in an age when class hatreds are numerous and bitter, when one man misunderstands the other man and different classes seem to be drifting farther and farther apart, should we not be thankful that there is one institution which stands for human brotherhood, which endeavors to realize and to express the fraternal idea, an institution which says in tones that do not falter, 'One is your Master, and all ye are brethren.'

"And in a century when the nations are rivals in the great field of commerce, and when the equipment of war is being rapidly increased, and when one silly tongue wagging on either side of the sea can set a thousand silly tongues wagging on the other—is it not a great thing that there is one institution whose business it is to keep repeating the angels' song of peace on earth?"

W. F. MORE.

PIONEER MISSIONARIES OF THE CHURCH. By Rev. Charles C. Creegan, D.D. New York, Printed by the American Tract Society. 1 Vol. Pages 313. Price, \$1.25.

Pioneer life in any sphere is the most interesting form of human experience, because those who are noble and enthusiastic enough to make the sacrifices necessary to such a life must be unique characters. Sketches of such form of life are valuable to historical literature because they relate the motives and purposes of the pioneer in his inauguration of a new movement. They describe beginnings and first causes. The pioneer life of Christian missionaries is of special interest because of the unselfish aspiration manifested, and the intense devotion experienced, to the cause of humanity. Those who are willing to leave home, friends and comforts of civilization to adapt themselves to new and often undesirable forms of life, for the sake of the extension of their Master's Kingdom, show wonderful heroism. The author of "Pioneer Missionaries of the Church," therefore, contributes in his work to the list of heroes of human life. He makes the reader of his twenty-six sketches of the leading pioneers in the Christian missionary movements in various lands feel that he is reading of heroes. The sketches are brief, but full of facts, stated in a very readable form. He does not enter into the minutest details of the lives of his subjects, but he endeavors and succeeds largely to characterize each personality, so that the reader easily catches the spirit which actuated the life. For instance, in reading of Brainerd, the "Apostle to the North American Indians," or Martyn, "Missionary to India and Persia," or James Hudson Taylor, the founder of "China Inland Missions," and several others, we are impressed with an intense spirit of devotion in their lives, which immediately explains the incentive which moved them into their heroic work. In reading of Robert Morrison, the pioneer missionary to China, and Calvert, the pioneer to the Fiji Islands, we learn of their courage and fortitude as characteristic of their lives, and the noble endurance with which they pursued their labors is recognized to be the result of these virtues.

The book would serve a good and practical purpose in any library, but especially so in that of a minister by whom it could be used as a guide for a series of addresses to his Missionary Society which would be both spiritually edifying and instructive. The author wisely dedicates his work to the members of the Student Volunteer Movement in the institutions of the land, to whom it will undoubtedly be one of the many inspiring influences which lead young men into missionary enthusiasm.

W. STUART CRAMER.

THE DIRECT AND FUNDAMENTAL PROOFS OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION.
By Professor George William Knox, of Union Theological Seminary.
Published by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. Price \$1.20, net.

This book contains substantially a course of lectures delivered by the author "on the Nathaniel William Taylor foundation before the Divinity School of Yale University." The purpose of the work, the author tells us in the preface, is to answer the question: "Is the Christian religion true to men who accept the modern view of the world?" The book belongs to the sphere of Apologetics. The author places himself on the position that all theological questions and problems must be investigated and studied from the view-point of the world of the present day. "The direct and fundamental proofs" of religion are not the same in every age for the reason that the world as a whole is viewed, apprehended and understood differently in different periods of the world's life. The proofs of the Christian religion which once were regarded as sufficient may carry but little force with them for the minds and hearts of men of a later age. Professor Knox seeks to set forth in the chapters of this book the proofs that meet the demands of the present day. The work is divided into nine chapters, as follows: I. The Classic Argument; II. The Modern View of the World; III. Reality and Proof; IV. Religion: Its Definition, Development, Varieties, Conflicts and Proofs; V. The Conflict of Religions, an Instance; VI. The Christian Religion; VII. Christianity as Ethics: Its Conflict and Proof; VIII. Christianity as Religion: Its Conflict and Proof; IX. Christianity, the Absolute Religion.

The titles of these chapters indicate in a general way the scope of the work; but to gain a knowledge of the line of argument pursued by the author the book itself must be read. In the first chapter the classic argument in favor of the Christian religion is given. According to it "the direct and fundamental proof" is found in miracles. This proof was sufficient and efficient in its day; it met its opponents on their own ground. But the modern view of the world is broader and of a different character from that formerly held. The Christian religion must be viewed and defended from the modern standpoint. The author bases himself on certain indisputable facts. These facts are, first, that man is a religious being; second, the history of the Christian religion, and third, the experience of men who practice "the presence of God." These and other collateral facts exist and must be accounted for. Nothing has accomplished as much good for the individual person and for organized society as Christianity. When we compare the civilization of the nations where the Christian religion prevails predominantly with the civilization of nations not influenced by Christianity the great

superiority of the former becomes at once evident. If the Christian religion were false, then falsehood and delusion would be productive of more good than truth and reality. No thoughtful person could believe such a proposition. The nature and accomplishments of the Christian religion constitute its proof.

"O taste and see that the Lord is good" says the psalmist. The man who accepts the Christian religion finds that it satisfies his soul. It is the source of inspiration, comfort, peace and rest for him. This has been the experience, not only of one person, but of thousands and millions of men and women. When a hundred men with a proper sense of color declare an object to be green we accept that fact as fully established. It is not possible that all could be mistaken. When a large body of men who are sane, intelligent and fully self-conscious tell us that they have discovered by experience that the Christian religion is a reality that has satisfied the deepest cravings of their spiritual nature we must accept their evidence as a sufficient proof in favor of Christianity. The fact of the Christian religion as a living power in the history of the world and the fact that a large number of persons have this common experience furnish proofs of Christianity that cannot be denied or set aside.

In harmony with many other theologians, Professor Knox holds that the miracles do not prove Christ, but that Christ proves the miracles. The person, spirit, character, teaching and life of Christ constitute a fact that no one can set aside and is a fundamental proof of the miracles. In like manner the Christian religion in the life of the individual and as a living force in society affecting every human interest and relation is a fact that cannot be gainsaid and constitutes a sufficient proof for all that it claims for itself. Christianity furnishes an order of objective realities as fully and clearly established as are those which constitute the basis of botany or any other science.

The pages of this book are full of suggestive and inspiring thoughts and ministers and theological students will be well repaid by reading and studying them. Chapter VI. we regard as very fine, though some of the author's positions are perhaps one-sided and some statements too liberal. Undue emphasis is perhaps placed on religion as a service rendered to fellowman rather than unto God, and too much latitude is given to his thoughts when the author implies clearly that a man may live the life of Christian service though not a member of the Church, and perhaps a heathen. We do not believe that anyone can be a Christian in the real and full sense or be able to practice the Christian religion unless he be a member of the Church. This book can be heartily recommended to all persons who are interested in the live theological questions of the day. We close this notice

with the author's statement on page 118, "The direct and fundamental proofs of Christianity are that it satisfies our religious needs, and that it may be embodied in all the varied activities of men."

A. E. TRUXAL.

THE STUDENT'S OLD TESTAMENT, *Logically and Chronologically Arranged and Translated*, by Charles Foster Kent, Ph.D. Volume I: NARRATIVES OF THE BEGINNINGS OF HEBREW HISTORY *from the Creation to the Establishment of the Hebrew Kingdom*. With maps and chronological chart. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904. Pp. xi + 382. Price, \$2.75.

This is the first volume of a series of six designed to cover the whole Old Testament and the Apocryphal books. The second volume will comprise *Historical and Biographical Narratives*; the third, *Prophetic Sermons, Epistles and Apocalypses*; the fourth, *Laws and Traditional Precedents*; the fifth, *Songs, Psalms and Prayers*; and the sixth, *Proverbs and Didactic Poems*. It is not our purpose at this time to review the volume which has already appeared (for this we have no space), but rather to set forth the general plan according to which the entire work will be constructed. It is a unique plan, skillfully devised and, in this volume, skillfully wrought out.

The Old Testament is not one book, but a whole library of books, the product of not less than ten centuries and of scores of inspired prophets, priests and sages, who lived far apart in time, wrote on a large variety of subjects, and occupied widely differing points of view. In our English version, which follows the Septuagint in this regard, the books of the Old Testament are arranged logically, according to the subject-matter, in three divisions,—the historical, the poetic and the prophetic books. In the Hebrew Bible the division is also three-fold,—the Law, the Prophets and the Hagiographa, but the arrangement is not logical, nor yet chronological as regards the books themselves in relation to one another, or as regards the various materials they contain. Take the Law, that is, the first five books of the Old Testament, for example, and you will find prophetic and priestly traditions, ancient songs, ethnological tables, patriarchal stories, genealogical lists, prophetic exhortations, laws, judicial precedents, historical narratives confusedly mingled together. This lack of systematic classification, so characteristic of the Semitic mind, is extremely perplexing to the modern English reader. "Maxims, practical observations, prayers, and hymns, on the greatest variety of themes, and written from many points of view, follow each other in close succession, so that one idea is no sooner fixed than it is displaced by another entirely different. The inevitable result is that no complete and definite conception is gained regarding the teaching either of the book or of the Old Testament concerning any one of the subjects treated."

The first important step, then, for the study of the Old Testament is a systematic logical and chronological classification of its contents. The material must be grouped according to its nature, whether historical, prophetic, legal or poetic. When this has been done, the material of each group must be arranged in the approximate order in which it was written. This has been rendered possible by the labors of many hundreds of earnest critical scholars who have during the last two centuries been grappling with the intricate problems of the Old Testament. Their conclusions, embodied in a very extensive literature inaccessible to the ordinary reader, are here collected, tested and sifted by Professor Kent, and now given to the public in a compact, yet very clear form.

Moreover, besides thus classifying the contents of the Old Testament according to their nature and date, another new and important feature of this work is the comparative presentation of the original sources of the Old Testament. Where there are different versions of the same narrative, or where two or more have been interwoven, as not unfrequently in the historical books, these various versions are here for the first time printed throughout in parallel columns, so that they can be readily studied in approximately their original form. And that, too, in a translation of the Hebrew into modern English which will represent not merely the words, but also the ideas, the spirit, and the beauty of the original. The text throughout is subjected to a clear literary analysis which enables the reader to trace the logical thought, and the relation of the different parts to each other and to the whole. Each volume will have its special introduction, and each section will be illuminated by footnotes of a critical, geographical and archaeological character. It is the work of sane, careful scholarship and of a reverent constructive spirit. It has been prepared not for specialists, but for Bible students generally, and is designed to meet not theoretical, but practical needs. We heartily commend it to all who wish to acquire a clear insight into, and a true knowledge of, the Old Testament. Single volumes can be had for \$2.75 (postage, 15 cents), or by advance subscribers the complete set of six volumes for \$13.50, payable in instalments on the publication of each volume, plus 15 cents postage.

F. A. GAST.